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Chapter 1
Introduction
The removal of discrimination between women and men in the workplace,
in order to open up equality of opportunity in employment, is a measure
of social policy regarded as desirable by makers of law and policy in
Western liberal democracies, including the four legal systems examined in
the present study. Legislative provisions with the specific purpose of
removal of sex discrimination in employment have been in place in those
legal systems for a number of years: since the 1960s, in the case of the
United States of America (Civil Rights Act 1964), since the 1970s, in the
case of the United Kingdom (Equal Pay Act 1970), since the 1980s, in the
case of the Federal Republic of Germany (EG-Anpassungsgesetz 1980) and,
in the case of the European Community, since its foundation in 1957
(Treaty of Rome, Article 119).
Now that comprehensive legislation with the purpose of removal of sex
discrimination in employment is in place, in the four legal systems
examined, attention should be focused on the effectiveness of the
legislation and on proposals for its continued improvement. The
effectiveness of a particular aspect of the general legislative provisions
concerning sex discrimination in employment is the focus of the present
study. The issue with which the study is concerned is that of exceptions
to the rule of non-discrimination, or 'justifications' for discriminatory
behaviour in the employment sphere. It is common ground that any
statement of general principle (including the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of sex) will be subject to exceptions. The
exceptions form the subject of the present study. Exceptions to a
general principle should be applied in such a way as to avoid
undermining the core principle. The study seeks to explore qualifications
to the general principle of non-discrimination in employment, and to refine
those qualifications, so as to protect the application of the general
principle.
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Exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination in employment may be
found in the legislation itself. However, most of the elucidation of factors
relevant to an inquiry into justification for discrimination is found in case
law, in the reasoning of the judiciary and amid curiae, as legislative
measures are interpreted and applied. Therefore the study is firmly
focused on case law.
I chose to focus on justifications for sex discrimination in employment for
two main reasons. The first is simply that the issue is one relatively new
to the judiciary and therefore that the law is still very much in the
process of development. This is particularly so in the case of the law of
the European Community. The second reason is more specific: my
particular concern is the development and application of rules governing
justification for sex discrimination in employment in European Community
law. The leading case in the jurisprudence of the European Court (Bilka-
Kaufhaus v Weber von Hartz), which lays down general provisions
concerning the standard of justification required to defend a claim of sex
discrimination, leaves much open to further interpretation, and may not
be appropriate for all cases in which the question of justification for
discrimination arises.
With European Community law the focus of the study, I adopted a
comparative methodology, on the grounds that this would at least give
insights into possible approaches to the issue of justification, and at best
might present a model solution. I chose to examine the law of the United
States of America because legislative provisions concerned with non-
discrimination in employment have been in place in that legal system for
a relatively long time. The law of the United Kingdom was chosen partly
because of ease of access, but also because many of the cases reaching
the European Court on the issue of sex discrimination in employment
originated in the UK. The latter reason was also the rationale behind the
choice of the Federal Republic of Germany; indeed, the leading case on
justification for discrimination in European Community law was referred
to the European Court by the German Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal
Employment Court). German law also provided the contrast of a civil, as
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opposed to common law, legal system. The methodology of the study is
explored in more detail in Chapter 2.
The scope of the study includes all issues directly relevant to lawful
justification for sex discrimination in employment. Relevant issues include
not only identification and examination of the many different substantive
grounds for justification, but also the standard by which justifications
are tested. The scope of the study includes examination of justifications
for 'direct' and 'indirect' discrimination, discrimination in pay and in
treatment, and 'negative' and 'positive' discrimination. These concepts are
explained in detail in Parts II and III.
While I recognise that other factors, such as remedies for breach of non-
discrimination rules, the practical effect of the legislation, and the
attitudes of employers to women employees (or male employees in
traditionally 'female' employment), will affect the way the test for
justification is applied, it should be made clear here that examination of
such factors is beyond the scope of this study.
The aims of the study are two-fold. First, I propose to examine, compare
and evaluate rules concerned with justifications for discrimination in four
different legal systems, by reference to the 'functionality' of those rules.
This means that the measures are evaluated in the light of the purpose
or em of sex discrimination law in general. It is sufficient to note here
that my position is that the purpose of sex discrimination law in the
employment sphere should be the promotion of 'equality of opportunity'
for women and men. The concept of 'functionality' and my position on the
aim of sex discrimination law are explained in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.
Second, I em to utilise the exploration of the material in order to
recommend specific ways in which the law of the European Community
could be developed, to promote equality of opportunity in that legal
system.
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The study is divided into three parts. In Part I (Chapters 2 and 3) the
methodology of the study and its theory basis are explained. In Part II
(Chapters 4 - 7), for each legal system in turn, a detailed description of
the relevant legislative measures, and their judicial interpretation, is
undertaken. Part III (Chapters 8 and 9) is analytical; there I have
sought to evaluate the detailed rules of each legal system by comparing
the different approaches, with reference to the concept of equality of
opportunity.
PART I
Methodology and Theory
Chapter 2
Methodology
1 Theories of Comparative law
This thesis uses comparative law as the basis of its methodology. As
there is no universally accepted meaning of the term 'comparative law',
it is pertinent to undertake at this stage an exploration of some of the
salient theories concerning the nature of 'comparative law' and 'the
comparative law method', and the claims made for comparative law by
these theories.
Some theorists reject the term 'comparative' as a description of a study
such as the present thesis. For example, Alan Watson' asserts that
comparative law is the study of the relationship of one legal system and
its rules to another. The proper task of the comparative lawyer is the
examination of either the reception of legal rules by one legal system from
another, or the imposition of legal rules on one legal system by another.
The movement of Roman law or canon law through Europe or the
imposition of the Code Napoleron, for example, are proper subjects of
study. Here, comparative law is concerned with historical analysis; it
seeks to elucidate something about the nature of law, or the nature of
legal development. According to Watson, the comparison of individual
rules or branches of law is not 'comparative law'.
Other writers recognise that the term 'comparative law' may be used to
refer to various different types of study. Hugh Collins 2, for example,
begins from this premise. Comparative law has various methods and aims:
four of these are as follows.
Firstly, comparative law may be used and has been used to search for a
natural law of contracts or obligations: or, more broadly, for the
unification of private law. Secondly, comparative law may shed light on
forces and mechanisms which cause changes in legal systems and
societies. Thirdly, comparative law may be used to seek the best
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solutions to legal problems; and may use 'legal transplants' to implement
these solutions. Finally, comparative law may be used with the objective
of better understanding one's own domestic legal system. Of these four,
the third and fourth are of the most immediate relevance in this work3.
Yet other writers on the nature of comparative law focus on the assertion
that comparative law is a method. These writers include Rudolf B.
Schlesinger, who suggests that the comparative method may be applied
to problems of domestic law either by using a foreign system as a model,
for example in judicial decisions, where arguments from other legal
systems may be regarded as persuasive; or by using a foreign system as
a basis of contrast, or to provide perspective; that is to say, in
particular as a starting point for critical analysis of existing domestic
rules, for example, to carry out statutory law reform.
H. C. Gutteridge3, distinguishes between what is termed 'descriptive
comparative law' and 'applied comparative law'. The former merely
provides a description of variations between the laws of two or more
countries, and does not aim to solve any problem, either abstract or
practical. 'Applied comparative law' is,
'the use of the comparative method with a definite aim in view,
other than that of obtaining information as to foreign law. The aim
in question need not be of a practical nature: it may, for instance,
take the form of a comparison carried out either to enable the legal
philosopher to construct abstract theories of law, or in order to
assist the historian in traping the origins and evolutions of legal
concepts and institutions.'u
Gutteridge goes on to say;
'The comparison must be based on a careful and accurate analysis
of the foreign laws under investigation, but its most important
aspect is the construction of a synthesis, founded on the results
of the analytical process, which is intended to elucidate some
problem either of an abstract or utilitarian character.'
The comparative lawyer is required to create a 'synthesis' by which to
contextualize the detailed analysis of the approaches of different legal
systems to a particular legal problem. The creation of this 'synthesis' is
a central part of the comparative law method. The method of creating
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such a 'synthesis' is addressed in detail in the work of Konrad Zweigert
and Hein Kiitz8 .
Zweigert and Utz, having asserted that comparative law is a process,
give a detailed account of how this process may be carried out. It is
this description of the comparative law method which has had the most
formative influence on the present thesis. The method envisaged by
Zweigert and Klitz will therefore be described in some detail in the
following.
The comparative lawyer begins with an 'idea'; a question or hypothesis
about how the law addresses or should address a particular social
problem; and gathers the relevant material in terms of rules and legal
principles. The 'idea' and the material may interact, leading to an
increasingly precise formulation of the question which the comparative
lawyer wishes to address.
The guiding principle when gathering material is that of 'functionality',
that is to say, the determination of the function of the law or rule or
other legal institution in question. This establishes which laws, rules or
legal institutions will be the subject of comparison. According to Zweigert
and Utz, the problem that the law is trying to address must be stated
in purely functional terms. Functionality is central to the theory of
Zweigert and Utz: it is, in fact, the 'synthesis' by which the comparative
lawyer seeks to organise the material, and to address the original
question posed by the comparative lawyer. Because functionality is so
central to the present work, a detailed explanation of that concept as it
relates to justification of sex discrimination in employment will be
necessary: this exploration will be carried out in the following chapter.
The comparative lawyer's next step is to make a choice among legal
systems, and to decide which of these will be compared.
The comparative lawyer reports on the material descriptively, by detailing
the operation of laws, rules or legal institutions in the different legal
systems chosen. Following this, the actual comparison is carried out; in
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a way designed to bring out differences and similarities between the rules
and their operation. The different solutions must be freed from their own
context and set in the context of all the solutions. The tool for such a
process is functionality: solutions are seen in light of their function, as
an attempt to satisfy a particular legal need.
Zweigert and laitz suggest that to do this a comparative lawyer needs to
'build a system'. The aim of the 'system' is to identify the demands that
a particular 'slice of life' poses for the law in all systems where social
and economic conditions are similar, and provide a realistic context within
which to compare and contrast the various solutions. Such a system
needs to be flexible, will give the impression of being a rather loose
structure, and is bound to have 'large concepts' to embrace the legal
institutions which are comparable.
Finally the comparative lawyer makes a critical evaluation of what has
been discovered by the comparisons made. The evaluation may focus on
the superiority of any one particular solution, or the equal validity of all
solutions. The critical evaluation should be carried out explicitly.
2 The issue of transferability
If the 'critical evaluation' at the last stage of Zweigert and Kiitz's method
is to be of any practical use; in particular, if it could be used in the
process of law reform, this entails certain presuppositions about the
nature of legal rules, and their 'transferability'. Should the solution (to
a social or legal problem under examination) of a foreign legal system be
superior to one's own, one would hope to transfer or transplant the
foreign solution into one's own legal system.
Zweigert and Ktitz's theory presupposes that foreign legal solutions are
transferable, at least in some situations, in particular where social and
economic conditions are similar. Coffins' theory that the comparative legal
method may be used to seek the best solutions to legal problems, and use
legal transplants to implement these solutions, rests on a similar
assumption.
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It is neither generally accepted, nor is it empirically demonstrable, that
legal rules, norms or institutions are transferable in the way that the
above cited comparative lawyers claim. The transferability of legal norms
is a matter of controversy. This question is addressed in what is
generally recognised as one of the classic pieces of writing on
comparative law; Sir Otto Kahn-Freund's 'On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative law% 9
 Kahn-Freund asks whether legal institutions are more
like kidneys or like carburettors. Does it make sense to talk of the
rejection of a transplanted norm, as one would in the case of a kidney
transplant, or would the case of a transplanted legal norm be more
analogous to the fitting of a new carburettor in a car? In fact, as is
asserted by Kahn-Freund, it is obvious that legal norms, as a class, are
comparable neither to kidneys nor to carburettors. However, it can be
agreed that there are degrees of transferability. According to Kahn-
Freund, the degree of transferability of a legal norm depends on factors
present in the country concerned, which link the law closely to its
environment, so that legal norms from elsewhere cannot be transplanted
into the system. The factors may be geographical (climate, size or
geographical position of the country), sociological, economic (wealth of the
people, population density, main economic activities) or cultural (religion,
customs), but, argues Kahn-Freund, political factors will be of the
greatest importance.
'Anyone contemplating the use of foreign legislation for law making
in his country must ask himself: how far does this rule or
institution owe its existence or its continued existence to a
distribution of power in the foreign country which we do not
share?'
Watson10
 is critical of the idea that a successful legal transplant depends
on a detailed knowledge of the foreign political context and power
structure. Using the examples of reception of Roman law by Germanic
tribes, with diverse political circumstances, in the 5th century, and of the
reception of the French penal code and German law of contract and
property by Japan, Watson argues that the link of the legal institution
to its environment may not always be significant.
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'When a law of general application is passed in a particular
jurisdiction, eg England and Wales, it is meant to apply both to
London and remote districts of Wales; to the very rich and the
very poor. Hence it ought to cope with very different
environmental factors. Within the range of its application, climatic
conditions, fertility of the soil, the life led by the people, their
wealth, density, trade and so on may vary greatly. Hence such a
general statute may in many cases not be very closely tied to any
one particular kinA,of environment, and thus will be transplantable
with greater ease.'"
As Eric Stein 12 explains, the difference in approach between Kahn-Freund
and Watson can be better understood by reference to their respective
viewpoints. For Watson, whose view is historical and 'macrolegal', 'the
transplanting of legal norms is socially easy ... even when the rules come
from a very different kind of system' 13. For Kahn-Freund, whose view
is social-legal and 'rnicrolegar, 'transferability stands in inverse relation
to the closeness of the local institution to its habitat' 14. As the present
study is conducted at the 'rnicrolegar level, the reservations expressed
by Kahn-Freund must be taken seriously.
According to Collins15, criticisms of direct legal transplants fall into two
categories. The first type of criticism is that direct legal transplants are
inappropriate because of significantly different social and economic
structures of two societies. As an example of this, Kahn-Freund uses the
attempted transplantation of the Industrial Relations Act from the legal
system of the USA to that of the UK. The attempt was unsuccessful on
account of differences in social structure, historical development and
prevailing social norms between the two countries, in spite of the fact
that both are 'industrialised Western nations'. The second type of
criticism focuses on the assertion that legal concepts fit into clusters of
concepts that comprise a consistent set. One cannot transplant a single
foreign concept into domestic law without undermining the conceptual
coherence of the recipient legal system.
Collins is critical of these arguments on the grounds that they express
extremes. 'These two criticisms of the positivist and utilitarian approach
to comparative law can be exaggerated. Sensitive transplants of rules
and techniques should be possible.'16
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My study rests on an assumption that legal rules concerning
discrimination in employment are, at least to some extent, transferable
between those legal systems which are examined. All of these legal
systems are termed Western democracies, with free market economies. All
regulate the employment contract by legislation, and do not leave
development of the employment relationship entirely up to market forces.
All have some sort of commitment to anti-discrimination legislation in the
employment sphere. The existence and influence of different power
groups ('political factors' in Kahn-Freund's theory) - for example trade
unions, women's groups, Commissions for Equal Opportunities - although,
of course, varying to an extent between the different legal systems under
analysis, are assumed to be sufficiently similar to make comparison
realistic in the sense envisaged by Zweigert and Ktitz.
3 The process of comparison
Use of the comparative method involves the comparison of selected aspects
of two or more different legal systems. The material presented for
comparison may cover a very broad area, for example law regulating
property ownership, or may focus on a relatively narrow topic, as is the
case in the present study. If critical evaluation is to lead to proposals
for law reform or development of the law in a particular legal system in
a certain way, the area of law examined must be transferable to the.
necessary extent.
3.1 Separate legal systems
The requirement that 'two or more legal systems' be compared raises a
question as to what exactly constitutes a 'legal system'. While an
ontological or metaphysical examination of legal systems is outwith the
scope of the present study, some indication, at least in the form of a
working definition, should be given of what is to be accepted as
constituting a legal system.
A neat, all-embracing definition of 'a legal system' is not particularly
helpful in this context: an indication of the factors which are common to
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most legal systems is probably more useful. Legal systems are composed
of legal norms, principles and concepts. In general, a legal system will
be co-extensive with a political system, usually that of a nation. The
legal systems of modern nation states have, in general, a body or bodies
which make and enforce laws, and resolve legal disputes: these are known
as the legislature, executive and judiciary respectively. The legal system
will define autonomously the subjects to whom its laws are applicable.
The legal systems examined by the present study are the legal system of
the United Kingdom (UK) (comprised of the law of England and Wales, and
Scots law17 ; in the area of discrimination in employment the laws of these
two legal systems are identical), the legal systems of the United States
of America (US) and the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany), and
European Community (EC) Law. There can be little difficulty with the
recognition of the first three systems as 'legal systems'. There may,
however, be some difficulty with the assertion that EC law exists as a
legal system independent of and separate from the legal systems of the
Member States of the European Community.
The EC is made up of twelve Member States, each with its own legal
system. The subjects of Community law (individual European citizens,
European companies) are also subjects of the law of the relevant
individual Member State: it is not possible to identify them as subjects
of Community law alone. Furthermore the EC legislature is characterised
by a concentration of power in the European Council, which is made up
of non-independent representatives of the governments of Member States.
The doctrine of direct effect provides that those provisions of EC law
which are directly effective (that is, Treaty provisions and provisions of
Regulations, and provisions of Directives in more restricted circumstances,
provided they are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional) become
part of the law of the Member States; in the sense that those provisions
are applicable by individual nationals of a Member State, before the
national judiciaries. The doctrine of indirect effect, established in von
Colson18, provides that, in certain circumstances, where a provision of
Community law is not directly effective, national courts have a duty to
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construe national law in such a way as to give effect to EC law. The
doctrine of indirect effect applies where a provision is not directly
effective; because of this, it is particularly appropriate in the case of EC
legislation brought into effect by Directive, which has been inadequately
implemented in national law. The application of these two doctrines19
means that Community law becomes, from the point of view of the
individual seeking redress, part of the law of that individual's own legal
system, in the sense that rights and duties originating in Community
provisions are enforceable in national courts. Most enforcement and
implementation of EC law is carried out by executive or judicial bodies of
the Member States, in particular, by national courts.
However, it is not unreasonable to regard EC law as a separate system.
Of particular significance here is the establishment by the Treaty of Rome
(as amended) of institutions of the EC (Council and Commission, with
Parliament) with power to pass legislation for the EC in matters of
Community law. Various provisions of the Treaty of Rome empower these
institutions to legislate for the Community, not least Article 235, which
provides that if action by the Community should prove necessary to attain
one of the objectives of the Community and there exist no relevant
enabling measures elsewhere in the Treaty, the institutions shall take the
appropriate measures. This body of legislation is identifiable as
'Community law', and the separate institutions and legislative process
indicate separation from the legislation of the Member States.
Most EC law concerning sex discrimination in employment (with the notable
exception of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome) is enacted in the form of
Directives. A Directive is binding upon the Member State as to the result
to be achieved, but leaves Member States a choice in the form and method
of implementation. 2° In the area with which the present study is
concerned, most EC legislation is found in Directives. Therefore the EC
law (embodied in a particular Directive, for example, the Equal Treatment
Directive21 ) is separate, and may in fact be different in effect, from the
national implementing measure. This is a further indication that it is
appropriate to compare the Community provisions with the national
provisions of Member States, such as the UK and Germany.
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Furthermore the European Court of Justice has been created as a EC
institution with judicial authority: judgments of the European Court have
done much to develop EC law, and the existence of this body of case law
further indicates the existence of a separate legal system. The Court has
the final competence in matters of interpretation of EC law; a competence
it has jealously guarded in order to ensure uniformity of application of
EC law, which is regarded as central to the successful achievement of the
aims of the Treaty of Rome. While the doctrines of direct and indirect
effect suggest the interdependence of EC law and the national legal
systems of the Member States, they do not preclude the separate
existence of EC law. In fact, it could be argued that the doctrines of
direct and indirect effect are evidence that EC law has a separate
existence from the legal systems of Member States, since these doctrines
govern situations where there is a clash in provisions of two different
systems. Finally Article 210 provides that the Community shall have legal
personality. This establishes the EC as a legal entity in international law
separate from the Member States which make up the Community.
It may not be possible to establish that EC law is 'independent' from the
laws and legal systems of the Member States. However one may posit that
EC law is 'separate' - or at least that this separation is sufficient for the
purpose of meaningful comparison of EC law with the laws of individual
Member States. The laws of the Member States run alongside the EC
provisions where EC law is enacted by Directive. Comparison is
particularly applicable to an aspect of law such as sex discrimination in
employment, for two reasons. The first of these is that the development
of EC rules in the area of sex discrimination in employment is incomplete,
so where there are lacunae in EC law, either through lack of legislation,
or simply because the European Court has not ruled on a point of
interpretation, national law applies. The second reason relates to the fact
that EC law on sex discrimination is mainly found in Directives, which
require implementation by the legislature of the Member States. The
reception into national law of the provisions in those Directives may often
be incomplete (evidenced by case law, in particular in those cases where
the Commission challenges implementation of EC law by a Member State,
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under Article 169 of the Treaty of Rome 22 ), in which case the national law
runs parallel to (but is not identical to) the Community provision.
3.2 Choice of topic for comparison
The topic chosen for comparison in the present study is the development
of rules of employment law justifying non-application of the general
principle of equal treatment of women and men in employment. This is a
narrow topic; it could even be described as focusing on a single legal
concept. To pursue a topic in comparative law on this scale is recognised
by some comparative lawyers as a valid use of the comparative method.23
The legal norms regulating the comparative topic examined are legislative
and judicial in nature. However, since the issue of justification for sex
discrimination is largely a matter of judicial interpretation, the study is
focused on case law. A comparison of case law can be a useful exercise
in the utilisation of the comparative method for the purpose of suggesting
improvements for a particular legal system. For example, Basil
Markesinis 24 uses comparison of case law to show that this process can
'yield, at the very least, positive insights and, at best, a model solution.'
M.
3.3 The 'transferability' of employment law
Gutteridge is among those who accept that the comparative method may .
be used to examine topics in the area of employment law. As he points
out,
'Labour law is one of the fields in which the comparative process
of research has been most frequently employed. In countries of a
western type of civilisation, the problems which have presented
themselves for solution are very similar in kind, and this had
resulted in a movement on an international scale with the aim of
removing certain injustices which were believed to be incidental to
the development of modern industrial life.
'The necessity and value of such research depends on two
considerations. In the first place a country cannot fail to benefit
by the experience of other countries in dealing with labour
problems; secondly, in the international sphere, it is essential that
the same standard should, so far as is possible, be reached by
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legislation everywhere or, otherwise, the more advanced countries
may be handicapped in competition for international trade.'
For this type of research to have a practical value, it must be accepted
that the results can be used, through the transplant of legal norms from
one system to another, by individuals or institutions concerned with law
reform.
4 Aims of the thesis
Comparative legal studies are, it has been argued, valid as an intellectual
exercise without a particular utilitarian purpose or practical end. Rodolfo
Sacco26 is critical of those who seek to validate the exercise of the
comparative method only by its practical results:
'Those who compare legal systems are always asked about the
purpose of such comparisons. The idea seems to be that the study
of foreign legal systems is a legitimate enterpRrise only if it results
in proposals for the reform of domestic law.'"
'Comparative law is like otper sciences in that its aim must be the
acquisition of knowledge.'"
While this is not denied, it should not be forgotten that comparative law
may also have practical aims.29
Comparative law may be used to seek the best solutions to specific legal
problems; and may use 'legal transplants' to implement these solutions.
Comparative law may be used with the objective of developing a better
understanding of one's own domestic legal system.3° The success of the
former aim requires acceptance that the legal rules of the topic chosen
for comparison are transferable, at least to some extent. Since this may
be disputed, the use of the comparative method as a means of gaining
insight into one's domestic system is an additional aim of the present
study.
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4.1 Improved understanding of one's domestic system
Even if it were shown that the legal rules for justification of sex
discrimination developed, for example, in the US, are not transferable to
the EC, this would not completely invalidate the present study. Although
this is not my position, it would be possible to argue that the different
roots of the anti-discrimination legislation in the legal systems compared,
attributable to different influences ('political factors'), make
transplantation of the rules impossible. Much of the anti-discrimination
legislation in the US was born of the Civil Rights movement and
originated in resistance to racial discrimination. Discrimination on the
grounds of sex was added to the original Civil Rights Bill as an
amendment while the Bill was passing through the legislative process.
The presence of Article 119 (equal pay for equal work for women and
men) in the Treaty of Rome is attributable largely to a desire, on the part
of those Member States which had already developed rules on equal pay
for women and men, to prevent unfair competition from those Member
States which had not. It was feared that, by using cheap female labour,
these Member States could gain a competitive advantage, which would be
contrary to the aims of the Treaty. The principal legislative measure
concerning discrimination between women and men in employment in
Germany31, the EG-Anpassungsgesetz, was passed, as its title suggests,
to comply with Germany's obligations as a Member State of the European.
Community. The UK government's White Paper, Equality for Women32, the
precursor to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, which draws parallels with
racial discrimination33, suggests that the roots of the British legislation
are similar to those of the US legislation. However, the UK legislation is
also similar to German legislation, in that it too is rooted in the
international obligations of the UK, including the UK's obligations as a
Member State of the European Community34. 	 .
Even if transplantation of rules on sex discrimination in employment were
to be considered unrealistic (a proposition with which I disagree), the
present study could still be used in accordance with Collins' fourth idea
of the nature of comparative law: that is to say, detailed analysis of the
rules of foreign legal systems gives an insight which can be used to
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develop a better understanding of one's own domestic system. Collins
envisages the identification of an aspect of domestic law apparently
meriting close examination, for example on the grounds that it seems
confused or is in the process of development. Judicial interpretation of
the justification for discrimination between women and men in employment
in EC law is one such area. It is therefore important to examine and
evaluate the legal doctrines by which other legal systems tackle this
issue. By these means, the domestic legal system is re-evaluated in the
light of the foreign experience. The insight into foreign law gives one
a clearer perspective on one's own legal system. In the present study,
that system is European Community law.
4.2 Evaluation using the functionality principle
The main aim of the thesis is to evaluate the rules and principles related
to justification for sex discrimination in employment in the four legal
systems studied. The principle of 'functionality' proposed by Zweigert
and K8tz is adapted and used as the basis for this evaluation.
'Functionality' serves as a useful analytical tool, especially in an evolving
system, such as that of the European Community.
Before evaluation can be undertaken, a theory of the purpose of anti-
discrimination law in employment must be developed. The general theory
will subsequently inform a functional evaluation of rules justifying
unequal treatment of women and men in the employment sphere. Once a
purpose is posited for anti-discrimination law in employment, the rules,
principles and other legal institutions of the four legal systems may be
compared, and evaluated with respect to their degree of success in
contributing to the purpose stipulated. My view is that the provisions
compared in the present study, that is, rules, principles and approaches
to justifications for sex discrimination in employment, are transferable, at
least to a sufficient degree, between the legal systems concerned. If it
may be accepted that the 'successful' rules are transferable to the
European Community, the results of the critical comparison may be
accepted as forming the basis of a recommendation for the further
development of EC law.
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In chapters 4-7 below, the relevant provisions of law in the four legal
systems which are the subject of the present study are explained and
examined in some detail. Chapters 8 and 9 contain the comparison and
evaluation envisaged by Zweigert and Klitz. But first the concept of
'functionality' is to be explored, in the specific context of the law
regulating sex discrimination in the employment sphere. The exploration
is undertaken in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Position
1 The concept of 'functionality'
The key to the comparative law process, as described by Zweigert and
laitz, is use of the concept of 'functionality'. Functionality as a tool for
the comparative lawyer comes into play at two stages of the comparative
process; that of collection of the material for comparison and that of
providing a 'synthesis' or context in which the approaches of different
legal systems to the problem or issue concerned may be compared and
evaluated. The use of the functionality principle in each of these stages
is explored in the current chapter. The first part of the chapter is
concerned with a fairly brief explanation of the choice of material
included in the present study, and the second part of the chapter is
concerned with a more lengthy examination of how an understanding of
the aim or purpose of anti-discrimination law will be used to carry out
the comparative part of the thesis, allowing evaluation of rules intended
for justifying discrimination.
2 Materials compared in the study
Zweigert and Utz envisage that the comparative lawyer begins with an
'idea', that is, a question or a hypothesis, and material: the idea and the
material interact. The 'idea' with which the present study began was that
the rules relating to justification for sex discrimination in employment and
other areas of social policy, developing in European Community law, would
merit some detailed scrutiny. The 'question' relates to the legal
justification of sex discrimination in the employment sphere. If employers
seek to justify discriminatory practices, given that not all behaviour of
employers with discriminatory intent or effect will be considered unlawful,
what does the law regard as an 'acceptable' justification for
discriminatory behaviour?
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The issue of justification for sex discrimination in employment becomes
increasingly pertinent as the general principle of non-discrimination
between women and men in the employment field becomes the accepted
norm in Western societies, including the European Community. In certain
circumstances, deviation from that principle is regarded as legally
justified and acceptable. There are some occupational activities from
which women (or men) can be legally excluded; in these circumstances
'direct discrimination' is justified. For example, a woman (or a man) actor
may be required for reasons of authenticity to play a particular part in
a play. Furthermore, some policies which have an effect of discriminating
against women are lawful; in these circumstances, 'indirect discrimination',
or, as it is termed in the US 'adverse impact' discrimination, may be
justified. A recruitment policy of a building firm which requires the
ability to lift a certain weight could have the effect of discriminating
against women, as fewer women than men could fulfil the requirement.
If the ability to lift heavy weights was an essential requirement for the
duties of the job, the requirement would be lawful.
The problem to be addressed, stated in functional terms, to enable the
collection of material, may be formulated as follows. How does a legal
system, wishing to outlaw sex discrimination in the employment sphere,
provide for instances where an allocative decision, while being
discriminatory, is justified in the circumstances concerned?
Material has been gathered from the law of the EC, the UK, the US and
Germany. The material is mostly case law, along with the relevant
statutory provisions, although some attempt has been made to include
constitutional provisions. The use of the functionality principle allowed
examination of not only specific statutory rules delineating where direct
sex discrimination is justifiable, for example, section 7 of the UK Sex
Discrimination Act 1975, which contains a list of occupations for which sex
is a 'genuine occupational qualification', but also to examine principles of
law, such as the principle of proportionality, found in the Constitution of
Germany and a 'general principle' of EC law, which may be used to
determine justification in direct and indirect discrimination.
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An extensive examination of the principles applied by courts in
determining when indirect sex discrimination is justified has been carried
out. As will be seen below, the European Court allows justification (for
indirect discrimination) only where the discriminatory policy is based on
a 'genuine need of the undertaking, is suitable for attaining the objective
pursued by the undertaking and is necessary for that purpose'.' The
early case law of the US required a 'manifest relationship' between the
alleged need of the employer and the discriminatory policy or employment
decision. 2 The UK courts allow justification where the employer acts
'reasonably'.3 German commentators have suggested that justification may
be established where the discrimination is 'zwingend geboten', that is,
compellingly required.4
3 Synthesis or context for comparison and evaluation
At the heart of the method of comparative law proposed by Zweigert and
KOtz is the comparison and evaluation of the approaches of different legal
systems to the problem or issue concerned. Meaningful comparison and
evaluation may only be carried out in the context of a 'synthesis' or
framework for comparison. This 'synthesis' cannot avoid being normative
in nature. It poses, and answers questions such as: Towards what aim
or purpose are the legal norms concerned being compared and evaluated?
What should the solution be to the problem these rules are trying to
address? Once again, the concept of functionality is brought into play,
only this time with a normative slant; what should the function be of
those rules which are coming under examination?
The problem to be addressed in this study, stated in functional terms, in
order to enable the comparison of the approaches of different legal
systems to the issue of justification of sex discrimination in employment
and the evaluation of those approaches, may be formulated as follows.
How should a legal system, wishing to outlaw sex discrimination in the
employment sphere, provide for instances where an allocative decision,
while being discriminatory, is justified in the circumstances concerned?
In particular, since it is the aim of the study to provide proposals for
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development of the law of the EC, how should these instances be dealt
with in that particular legal system?
'Function' is the 'mode of action by which [a thing] fulfils its purpose'.5
The function of an entity may be defined as its relevance to the purpose
of the whole of which the entity is a part. The function of a cog in a
watch is to move the mechanism, within the whole, that is, the watch,
whose purpose is to tell the time. The effectiveness of the cog may be
evaluated in the light of its contribution towards the purpose of time-
telling; but not by how well it tells time. Transferring the analogy into
the context of the present thesis, the whole is the set of statutory,
judicial and other rules which make up 'the law on sex discrimination in
employment' in a particular legal system. Each entity to be evaluated is
a particular rule or court decision or principle which provides legal
justification for an employment decision which is discriminatory on
grounds of sex. The function of the entity (the rule justifying sex
discrimination) may be evaluated in the light of its contribution towards
the purpose of the whole, that is, the purpose of sex discrimination law
in general.
3.1 Purpose of sex discrimination law
-
There is no common agreement or understanding as to the purpose of sex.
discrimination law; rather, different theories of what sex discrimination
law is aiming to achieve, and how it should do so, have been put forward,
either explicitly or by implication. For the purposes of the present
study, a particular theory, or position on the aims and purpose of sex
discrimination law, will be posited. The theory is that the purpose of sex
discrimination law is to provide equality of opportunity for women and
men in employment. This position may be regarded as axiomatic for the.
purposes of the thesis; it is naturally normative in nature. At this point
it should be made clear that my position is not advanced as a 'grand
theory' of sex discrimination, but as the basis for a useful framework for
analysis of the existing rules on sex discrimination in a particular area,
that is, employment.6 It is not the aim of the thesis to examine and
evaluate theories of sex discrimination, but rather to submit to detailed
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scrutiny those particular rules of justification for sex discrimination
which are to be singled out for analysis.7
The posited theory for the present study emanates from the various
strands of sex discrimination theory, aiming to provide a synthesis
between at least some of those strands. This chapter, therefore, is
concerned with a brief exploration of some writings representing some
main strands or 'theory bases' of thinking on sex discrimination, and some
of the issues with which those who posit a purpose for law which
disallows sex discrimination must grapple. The exploration is not meant
to be exhaustive, nor does it aim to provide a complete overview of
feminist theories of law; such a task is beyond the scope of the present
study. The general theory examined is narrowed down to its application
in the employment context; and further narrowed to the context of the EC,
which remains the focus of the present study.
3.1.1 'Discrimination'
There are two senses of the word 'discrimination' in the English language.
The first sense of 'to discriminate' is the neutral sense of 'to make a
distinction between'. The second sense is the pejorative sense - 'to
discriminate against' is 'to make unfair distinctions', or to act arbitrarily
or unjustly. 'Arbitrary' actions or decisions are those performed or
taken with no relevant reasons, for example, the exclusion of men from
employment in an office, because the managing director prefers to be
surrounded by women at work. An enquiry into the arbitrary nature of
an action thus leads into an assessment of which reasons may be deemed
'relevant' in the making of distinctions. 8 In the context of the present
study, the distinctions will be in the treatment of two employees
differently from each other. The concept of 'unjust' actions or decisions
is altogether wider: it may only be approached by means of an enquiry
into the particular standard of justice to be applied. Unjust behaviour
in the context of the present study may often relate to the balance of
fairness between the employer and the employee. For example, where an
employer is required to provide uniforms for prospective woman
employees, it may be considered unjust to require the employer to bear
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the burden of the extra cost this would entail, or the balance of 'justice'
and 'fairness' may favour the woman applicant, who has been treated less
favourably than a male applicant for whom a new uniform would not have
to be bought.
In languages other than English, for example German (diskriminieren), the
term 'to discriminate' is only used in the second, negative sense. It is
the second sense of unfair actions with which the law on sex
discrimination in employment is concerned. The unfairness or arbitrary
nature of the actions lies in the unequal treatment of equals, or the equal
treatment of unequals. 9 A general definition of 'discrimination' would be
'the different treatment of persons in an equal or comparable situation'.
The concept of discrimination therefore has two component, but inter-
related, parts; the 'treatment' component and the 'equality' component.
3.1.1.1 'Treatment' component
Discrimination by definition arises as a result of human choices, not by
chance or accident. As Tom Campbell points out, 'To be born a dwarf is
not to be discriminated against, but to be disqualified from voting on
grounds of size, or to be allowed to vote only where 'ballot boxes are five
feet above the ground, may be'. 19 For discrimination to exist, there must
be a discriminator, and a person discriminated against. The person
discriminated against is treated by the discriminator in a deprecatory
manner; is disvalued, disfavoured or disadvantaged.
One approach to the 'treatment' component of discrimination is to suggest
that discriminatory treatment may often be the failure to treat a person
as an individual. It seems paradoxical that this approach focuses on the
idea that discrimination is ultimately a group matter. Discrimination is not
just a personal matter, although a person discriminated against will
naturally bear the brunt of the discriminatory treatment as an individual,
but is also a class or group concern. For a person discriminated against
is treated in this way because of their membership of a group. Groups
discriminated against are subject to political or social power; the
discriminator holds the power." The unfair treatment of an individual
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may only be termed 'discrimination' if it is rooted in the individual's
membership of a group; the stereotyped characteristics of the group are
assumed to be the characteristics of the individual who experiences the
discriminatory treatment. Thus the individual is not treated as an
individual. An employer who refuses to employ a woman on the grounds
that 'women have or will have small children, and are therefore unreliable
at work' is acting in a discriminatory manner: the particular woman
concerned may have no intention of having children, or may have grown
up children, or have good childcare provisions available, and be highly
reliable in the employment context. The discriminatory nature of the
treatment is the failure to treat the woman concerned as an individual.
'This point is not always appreciated by those who write about
discrimination, perhaps particularly by those writers who lack
personal experience of discrimination. To them it is a puzzle that
the remedy for discrimination is seen politically as a matter of
groups rather than individuals, for in the traditional debates of
liberalism, the wrongs of inequality of opportunity, for instance, are
wrongs done to individuals and the remedies are equally atomistic.
But discrimination has displaced simple injustice in the language of
social and political oppression precisely where it transcends the
individualism of traditional liberal values and acknowledges that
group-related wrongs are in issue.
'The issues here are often obscured by the valid assertion that
discrimination is what it is in virtue of treating someone as a
member of a group rather than as an individual. In contrast, in
allocative situations the proper thing to do is to allocate by the
merit, ability, need, capacity of the individual concerned rather
than on the basis of average (or stereotyped) properties of
members of that group ... In this sense discrimination is ,,the
failure to individuate, that is to treat on an individual basis.'"
Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between equal treatment and treatment as
an equal. 13 The right to 'equal treatment' is 'the right to an equal
distribution of some opportunity or resource or burden', for example the
right to an equal vote in a democracy. The right to equal treatment is
the right to the same right in substance as others deemed in the same
?osition; for example, adults not otherwise disqualified from voting. The
right to 'treatment as an equal' is 'the right to be treated with the same
respect and concern as everybody else'. This will not necessarily result
n the same substantive right being accorded to each person, as it takes
nto account differences in position between the persons being treated
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with the same respect and concern. Dworkin's example is the following:
'If I have two children, and one is dying from a disease that is making
the other uncomfortable, I do not show equal concern if I flip a coin to
decide which should have the remaining dose of a drug.'14
Dworkin's concept of 'treatment as an equal' is more appropriate than
'equal treatment' in the context of regulating sex discrimination in
employment, as women are not in the same position as men with regard
to a number of issues relevant to the employment sphere 15. 'Treatment
as an equal' does not assume that the persons so to be treated are, or
may be deemed to be, in the same starting positions. The concept of
'treatment as an equal' therefore may include more favourable treatment
of persons belonging to a group suffering a prior disadvantage as not
only permissible within a general scheme of equality legislation, but also
necessary for the achievement of 'equality'. That is to say, the concept
of 'treatment as an equal' embraces 'positive discrimination'.
If 'equal treatment' does not, then, necessarily mean 'the same treatment',
this leads to an enquiry as to what is meant by the concept of equality.
3.1.1.2 'Equality' component
The second component of the concept of discrimination is that of equality.
Persons must not only be treated as individuals, they must also be
treated equally. As we have just noted, the concept of equality may be
difficult to substantiate. As Warwick McKean notes,
'Though the importance of the principle of equality as an ideal is
obvious, the content of the principle is not nearly so apparent ...
The essence of 'equality' as a component of 'justice' has been
sought by many. Aristotle believed in a form of distributive or
proportional justice where equal things should be given to equal
persons and unequal things to unequal persons ... Obviously, the
weakness of this doctrine is that it makes no attempt to answer the
question, 'what differences are relevant and what are not in
determining whether individuals are equals or unequals?' The fact
is that 'equality' is a term which is used in a great many different
ways, and this variety of usage has been a perpetual source of
confusion. Does it mean simply 'sameness' or 'identity'? Is it a
purely formal principle ppr does it have some content and if so, how
is it to be discovered?'"
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Equality in the sense of 'sameness' or 'identity' can only be said to exist
in abstract notions, such as A=A in mathematics. Absolute identity is not
relevant to equality between persons, as two persons can never be
identical in all respects. 17
 Equal treatment therefore depends on whether
one wishes to stress the similarities between persons, or the differences.
The decision whether to stress similarities or differences is a value
judgment, a prescription. Legislation concerned with sex discrimination
prescribes equal treatment for women and men, in those fields covered by
the legislation, which include the sphere of employment, in the case of the
legal systems examined by the present study. That is to say that sex is
a 'forbidden ground' - a ground on which distinctions, in particular those
concerned with &locative decisions, may not legally be made - and an act
carried out on the ground of sex which disadvantages the person
concerned may be termed 'discrimination'.
The assertion that women are to be given equal treatment with men in
certain fields still does not address the question of what it is to be
treated equally. This question cannot be answered by reference to the
legislation itself, as the legislation to be examined does not make explicit
its underlying conception of equality. Rather it is to be recognised that
there exist a number of conceptions of equality. Some of these are now
examined.
'Formal equality'
Women in the nineteenth century struggling for access to education and
employment relied on the liberal ideology of 'formal equality'. John Stuart
Mill's The Subjection of Women, published in 1869, for example, opens with
the statement that the legal subordination of women to men is wrong in
principle and ought to be replaced with perfect equality. Mill argued
that women should not be restricted by their status as women in the
choices they might make. 18
 Formal equality requires that the law grant
identical rights to women and men, both in the sense of equality before
the law and in the sense of equal rights in the domains of employment,
market transactions and education.19
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Formal equality rests on the Aristotelian notion that like persons be
treated alike and un-like persons unalike. The question then becomes
whether a difference between two persons is recognised by the law as a
relevant difference. This notion of equality was espoused by the US
Supreme Court in Reed v Reed°: it was established that a classification
'must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike'.
The term used by the UK government to describe the notion of equality
which informs the British Equal Pay Act 1970 and Sex Discrimination Act
1975 is that of 'equality of opportunity'. The White Paper, 'Equality for
Women',21 states that it is the aim of the legislation 'to introduce
effective measures to discourage discriminatory conduct and to promote
genuine equality of opportunity for both sexes'. The phrase 'equality of
opportunity' is misleading in this context. In fact, the phrase 'equality
of opportunity' (the terminology I have adopted for my position on
equality, which goes further than formal equality 22) describes, in this
context, a version of formal equality, as Katherine O'Donovan and Erika
Szyszczak note:
V%
'Competition on merit is what equal opportunity is about. To
overcome the question of the relationship between need and merit
liberal writers advocate minimal state provision for need, after.
which all compete on merit. Thus intervention because of need or
inequality is a justification for state action, regulation or
legislation. Thercofter the role of the state is to hold the ring for
free competition.'"
Formal equality is closely linked to free competition and market economics.
The presence of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome regulating
discrimination between women and men 24 may be attributed to a
commitment on the part of the original six Member States to rationalisation"
of the market, and perfection of competition. In Weber's terms, the
exclusion by law of preferences for one sex of persons as employees (and
other categories of people) is rational; whereas unjustified prejudice
towards men is irrational. The state may interfere in the labour market,
in accordance with Weber's thesis, to limit the actions of employers (inter
Theoretical Position	 33
alia), in order to prevent them from acting on their irrational
preferences.25
However the notion of formal equality is limited, most notably in its
failure to take account for differences between the groups of persons
described as 'equal' and of the prevailing hegemony. A commitment to the
concept of formal equality implies comparison between women and men,
and is unable to deal adequately with those situations in which women are
different from men. An issue in which this proves problematic is that of
pregnancy of a woman employee. For example, the UK courts dealt with
the problem by deeming a pregnant woman employee to be 'like' a male
employee with an illness. 26 The likening of the state of healthy
pregnancy to that of illness is inappropriate, misleading and undesirable
in terms of women's interests, as it perpetuates the stereotype of women
as weak and vulnerable. A woman's pregnancy is often the result of her
own choice, whereas illness never occurs by the choice of the person
concerned. Pregnancy is not 'the same as' or 'like' illness: pregnant
women are not ill.
A deeper problem of the notion of comparability is that it sets a norm
against which comparisons are made: the male norm is that with which
behaviour is compared. 27 Critical of Mill's advocacy of formal equality,
Katherine O'Donovan points out,
'Mill accepted a division of labour between the sexes and separate
spheres. His object was to make women equal to men by the
removal of juridical obstacles. He did not recognise that the
maintenance of separate spheres would constitute a major problem.
His notion of equality was limited to the lifting,of de lure barriers
to women's participation in the public sphere.'"
The problem with the liberal belief in formal equality is that it 'leaves
untouched issues of power and privilege.' 29; it takes no account of
women's 'different position resulting from prior discrimination'. 39 The
idea of formal equality presumes that if legal barriers are removed, women
can compete equally in the market, for jobs and other goods. Catherine
MacKinnon, a more 'radical' theorist, is particularly critical of the
conception of formal equality:
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'Equality is comparative in sex discrimination law. Sex in law is
compared with sex in life, and women are compared with men.
Relevant empirical similarity to men is the basis for the claim to
equal treatment for women. For differential treatment to be
discriminatory, the sexes must first be 'similarly situated' by
legislation, qualifications, circumstance, or physical endowment ...
To see if a woman was discriminated against on the basis of sex,
ask whether a similarly situated man would be or was so treated.
Relevant difference supports different treatment, no matter how
categorical, disadvantageous or cumulative. Accurate reflections of
situated disparities are thus rendered either noncomparable or
rational, therefore differences not inequalities for legal purposes.
In this view, normative equality derives from and refers to
empirical equivalence. Situated differences produce differentiated
outcomes without necessarily involving discrimination.'
I agree with MacKinnon in her perception that 'situated differences'
between men and women, in particular those arising from past
disadvantages, cannot be ignored in a meaningful conceptualisation of
equality. Rather, 'equality' should embrace different, more favourable
treatment for those belonging to groups which have been disadvantaged
by the status quo, in order to redress the very differences leading to
inequality. Room should be made, in other words, for measures of
positive discrimination.
An alternative position to the conception of equality which stresses
women's 'sameness' with men is to stress women's difference from men.
In the US, this is termed the 'special protection rule'. The special
protection rule allows the law to take account of differences between
women and men, in particular biological differences, relating to pregnancy
and childbirth. It allows positive discrimination, or 'affirmative action',
in favour of women. In the EC context, Article 2 (3) of Directive 76/207
(the Equal Treatment Directive), which allows special provisions
concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy
and maternity, is an example of the special protection rule.
Wendy Williams rejects the 'special treatment' model on the grounds that
'it has great costs', for several reasons, including the following. First,
as Williams points out, the special treatment model is not reliably
beneficial to women; 'conceptualising pregnancy as a special case permits
unfavorable as well as favorable treatment of pregnancy'. It also focuses
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attention from the inadequacies of the employer's general policies, for
example, for sick leave, onto the 'unfairness of protecting one class of
worker and not others'. Special protection for women, furthermore, may
operate in practice to encourage 'the employer who wants to avoid the
inconveniences and costs of special protection [to] find reasons not to
hire women of childbearing age in the first place'.32
MacKinnon goes further than Williams by rejection of the notion of
comparability as a whole, on the grounds that to take either the approach
that women are the same as men, and therefore should be granted the
same rights as men, or the approach that women are different from men,
and therefore should be granted special protection by law, is to submit
to the concealed assumption that man is the norm, the measure or
standard to which women are required to aspire.
'Missing in sex equality law is what Aristotle missed in his
empiricist notion that equality means treating like alike and unlikes
unlike. No one has seriously questioned it since. Why should one
have to be the same as a man to get what a man gets simply
because he is one? Why does maleness provide an original
entitlement, unquestioned on the basis of its gender, while women
who want to make a case of unequal treatment in a world men have
made in their image (this is really the part Aristotle missed) have
to show in effect that they are men in every relevant respect,
unfortRnately mistaken for women on the basis of an accident at
birth.'"
Formal equality may be regarded as a useful starting point, but it cannot
be regarded on its own as an adequate theory of equality for the
purposes of the present thesis.
'Equality of outcome'
In contrast with the conception of formal equality, the focus of theorists
who might be termed 'socialist feminists' is the rejection of formal
equality as a conception of equality, as it is limited to the procedural, for
the conception of 'equality of outcome', which addresses the substantive.
'Equality of outcome as a concept looks to the results of competition and
then raises questions about the rules of entry.'34
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A commitment to equality of outcome or results would require a major
social revolution. Liberals argue that it would be attainable only at the
cost of liberty; that is, it could only be achieved with widespread
coercive intervention. It cannot be claimed that anti-discrimination
legislation attempts this in any of the legal systems examined in the
present study.
Assimilationist or pluralist?
Different conceptions of equality may also be informed by different
conceptions of the ultimate aim of legislation which proscribes
discrimination on ground of sex. The assimilationist and the pluralist
models are posited as polar opposites in possible ultimate aims. The
assimilationist ideal may be characterised by a passage in an early piece
of feminist writing, Mary Wollstonecraft's 'A Vindication of the Rights of
Women'.
'A wild wish has just flown from my heart to my head, and I will
not stifle it, though it may excite a horse-laugh. I do earnestly
wish to see the distinction of sex confounded in society, unless
where love animates the behaviour. For this distinction is, I am
firmly persuaded, gie foundation of the weakness of character
ascribed to women.'"	 .
To take the assimilationist ideal to its extreme is to aim for a society in
which the difference of sex is no different to that of, for example, eye
colour. 36 The contrasting position is the pluralist ideal in which
differences, including those related to sex and gender, are tolerated and
no disadvantage is attached to them. An unresolved question of feminist
theory is whether anti-discrimination legislation has an assimilationist goal
or a pluralist goal.
In an attempt to avoid this dilemma, the introduction of the concept of
androgyny has been suggested: a commitment to the concept of androgyny
would operate to allow both 'men and women alike - and equally - to
develop aspects of their nature repressed by the stereotypical
exhortations and expectations of society'. 37 The concept of androgyny,
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'has great appeal for liberal men. If perceived difference between
the sexes is only the result of overly rigid sex roles, the men's
liberty is at stake too. Ending this form of sexual inequality could
free men to express their "feminir
"
e side, just as it frees women
to express their "masculine" side'.
As Christine Littleton explains,
'Androgyny ... posits that women and men are, or at least could be,
very much like each other [and] argues that equality requires
institutions to pick some golden mean between the ntwo and treat
both sexes as androgynous persons would treated.''
However, the practical considerations of a commitment to androgyny are
extremely complex:-
'... given that all of our institutions, work habits and pay scales
were formulated without the benefit of substantial numbers of
androgynous persons, androgynous symmetry is difficult to
conceptualise ... Moreover the problems involved in determining
such a norm for even one institution are staggering. At what
height should a c9Tiveyor belt be set in order to satisfy an
androgynous ideal?'"
It may, therefore, be questioned how far androgyny is, or could be, a
goal of anti-discrimination legislation.
Focus on inequality
The position of a group of theorists who may be termed 'radical feminists'
is that the focus (of formal equality) on equality of women with men is
misconceived. The conceptualisation of sex discrimination as being about
equal treatment for men and women does not fit with the feminist
perspective of the social situation, which the legislation purports to
address, as a situation which itself discriminates against and
disadvantages women. As Lacey points out,
'By conceptualising the problem as sex discrimination rather than
as discrimination against women, the legislation renders invisible
the real social problem and deflects naway a social ideal or goal
which would identify and address
The 'real social problem' is concerned with the position of women in the
prevailing male hegemony in the social hierarchy. From the 'radical' point
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of view, discrimination is not so much a matter of differentiation or
comparison between women and men, as a matter of men's dominance and
women's subordination.
'Sex equality in law has not been meaningfully defined for women,
but has been defined and limited from the male point of view to
correspond with the existing social reality of sex inequality. An
alternative approach to this mainstream view threads its way
through existing law. It is the reason sex equality law exists at
all. In this approach, inequality is a matter not of sameness and
difference, but of dominance and subordination. Inequality is about
power, its definition, and its maldistribution. Inequality at root is
grasped as a question of hierarchy, which - as power succeeds in
constructing social perception and social reality - derivatively
becomes categorical distinctions, differences. Where mainstream
equality law is abstract, this approach is concrete; where
mainstream equality law is falsely universal, this approach remains
specific. The goal is not to make legal categories that trace and
trap the status quo, but to confront by loy the inequalities in
women's condition in order to change them.'"
The legal confrontation of the inequality of women is to be on the
following terms, proposed by MacKinnon:
'the focus in equal protection law should not be on whether the
sexes are similarly or dissimilarly situated; nor on "differences";
nor upon whether differences are "arbitrary" rather than
"rational"; but upon "inequality". The courts should consider
whether legal treatment results in systematic disadvantage because
of membership of a particular group. In the area of sex
discrimination the "only question for litigation is whether the policy•
or practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance qg
an underclass or a deprived position because of gender status.""
O'Donovan and Szyszczak doubt whether MacKinnon is successful in
avoiding 'the difference approach'. MacKinnon's approach does go some
way towards pluralism in its admission that not everyone is similarly
situated, and it does avoid the limitation to comparison of treatment which
the equal treatment conception of equality advocates. Women's difference
from men would trigger a suspicion of the existing inequality in law, the
application of law, or extraneous factors. This contradicts the assumption
of other approaches to equal treatment which assume that women and men
can be taken to be the same - social, economic and biological fact negates
that assumption. However, the main difficulty with MacKinnon's position
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relates to how the courts would apply MacKinnon's proposed standard in
practice. As O'Donovan and Szyszczak explain,
'[D]ifferences, where they exist in biology or socioeconomic
structures, cannot be ignored. The problem remains that, just as
courts have justified differential treatment on grounds that women
and men au not similarly circumstanced, so too may they justify
inequality.'"
'Case specific' conception
In the context of a critique of rights-based approaches to sex
discrimination issues in law, Elizabeth Kingdom espouses the position that
there is no one principle from which to derive feminist politics; rather
issues must be resolved at a case-by-case level. Discussing Elizabeth
Wolgast's 'Equality and the Rights of Women' 45, Kingdom states,
'The phrase "in some cases" is significant. Alert to the complex
ways in which the biological sciences and current law are making
the concept of parenthood problematic, feminists involved in legal
studies and in legal struggles are increasingly taking the position
that there is no single principle from which to de/lye feminist
politics. Indeed, this is the main theme of this book.'"
Kingdom points out that we might expect moral philosophers to disagree
with so unprincipled an approach, but that we find Wolgast (a moral
philosopher) advocating exactly this.
'... she grants that there are cases where men and women should
have equal rights, such as those connected with jobs and
promotions. What she also argues, however, is that there is no
general principle of equality from which such cases can be derived,
since their various justifications are not all the same. Quite
consistently with this position, Wolgast goes on to make the point
that there is no one rationale either for equal rights or for special
rights. And in case the reader is in any doubt, she stresses that:
'For some issues the biological and reproductive differences of the
sexes play a crucial part, but in others they have to be carefully
ignored' (Wolgast 1980: 87). In other words, rights ought to be
equal when they ought to be eqmal, and rights ought to be special
when they ought to be special.'"
Kingdom's position may avoid the difficulties attendant on a commitment
to rights-based discourse, but it does not present a position from which
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the detailed provisions and application of sex discrimination legislation
may be compared and evaluated. However, it is useful as a reminder that
the context in which sex discrimination provisions operate is of
fundamental importance. A focus on context is a necessary result of
commitment to the stance termed by Katharine Bartlett as 'positionality'.48
'The positional stance acknowledges the existence of empirical truths,
values and knowledge, and also their contingency.' Positionslity rejects
the concept of 'objectivity' in knowledge of 'the truth' and 'the right
answer' to the problem of sex discrimination. Rather, 'knowledge arises
within social contexts and in multiple forms.' 49 With this in mind, it must
be stressed the focus of my position on the purpose of sex discrimination
law is the context of employment, as it is currently organised in the
systems examined. There is no claim that this position is applicable or
useful in other arenas in which feminism takes issue with law.
'Equality of Opportunity'
My position is that the purpose of anti-discrimination law in the
employment sphere is that of 'equality of opportunity' for women and men.
This position recognises the shortcomings of the 'formal equality'
conceptualisation, and builds from the critical stance of 'radical feminism'.
It provides a realistic, pragmatic standpoint by which actual rules and
the judicial interpretations of those rules may be evaluated. In the
context of employment, the conceptualisation of equality is to be one
which allows women the chance to compete equally with men for those
jobs, with their attendant benefits, available in society.
Other writers share a similar position. Evelyn Ellis states her standpoint
as follows:
'Men and women are both essential to the continuation of human life
and society, and both must therefore be equally able to influence
and determine the rules upon which that society operates. Instead
of rigidly forcing gender roles on people irrespective of their
desires, we must aim for a freer environment in which either sex
can be expected to play a part in child-rearing, family nurture and
outside employment. The law, a potent instrument for social
change, plays an important part in achieving thia dynamism. It
must be so constructed so as to achieve this end'"
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Ellis' position is essentially committed to a degree of pluralism, and to
this extent coincides with my view. However, in the context of
employment, commitment to pluralism must be coupled with a recognition51
that the existing social structures52
 and the assumptions of those with
power to make decisions (in this context, employers) operate to the
disadvantage of women, in that, as a generalisation, it is still assumed
that 'an employee' is a man. The law must recognise the prevailing
conditions in the employment sphere, which are still based on the model
of a male employee, who is the only or main breadwinner, with another
person (his wife) as the primary carer for children. 53
 Other types of
employment, for example part-time work or job-sharing, which have
proved particularly appealing to women, are not viewed as 'real
employment' and consequently the limitation of rights for employees (for
example to pay, access to pension schemes and other beneficial conditions
of employment) in those circumstances may be legally justified. The
contribution of legislation which purports to proscribe discrimination on
grounds of sex will be at best limited if it does not operate to counter
the general assumption of employers that an employee fits this concept
of an employee, that is, that an employee is a man.
Christine Littleton's conception of equality, _that of 'equality as
acceptance' 54
 and 'making difference costless' 55
 is similar to that of
'equality of opportunity' as used in my study. 'Equality as acceptance',
explains Littleton, is to be contrasted with 'equality as accommodation'.
The latter conceives equality as accommodation of women's differences
from men; a position which 'implicitly accepts the prevailing [male] norm
as generally legitimate'. 56
 Equality as acceptance, on the other hand, is
to attempt to determine how to achieve equality despite 'real differences'
(biological and cultural) between women and men. It rejects the focus on
the male norm and the assertion that it is women who are different.
'Equality as acceptance does not prescribe the superiority of socially
female categories, nor even the superiority of androgynous categories.
It does, however, affirm the equal validity of men's and women's lives'.57
'Making difference costless' is a conception of equality which allows men
or women the opportunity of taking on social roles which are currently
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seen as 'masculine' or 'feminine', without facing disadvantage. For
example,
'If it costs most men and women the same to stay home with the
baby, parenting is more likely to be shared. (Currently, women
have less to lose than men by foregoing paid employment for
unpaid childcare,,pince both women's salaries and expectations are
generally lower.)'"
Making difference costless would grant women and men the equal
opportunity of enjoying parenthood and returning to employment.
In a similar vein, my position is in accordance with the proposal of
O'Donovan and Szyszczak that, in order to give substance to the concept
of equality in the context of anti-discrimination legislation, the concept
of equality of opportunity be reworked to its full 'radical' extent:
'Equality of opportunity as a concept is more radical than its critics
realise'.59
 The standard of equality of opportunity is merit; everyone
may compete and achieve, therefore receive benefits, according to their
merit. But this assumes that all competitors begin from an equal starting
point; therefore prior inequalities cannot be ignored if equality of
opportunity is to be achieved. O'Donovan and Szyszczak note:
'Equal opportunity contains the notion that a good or benefit will
be allocated in such a way as not to exclude a priori any of those
wishing to have it ... We are not talking of a mechanical, minimal
equality, but of equality of life chances ... To equal up
opportunity we must Ttp cognise the effects of history, background
and social conditions.'"
Their focus then moves to the position of women in the employment
sphere:
'Equality of opportunity in its full sense requires a fair, rational
and appropriate competition for goods and benefits. This means
that competitors must have an equal starting point, where possible.
It goes further than lowering barriers to access to education,
services and the labour market. For women to compete equally with
men, both sexes must start equally. The question then becomes: do
women have,, an equal starting point with men in marketplace
competition? ,°1
State intervention in the market may be necessary to perfect competition;
anti-discrimination legislation is justified by this. The state may limit the
Theoretical Position	 43
free choices of some market actors (for example, employers who prefer not
to employ women) in order to open up the market to competition from
those groups targeted by the anti-discrimination legislation, that is,
women. If women are not experiencing an equal starting point, the law
may operate ostensibly to favour women, for example, in affirmative action
programmes, or special measures in the case of pregnancy and childbirth.
Measures of positive discrimination would therefore be regarded as
justifiable in certain circumstances.
If a commitment to equality of opportunity means at least some
reorganisation of the employment sphere and of the terms and conditions
of all workers, in particular women workers, this begs the question of
who is to bear the burden of the cost of equality of opportunity. This
question is especially pertinent in the context of the EC, where the
principal purpose of that supranational organisation, as stated in the
Treaty of Rome62, is the attaining of higher standards of economic
efficiency, through the operation of the market. In the legal system of
such an organisation, as in that of the states which are examined in the
present study, any intervention with the free play of market forces may
not be undertaken lightly. It should be stressed that a detailed analysis
of the cost of equal treatment for women in employment in the EC is
beyond the scope of the present study; only a few relevant points are
noted here. It is arguable that the burden of social change of the nature
of a commitment to equality of opportunity for women and men in all
aspects of employment is best borne by the State. However, in many of
those areas where discrimination laws have been used by women to claim
equal opportunities with men in employment, for example the provision of
sick pay and retirement benefits to part-time workers 63, the current
trend is increasing reliance on private, rather than State provision.
Private employers therefore will have to be called upon to bear the cost,
but not without appropriate state support. Within the EC, the
harmonisation of rules on sex discrimination in employment provides a
level playing field: if all employers are required to carry the same
burden, then none suffer from the unfair competitive advantage of others
who do not carry a similar burden. Mechanisms such as insurance may
be used to spread the burden, for example of payment of maternity pay
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to working mothers, among all employers. Perhaps of most importance is
the social aspect of employment. It has been accepted since the first
protective employment legislation came into effect in the nineteenth
century, that it is not appropriate, in a civilised society, to leave
regulation of the employment relationship entirely to free market forces.
A worker is not an 'economic unit', but a human being, with human
rights. Commitment to equality of opportunity for women (and men)
employees is a sufficiently important principle to require that, in some
circumstances, the cost of that commitment is borne by employers.
In the present study, the justifiability of measures which allow
discrimination between women and men in employment will be evaluated in
terms of their contribution to the aim of provisions of employment law
prescribing sex discrimination, that is, the rejection of the assumption
that all employees fit the male norm, and a commitment to full equality of
opportunity. If rules concerning justification of sex discrimination are
to contribute to the goal of equality of opportunity, they will be required
to fulfil a dual role. 'Functional' rules on justification will take into
account the disadvantages of women in the employment sphere; this would
allow 'protective legislation' and 'positive discrimination' or 'affirmative
action' in those areas where the special position of women requires it.
'Functional' rules on justification will also deny the legality of unfair or
arbitrary grounds proposed to justify discrimination.
3.2 The concept of equality in European Community law
It is submitted that my position on the purpose of legislation countering
sex discrimination in the employment sphere is appropriate in the context
of the European Community." Although the EC as an organisation is, in
general, committed to economic ends, the social policy of the EC, including •
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which prescribes equal pay for equal
work for men and women, is also to be taken into account. The European
Court has been required to concretise the concept of equality in the area
of sex discrimination in employment, and has done so in two ways. The
first of these is in the interpretation of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome
and the relevant secondary legislation, especially Directives 75/117 and
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76/207 . The second is in the development of equality as a 'general
principle of EC law'.
The original measure of EC law concerning sex discrimination in
employment, Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, was motivated by economic
ends. That non-discrimination on grounds of sex is desirable was
recognized by the founders of the European Community. But there was
concern that commitment to equal treatment could have led to unfair
advantage for employers in those Member States which had already
implemented the principle of equal treatment, which would be contrary to
the principle of free competition. Article 119 owes its existence to the
special relationship between the principle of which it is a specific
instance (that, in employment, men (or women) should not enjoy more
favourable conditions as a result of their sex alone) and the economic
integration by competition which is the purpose of the EC.
The economic aim of Article 119 suggests that the EC conceptualisation of
equality is one committed to competitive fairness between employers,
rather than the equal opportunities of employees. However, it should be
noted that Article 119 is found in the Social chapter of the Treaty of
Rome, and forms part of EC social policy. 	 -
The social policy of the Treaty is essentially an employment policy. Social
policy,
'... was included in the Treaty for three men reasons. First
because it was seen as necessary to take some action to cushion
the effects on workers of the kind of economic restructuring
envisaged in the formation of the common market; second because
the objectives of greater labour mobility required at least the
opening up of national welfare schemes to workers of other Member
States; and third because national differences in levels of welfare
and social provision were seen as one of the factora which might
distort competition between the different countries.'"
There also existed, among the founder Member States, a desire to improve
the living and working standards of the citizens of the Member States
through economic integration.66
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Article 119, which provides for equal pay as between women and men in
the EC, as part of the Chapter on social policy, clearly has 'social' ends,
as well as the 'economic ends' discussed above.
Interpretation by the European Court of Article 119 has elucidated the
'economic' and 'social' ends of the provision. The dual aim of Article 119
was explained in Defrenne v Sabena (No 2P:
'Article 119 has a double aim: first to avoid a situation in which
undertakings established in States which have actually implemented
the principle of equal pay suffer a competitive disadvantage in
intra-community competition as compared with undertakings
established in States which have not yet eliminated discrimination
against women workers as regards pay', and secondly Article 119,
'... forms part of the social objectives of the Community, which is
not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, by
common action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant
improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoplesRd
•••
As AG Trabbauchi pointed out, a worker who is a citizen of the EC is
regarded, 'not as a mere source of labour, but as a human being'69.
Coupled with the recognition that,
'respect for fundamental personal human 'rights is one of the
general principles of Community law ... There can be no doubt that
the elimination of oLiscrimination based on sex forms part of the
fundamental rights'",
this assertion of the Advocate General suggests that my position, namely
that the purpose of anti-sex discrimination legislation should be the
promotion of equal opportunities for women and men, is appropriate for
the law of the EC.
The clarification by the European Court of the 'social aim' of Article 119
was followed by incorporation of a 'social' motive in the provisions of
secondary legislation in the field of sex discrimination. For example,
Directive 76/207, Article 2 (4) provides that measures to promote equal
opportunities, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect
women, are compatible with EC law. A legislative measure allowing
positive discrimination, such as this one, cannot be motivated by economic
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ends alone. This is a further indication that equality of opportunity is
an aim of European Community social law.
The European Court has continued to strengthen the 'social' nature of
measures relating to equality for men and women in employment. One way
in which the Court has effected this is by the recognition of equal
treatment as a 'fundamental right'.
Equal treatment of women and men in employment is regarded in EC law
as a 'fundamental personal human right'. It might be asserted that the
protection of human rights belongs in the arena of politics, not economics,
and that as the EC is primarily concerned with economic, social and
technical development, and is not primarily a political body 71, it should
play no part in the protection of human rights, including the right to
equal treatment for women and men. However, there are many situations
in which questions concerning human rights, particularly in a broad
sense, might arise in EC law, for example freedom of trade, protection of
property and social security. It is not possible to regard human rights
as exclusively 'political' and therefore irrelevant in an 'economic'
community, as politics and economics are intermingled in modern society.
As M. Dauses observes,
'The Communities' powers affect basic individual rights in numerous
contexts: prohibitions against imports, exports and marketing, price
regulation, the organisation of agricultural markets and competition
laws all permit interference in the essential right to property and
in the right to free exercise of a profession. Freedom of
association and freedom to form a union may conflict with the power
reserved under Community law to the Member States to take steps
with reference to public policy. Finally freedom of religion and
liberty of thought restrict the power of the institutiops of the
Communities in their organisation of the public service.'"
Furthermore, the EC has increased its political credibility greatly since
its foundation. Transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the EC
institutions is very real in many areas. This will be further enhanced
after the completion of the Single European Market in 1992, with the new
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procedures for decision-making. 73
 Recognition of this has encouraged
some commentators to call for the protection of rights on an EC level.
'...[T]he EC deserves to be taken more seriously as a political
arena. Economic interdependence has been increasing rapidly and
governments are far more constrained than they used to be by
developments in other countries and at the European level. It is
already the case that some labour movements campaigns must be
coordinated throughout Europe (and beyond) if they are to have
any chance of success. The logic of this situation is that sooner
or later the rights of workers, as well as those of citizens, wilj
have to be fought for and secured at the level of the Community'"
In the Defrenne cases75
 it was suggested that the right to equal pay,
whilst being enshrined in Article 119, was also a fundamental human right,
and part of the general principles of EC law,
'... respect for fundamental personal human rights is one of the
general principles of Community law, the observance of which [the
European Court] has a duty to ensure. There can be no doubt that
the elimination of d#crimination based on sex forms part of these
fundamental rights.'"
If the EC is to be committed to equal treatment of women and men as a
fundamental personal human right, recognising that an employee is a
human being, then the conceptualisation of equality espoused by the EC
must be appropriate to that commitment. The concept of 'equality of
opportunity' will fulfil that role.
4 Conclusion: Equality of Opportunity for Women and Men in the EC
Article 119, it was explained by the European Court in Defrenne v
SABENA77, has a double aim, both economic and social. The economic aim
is to avoid the situation where undertakings in those Member States
which have implemented the principle of equal pay for women and men
suffer a competitive disadvantage as against undertakings in other
Member States. If this aim is accepted as the sole purpose of the EC
provisions on sex discrimination in employment, then my proposal of
'equality of opportunity', as the standard by which the legislation is
evaluated, may be considered to be inappropriate. However the 'social
aim' of the provisions must also be taken into account. The social aim is
linked to the general social policy of the EC: the EC is to ensure social
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progress and to seek the constant improvement of the living and working
conditions of its citizens. The implementation of the provisions of EC law
providing first for equal pay for women and men, and subsequently for
equal treatment for women and men in employment is part of the
improvement of living and working standards for women workers.
Furthermore, it is accepted by the European Court that the principle of
equal treatment for women and men is one of the 'fundamental personal
human rights' which is a 'general principle' of EC law. 78 General
principles of EC law do not, of themselves, give rights to individuals
within the EC. However, the fact that the European Court has recognised
that equal treatment for women and men is a fundamental human right
indicates that the EC conception of equality cannot be related exclusively
to the economic aim of the provisions regulating sex discrimination in
employment. Women (and men) of the EC should be entitled to equality
of opportunity in its full sense.
How far the EC provisions justifying sex discrimination fulfil their
function, in the light of the purpose of sex discrimination legislation as
legislation which provides equality of opportunity for women and men will
be explored in Part III. In that part of the thesis, detailed comparison
will be made with those provisions in the other legal systems examined.
First the content of the provisions is set out in detail, in Part II.
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The following four chapters set out the legal framework, in each of the
four legal systems examined, for the prohibition of sex discrimination in
employment, and show how the rules, principles and judicial
interpretations relating to aspects of justification for discrimination fit
into that general framework. Each chapter covers one legal system.
The chapters are divided into three sections. The first section describes
briefly the sources and structure of law regulating discrimination in
employment in the legal system concerned. It gives an overview of the
legislative provisions, and the judicial bodies concerned with employment
law. The second section sets out in more detail the legal provisions
(mainly statutory in nature), along with their judicial interpretation,
which govern the standard of justification for discrimination. This
section seeks to describe the 'legal test' for justification. Part of the
test is the issue of burden of proof in a case concerning justification for
discrimination. The section is divided into a subsection discussing
justification for direct discrimination and a subsection discussing
justification for indirect discrimination. Each of the principal legislative
measures is examined in turn; in the first subsection, as it relates to
justification for direct discrimination (or 'disparate treatment', in the case
of the US), in the second subsection, as it relates to justification for
indirect discrimination (or 'adverse impact', in the case of the US).
The third section provides some examples of types of justification, or
substantive grounds for justification. Again, the division between direct
and indirect discrimination is used. Grounds for justification of indirect
discrimination are divided into the sub-categories of 'job related
justifications', 'enterprise related justifications' and 'public interest
related justifications'. Job related justifications are those in which the
ground for justification relates directly to the duties of the job. A
requirement for a certain amount of muscular strength, where the job
involves lifting and carrying of heavy weights, is a job related
justification. Enterprise related justifications are those in which the
ground for justification relates to the wider organisation of the enterprise
of the employer. The exclusion of part-time employees from employee
fringe benefits, on the grounds of economic efficiency of the enterprise,
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is an enterprise related justification. Public interest related justifications
usually apply to legislation or other State measures. The broad social
benefit provided by indirectly discriminatory legislation is a public
interest related justification. The precise location of a particular
substantive ground for justification within these three categories may, in
some cases, be a matter for debate, as the three categories are not
divided by sharp lines, but in fact merge into one another. For the
purposes of the thesis, it was necessary to allocate various grounds of
justification to a particular category, in what may seem a rather arbitrary
manner; for example, justifications related to grading and pay structures,
although arguably job related, are discussed as 'enterprise related'
justifications.
To facilitate comparison between the legal systems, an attempt has been
made to keep the structure and headings of each chapter the same as the
others. This approach resulted in some minor difficulties in the
presentation of the material; however, the benefits of comparison easily
outweigh those difficulties. In the discussion of the European Community
measures, where the history of sex discrimination cases is relatively
short, and, more significantly, the actual number of cases is small, it has
been necessary to refer to the same cases in, the discussion of the
standard of justification and in that of the available types of justification.
In the common law legal systems, the United Kingdom and the United
States of America, the amount of case-law is much greater: this fact
enabled a more eclectic approach to the available material. It should be
stressed that the discussion of the case law of those systems is by no
means exhaustive. The chapter on German law presented different
concerns again. Case law is not binding in German law, and is only
illustrative of the import of the legislative provisions. The opinions of
commentators were therefore relied on in order to fill lacunae.
In this part of the thesis, neither detailed analysis of the material, nor
evaluative comment on the judgments of the courts concerned, may be
found. Comparison and evaluation of the approaches is undertaken in
Part III. Part II is concerned with description of the legal provisions.
Chapter 4
European Community
1 EC law on employment: Sources, Structure, role of European Court of
Justice
The primary source of European Community (EC) law is the Treaty of
Rome'. This framework treaty establishes the EC 2, sets out its broad
3	 4aims , and outlines its scope of activities4 .
 The main aim of the EC is
the establishment of a 'common market': that this will have repercussions
in the sphere of employment is recognised in Article 3 (1). Inasmuch as
this is necessitated by the aims of the EC, and provisions of the Treaty,
the EC has jurisdiction to legislate in the employment sphere. 5 In the
field of equal treatment of women and men, this legislative activity has
perhaps been greater than was originally envisaged.
Title III of Part 3 of the Treaty contains provisions concerning the Social
Policy of the EC. These are particularly directed towards the
improvement of working conditions and standard of living of workers6.
In other words, the Social Policy of the Treaty-
 is concerned with the
employment sphere; it is to operate to protect workers from suffering
hardship under the economic restructuring envisaged by the Founders of
the Treaty, to open up social security in host Member States for migrant
workers in the EC, and to prevent the enjoyment of competitive advantage
by those Member States whose provisions protecting employees were more
developed than others.7
Included in this Title is Article 119, which establishes the principle of
equal pay for equal work for women and men in the EC. Article 119 is
in a special position in the Chapter of the Treaty on social policy, as it
is the only provision in that Chapter which imposes definite obligations
on the Member States of the EC. It is not merely a policy statement or
a statement of intent, rather it is directly effective8, that is, it gives the
right, enforceable before a national court, to individuals within the
Member States to equal pay as between women and men for equal work.
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Article 119 contains a clear statement of principle, a definition of pay and
a description of pay without discrimination based on sex.
Secondary legislation has made clear that the principle of equal treatment
for women and men in employment is not limited to pay alone. The
principle in Article 119 has been extended by provisions of EC legislation:
in particular Directive 75/117 (Equal Pay) 9, Directive 76/207 (Equal
Treatment) 10
 and Directive 79/7 (social security) 11 .
The European Court of Justice has played an important role in the
development of the principle of equality for women and men in
employment. Acting under its general duties to interpret and apply EC
law, both in actions brought under Article 177 (preliminary rulings) and
those brought under Article 169 (breach of Treaty obligations by a
Member State), the European Court has provided much of the content and
effect of the principle in specific situations. Examination of decisions of
the Court will therefore form an essential part of this chapter.
2 Provisions of European Community law establishing the Equal Treatment
of women and men in Employment, and justification for derogation from
those provisions	 -
The EC provisions concerning equal treatment of women and men in
employment proscribe both 'direct' and 'indirect' discrimination 12. The
terms 'direct discrimination' and 'indirect discrimination' are not defined
in any of the legislative provisions of EC law, although Directive 76/207,
Article 2 (1) defines the principle of equal treatment as 'no discrimination
whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly'.
2.1 Direct discrimination
The European Court defined 'direct and overt discrimination', in Defrenne
v SABENA13, as that discrimination 'which may be identified solely with
the aid of the criteria based on equal work and equal pay referred to by
Article 119'. Direct discrimination is thus, in the area of equal pay, the
failure to pay women at a rate equal to men (or vice versa), where the
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women and men concerned carry out work that is equal. 'Equal work'
may be the same work or work of equal value 14. Similarly in an equal
treatment claim, the failure to treat a woman equally to men engaged in
equal work is direct discrimination. In a direct discrimination claim, the
difference in pay or treatment is based directly on grounds of sex.
2.1.1 Article 119
The provisions of Article 119 read as follows:
'Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and
subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and
women should receive equal pay for equal work.
'For the purpose of this Article, 'pay' means the ordinary
basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration,
whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or
indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer.
'Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means:
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated
on the basis of the same unit of measurement;
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the samejob.'	
.
There are no provisions in Article 119 justifying direct discrimination in
pay between a woman and a man.
2.1.2 Equal Pay Directive 75/117
Directive 75/117 was introduced to implement and to some extent interpret
Article 119. It provides a fuller definition of equal pay for women and
men, which includes equal pay for work of equal value.
'The principle of equal pay for men and women outlined in Article
119 of the Treaty ... means, for the same work or for work to which
equal value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on
grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of
remuneration.
'In particular, where a job classification system is used for
determining pay, it must be based on the same criteria for both
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men and women anaL so drawn up as to exclude any discrimination
on grounds of sex.'"
The remaining provisions impose duties on the Member States to ensure
that individuals are able to pursue claims for breach of the equal pay
principle16, that provisions of legislation, regulations or other
administrative measures and provisions in employment contracts of all
types are in conformity with the principle 17, that employees who complain
of breach of the principle are protected from dismissal l°, that measures
are taken to ensure that the principle is applied 19 and that the
provisions of the Directive are brought to the attention of employees in
the MS20. There is no provision allowing derogation from the principle
of equal pay; in other words, there is no justification for direct
discrimination in breach of the Equal Pay Directive.
2.1.3 Equal Treatment Directive 76/207
The Equal Treatment Directive establishes the principle of equal treatment
for women and men as regards access to employment, including promotion,
access to vocational training and as regards working conditions. 21 It
prohibits discrimination in treatment of women and men both directly and
indirectly, in particular by reference to marifal or family status.22
Discrimination between women and men is forbidden in the process of
selection of employees, promotion, 23 access to all types and levels of
vocational training24 and all conditions of employment, including those
governing dismissa1.25
The Equal Treatment Directive contains in Article 2 (2), (3) and (4) a
number of exclusion provisions. These justify direct discrimination in
equal treatment in certain circumstances in EC law.
The Equal Treatment Directive 76/207, Article 2 (2), reads as follows:
'This directive shall be without prejudice to the right of Member
States to exclude from its field of application those occupational
activities and where appropriate, the training leading thereto, for
which, by reason of their nature or the context in which they are
carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor.'
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The exception provided by Article 2 (2) is narrow. A Member State or
employer wishing to use it must show that, for the occupation concerned,
sex is a determining factor, that is, a non-discriminatory policy in the
occupation concerned would make it very difficult or impossible to carry
out the activities of that occupation. In other words, it must be shown
that it is necessary to employ a person of a particular sex.
The provision must be read alongside Article 9 (2) which requires Member
States to assess periodically the activities in Article 2 (2) 'to decide, in
the light of social developments, whether there is justification for
maintaining the exclusions concerned' and to notify the Commission. The
directive thus requires 'transparency'. The policy of the Member States
must be sufficiently open for scrutiny by the Commission.
The case Re Discrimination Laws: EC Commission v. Germany26 is
indicative of the strict interpretation given by the European Court to the
requirement for transparency. The German government, unlike the
governments of other Member States, had failed to indicate those
occupations which it considered were covered by Article 2 (2). It had not
defined in national legislation the scope of the derogation. There was
therefore no means by which the Commission - could supervise this
derogation, as it is required to do under the provisions of the Directive.
There was no transparency.
The Advocate General submitted that the principle of non-discrimination
was so important that Member States should be required to provide a list
of activities excluded from the Directive, in order to ensure that Member
States did not avoid their obligations in the exercise of their discretion.
[T]he purpose of Article 2 (2) is not to authorise Member States
to permit discriminatory treatment whenever it proves necessary to
do so ... Its purpose is to prevent the prohibition of discrimination
from making it difficult or impossible to carry on those and only
those activities for which a person's sex is a prerequisite. From
that point of view a precise indication of the activities that are
included is ... necessary in order to prevent the rule that there is
to be 'no discrimination whatsoever' frombeing circumvented by an
unrestricted power to derogate from it.'"
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The European Court indicated in its decision that the terms of Article 2
(2) are such that a general statement from a Member State that derogation
would be desirable is not sufficient to establish an exclusion under Article
2 (2): certain specific activities only may be excluded, and only where
specific reasons are given. Furthermore the Member States must keep
under review the reasons for maintaining the exceptions, and must notify
the Commission. This will ensure that existing derogations which no
longer appear justified are progressively eliminated 29. The Court did
not, however, specifically require Member States to provide a list of
excluded activities. It is important to note that the exception covers
specific activities only, and not entire occupations.29
In general, the exclusion clause in Article 2 (2) is given a narrow scope
in interpretations by the European Court. The Member State (or
employer) must show a specific relationship: the relationship is between
the actual duties of the job and the need for a worker of a particular
sex. The Court will probably continue to narrow the confines of
situations in which Article 2 (2) applies; a trend suggested by the fact
that the decision in EC Commission v France313 narrows the previous
Johnston31 decision32. Strict application of the requirement for
transparency should operate to encourage this trend.
The standard of justification applicable under Article 2 (2) is as follows.
It is for the national court to decide whether the activities concerned may
be justifiably restricted to employees of one sex only, with due regard
to the principle of proportionality, which requires that derogation remains
within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the
aim in view.33
Article 2 (3) of the Equal Treatment Directive provides an even narrower
ground for justification of discrimination. It states that,
'This Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions concerning
the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and
maternity.'
Article 2 (3), therefore, envisages that measures which treat women
differently from men may, in certain circumstances where the special
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protection of women is desirable, be consistent with the principle of equal
treatment. Certain types of positive discrimination may be justifiable, in
terms of the Directive. In Johnston'', it was found by the European
Court that Article 2 (3) was intended only to cover measures concerned
with protection of women's biological condition. This interpretation of
Article 2 (3) was upheld in Hoffmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse's where the
Court held that special provision for maternity leave was covered by
Article 2 (3), which provided protection for a) the biological condition of
women during and after pregnancy; and b) the relationship between
mother and child during the period following pregnancy and birth.
This construction was confirmed by the decision in Re Protection of
Women: EC Commission v France", which concerned French legislation
applying Directive 76/207. This legislation allowed the continuation, in
collective agreements and employment contracts, of certain privileges for
women, including extended maternity leave, time off for sick children, an
extra day holiday per year per child, allowances for childminders and
several others. The Court held that these privileges were far wider than
those envisaged by Article 2 (3)•37
Finally, Article 2 (4) provides that,
'This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote
equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing
existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities in the areas
referred to in Article 1 (1).'
'Measures which promote equal opportunity for men and women', designed
to remove existing disparities in employment, are termed measures of
positive discrimination. Article 2 (4) is authority for the proposition that
some measures of positive discrimination are justifiable in accordance with
EC law.
However, Article 2 (4) has not yet been successfully relied upon to justify
sex discrimination. The French Government attempted to plead this
justification in Re Protection of Women", but it was held that the
privileges were not justified by the precise objective in Article 2 (4) of
eliminating de facto inequalities.
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The provisions concerning justification of direct sex discrimination in EC
law require a high standard of justification: this construction has been
strengthened by the European Court's interpretation of the provisions.
The construction can be regarded as appropriate because of the
importance of equality as between men and women in employment as a
part of the social policy of the EC and as a part of the provisions
establishing a common market, with fair competition between all Member
States.39
2.2 Indirect discrimination
Indirect discrimination arises where an employer's policy, although not
differentiating on a forbidden ground (in this instance sex), has the
effect of so doing. The plaintiff, in EC law, bears the initial burden of
establishing the discriminatory effect of the policy or practice of the
employer. The burden is then transfered to the employer to justify such
a policy. In Bilka-Kaufhaus v Weber von Hartz40, the European Court
laid down guidelines, interpreting Article 119, indicating the standard for
justification of indirect sex discrimination in pay. The Court expressed
the method by which a national court is to determine, in applying EC law,
whether an employer has discriminated indirectly against women, in the
following way:
'It falls to the national court, which alone is competent to assess
the facts, to decide whether ... the grounds put forward by an
employer to explain the adoption of a pay practice which applies
irrespective of the employee's sex, but which in fact affects morg
women than men, can be considered to be objectively justified ...141
The question of justification is central to the concept of indirect
discrimination. Any disproportionate effect in fact on women as compared
to men may trigger an enquiry into indirect discrimination; if the
employer can show justifiable reasons for the difference, then
discrimination is not established.
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2.2.1 Article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive 75/117
Article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive 75/117 have been held to cover
not only direct discrimination, where the difference in pay is based
directly or intentionally on the grounds of sex, but also indirect
discrimination.42
As the Equal Pay Directive is an interpreting and implementing measure
of Article 119, both provisions may be taken together in an examination
of the decisions of the European Court concerning indirect sex
discrimination contrary to EC law. In fact, cases are often argued using
the provisions of the Article 119 and the Directive in tandem.
The case of Jenkins v Kingsgate43 was a forerunner to the case law
regarding justification for indirect discrimination in pay and treatment.
The European Court, in its ruling, did not actually identify the
discrimination concerned as 'indirect discrimination', and consequently did
not discuss justification for indirect discrimination in those terms.
Nevertheless, important issues concerning justification for discrimination
were discussed in the proceedings.
Ms Jenkins worked part-time for Kingsgate. She claimed under the UK
Equal Pay Act 1970 for the same hourly rate of pay as a man employed
on like work. The UK industrial tribunal found that the difference in pay
was motivated by the need to discourage absenteeism, the need to ensure
that the expensive machinery in the factory was being used to its full
extent, and the need to encourage greater productivity. The case was
referred to the European Court, to determine whether in those
circumstances, there was a breach of EC law (Article 119 or Directive
75/117).
Ms Jenkins argued that the principle of equal pay, enshrined in EC law,
is violated not only where an employer intends to discriminate against a
woman on grounds of sex (direct discrimination) but also where the effect
of the employer's policy is to discriminate against her on such grounds
(indirect discrimination). She conceded that,
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'... in certain situations the difference in hourly rates of pay
between a female part-time worker and a male full-time worker may
be objectively justified by the operation of factors which are
unconnected with any discrimination on grounds of sex. It might
be the case, for example, that the male worker has superior slcill
or qualifications or longer service,'
but submitted further that,
'... the principle of equal pay is violated not only where an
employer intends to discriminate but also where the effect of his
policy on pay is to discriminate against her on such grounds. If
a condition or requirement which must be met in order to obtain
equal pay for equal work operates so as to exclude women and
cannot be shown to have a manifest relationship to the services
involved, the application of such a condition or requirement" , must
be considered to be contrary to the principle of equal pay.'"
According to the plaintiff, the standard of justification for discrimination
was to be in terms of a 'manifest relationship to the services involved'.
The Commission considered that it could be argued, in case of facts such
as were before the European Court in the Jenkins case, that equal pay
could not be excluded either a) on grounds that part-time or full-time
workers are not engaged on the same job, or b) on grounds that,
although it is in reality the same job, 'the fewer hours worked entail
additional charges (principally financial) for the employer, which may be
taken into consideration to give the female part-time employee a lower.
time rate.'45 However, in answer to a) the Commission considered that
the language versions other than English suggested it was the post or
the nature of the services, and not the number of hours worked which
determines whether it is the same job. As to b), the extra cost to the
employer, the Commission referred to its policy that 'factors affecting the
cost or yield of female labour shall not be taken into consideration in the
case of work paid by time.'46 Otherwise, this approach would enable-
employers to continue their discriminatory practices. The Commission
concluded,
'of course, that does not exclude the possibility that a difference
between two workers occupying the same post may be explained by
the operation of factors which are unconnected with any
discrimination on i,grounds of sex. Whether that is the case is a
question of fact."
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According to the Commission, the standard for justification was a showing
that the factor was 'unconnected with sex'.
The Court held
'... if it is established that a considerably smaller percentage of
women than men perform the minimum number of weekly working
hours required in order to be able to claim the full-time hourly
rate of pay, the inequality in pay will be contrary to Article 119 of
the Treaty where, regard being had to the difficulties encountered
by women in arranging to work that minimum number of hours per
week, the pay policy of the undertaking in question cannot be
explained by factors other than discrimination based on sex.
'... it is for the national courts to decide in each individual case
whether, regard being had to the facts of the case, its history and
the employer's intention, a pay policy such as that which is at
issue in the main proceedings although represented as a difference
based on weekly working hours is not in reality discrimination
based on the sex of the worker.
'... a difference in pay between full-time workers and part-time
workers does not amount to discrimination ... unless it is in reality
merely an indirect way of reducing the level of pay of part-time
workers on the ground that that grouR of workers is composed
exclusively or predominantly of women.'"
The judgment does not refer to the standard required for justification.
However, having established in Jenkins that, in principle, indirect
discrimination, prima fade contrary to the provisions of Article 119, could
be justified in certain circumstances, the Court considered in more detail
the question of the standard by which such justification could be
established, in the case of Bilka-Kauthaus v Weber von Hartz".
Full-time employees of Bilka were given a non-contributory pension on
retirement. Part-time employees only qualified for the pension if they
had been employed full-time for at least fifteen years. This was
indirectly discriminatory against women, since the proportion of women
workers who are able to undertake full-time employment, because of their
family duties, is considerably smaller than that of men. Therefore the
proportion of women able to qualify for the pension was considerably
smaller than that of men.
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Bilks contended that the exclusion of part-time workers from the pension
scheme was to discourage part-time employment. This was necessary, as
Bilks was obliged to employ some full-time workers to cover the evening
and Saturday opening times which were unpopular among part-timers, and
so had to make full-time work more attractive than part-time work. The
policy was therefore justified by economic necessity, as referred to in
Jenkins.
Ms Weber von Hartz argued that the objective of cutting down on part-
time employment could not justify the discrimination in pay.
'An employer who wishes, as a matter of policy, to encourage full-
time work is entitled to decide not to recruit part-time workers.
He cannot, however, without infringing Article 119, worsen the
situation of such workers, who are already upt a disadvantage ...
Any other solution would be discriminatory.'Ju
The Court held that,
'Article 119 is infringed by a department store company which
excludes part-time employees from its occupational pension scheme
where that exclusion affects a much greater number of women than
men, unless the enterprise shows that the exclusion is based on
objectively justified factors which are unrelated to any
discrimination based on sex ...
'It falls to the national court, which alone is competent to assess
the facts, to decide whether, and if so to what extent, the grounds
put forward by an employer to explain the adoption of a pay
practice which applies irrespective of the employee's sex, but which
in fact affects more women than men, can be considered to be
objectively justified for economic reasons. If the national court
finds the reasons chosen by Bilks; a) meet a genuine need of the
enterprise, b) are suitable for attaining the objective pursued by
the enterprise, and c) are necessary for that purpose, the fact that
the measures in question affect a much greater number of women
than men is n9t sufficient to conclude that they involve a breach
of Article 119.'31
The Bilka test for objective justification (that is, points a), b) and c)
above) has been applied in subsequent case law 52. It forms the basis of
EC law on justification for sex discrimination. Subsequent applications of
the Bilka test have clarified to a certain extent what is meant by the
provisions.
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Each of the three elements (or 'legs') of the Bilka test, an objective
criterion, a genuine need and suitable and necessary for the purpose, is
now considered in turn.
2.2.1.1 An objective criterion
It is not clear what (if anything) the requirement that a justification be
'objective' adds to the Bilka test. Objectivity in itself cannot be defined
in legal terms, as the decision as to objectivity is left to the discretion
of the court deciding the issue.53 All the court in fact appears to do is
decide whether the justification is 'acceptable'. The most obvious
interpretation is that the criterion used by the employer must not be one
that is itself based on discrimination on grounds of sex. It may not be
a generalisation based on presuppositions regarding the characteristics
of certain categories of worker, in this instance women.
This seems to be what the European Court is suggesting in
Rinner-laihn54. This case concerned the compatibility with Article 119
of a provision of German law excluding the obligation of employers to pay
sick pay to employees who work less than 10 hours a week or 45 hours
a month, the provision being indirectly discriminatory as most part-time
workers are women. The question was whether the different policy for
part-timers was justified. The Commission considered that it could not
be economically defensible and socially necessary to grant the benefit of
six weeks' payment of wages to full-time workers whilst part-timers, who
are the socially weaker, should be denied the benefit. The German
government's argument that the obligation of continued payment by the
employer in the event of illness flowed from its duty of social care, for
which there was no basis with regard to those who are minimally
employed could not be regarded as convincing.55
The Court held that the Member State concerned was required to show
that the legislation was justified by objective factors unrelated to any
discrimination on grounds of sex, and that this was for the national court
to determine. 56
 It specifically rejected the argument of the German
government that the legislation was justified because the part-time
European Community
	 70
workers were not integrated in or connected with the undertaking in a
comparable way to other workers and therefore the conditions for
recognition of a duty of care from the employer towards them, including
an obligation to continue to pay wages, did not exist.57
'... [T]hese considerations only represent generalised statements
concerning certain categories of workers and do not therefore admit
the conclusion of objective criteria unrelated to any discrimination
on grounds of sex.'
This statement probably reveals no more than that the Court regarded the
purported justification as unacceptable. In other words it was not based
on a genuine objective, which operates to outweigh the right to equal
treatment. This is a restatement of the other branches of the Mika test,
that justification must be based on a 'genuine need' and the measure in
question must be 'suitable and necessary' to meet that need, that is,
applied in accordance with the principle of proportionality58.
In Danfoss59, in the context of a pay grading agreement, the European
Court interpreted the 'objective criterion' part of the test using a
different approach. The Court held that the application of the criteria
must be objective. The Danfoss decision concerned a collective agreement
between Handles-Og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark (a Danish
staff union) and Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (an employer's association)
(acting for Danfoss). Under the agreement, the same basic rates of pay
applied to all workers in the same grade. Grading was determined by job
classification. However, a provision of the agreement allowed the payment
of additional wages to individuals within a particular grade on the basis
of 'flexibility', vocational training and seniority. The union pointed out
that within a pay grade the average pay of women was less than that of
men. The application of the criteria was contended to be discriminatory,
contrary to the equal pay principle.
Concerning the 'flexibility' criterion, the Court distinguished between
flexibility as referring to the quality of work carried out by the
employee, and flexibility as the adaptability of the employee to variable
work schedules and places of work. The former could not constitute
justification, as it was totally neutral from the point of view of sex, and
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so if it were shown that the use of the criterion led to systematic
unfairness to women, that could only be because the employer had applied
it in an abusive manner. The purported justification therefore failed, as
it was shown not to be an objective factor unrelated to grounds of sex.
In a situation, such as that in Dan foss, the disparate results, as between
male and female workers, from the application of the criterion could be
regarded as evidence of direct discrimination. If this is accepted, then
neither interpretation of the word 'objective' adds anything to the
existing interpretation of the Bilka test for justification of indirect
discrimination. What is meant by 'objectivity' is included in the second
and third legs of the test, which are now examined in turn.
2.2.1.2 'Genuine need of the enterprise'
The second leg of Bilks is that the justification advanced by the employer
as a defence must relate to a 'genuine need of the enterprise'. What
exactly is meant by genuine need of the enterprise is not elaborated in
the Bilka decision; all that the European Court pronounced was that it is
for the national courts of the Member States to decide in each case. The
types of need which are acceptable as justification are discussed below.
The standard applied to the 'need' is that it must be 'genuine' and not
spurious or merely convenient.
2.2.1.3 'Suitable for attaining the objective pursued and necessary for
that purpose'
The third leg of Bilka is that the measure be 'suitable for attaining the
objective pursued'. The requirement for 'suitability' could conceivably
be narrowly construed to connote that if the discriminatory policy alleged
to be serving the genuine need established by the enterprise could not
possibly meet that need, then the policy is unacceptable.
A different interpretation of 'suitability' was used by the German court
which applied for the ruling in Bilks!. It was decided that the alleged
justification for giving superior pension conditions to full-time workers
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was inter alia to enable the store to maintain its staffing levels on
Saturdays, allegedly unpopular with part-timers. It was accepted by the
court that the policy of the employer would not necessarily (rather than
could not possibly) have the desired effect, and in particular that there
had been no attempt by the employer to offer the superior pension rights
to part-timers who did work on Saturdays, therefore that the requirement
of suitability in Bilks had not been met.
The requirement that a justification be 'suitable for attaining the
objective pursued and necessary for that purpose' presents a tight
standard by which justifications are to be assessed for legality. Each
requirement is useful separately, but it may also be considered that the
two requirements together comprise a statement of the requirement for
proportionality.
The principle of proportionality, which has its origins in German law, is
well established in the law of the European Community. The principle
requires that, in the exercise of powers, the means used by the person
or body exercising the powers must be in proportion to the ultimate
objective or ends, which the exerciser of the powers seeks to achieve.
In the case of indirect discrimination on grounds of sex, the principle of
proportionality requires that, for example, an employer seeking to justify
an employment policy which discriminates in its impact against women (or.
men) must show that the method chosen to achieve the policy is
proportionate to the effect or impact of the policy. In practice, this
means that, since the principle of non-discrimination or equality is central
to the law of the European Community, if there exists a
non-discriminatory (or less discriminatory) means of achieving the policy,
the principle of proportionality will not be satisfied. The measure must
be no more than is necessary to meet its objective 61. It follows that
even if an employer succeeds in establishing a genuine business need, it
may still fail to justify its policy, if the employee who has been
discriminated against can show that the allegedly discriminatory measure
is disproportionate to the achievement of the 'genuine business need'.
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What is to be regarded as proportionate in terms of measures which
discriminate against women (or men) has not been made explicit by the
Court and could not be, given the multiplicity of possible situations in
which such a question might arise. For guidance in this respect, one may
look to other areas of European Community law in which the principle of
proportionality has been applied.
The principle of proportionality permeates EC law. Recognised as a
'general principle' of EC law 62, it has been applied in numerous
substantive areas, including agriculture, competition, free movement of
persons and free movement of goods, as well as sex discrimination. As
an illustration of the operation of the principle of proportionality in EC
law, the principle of proportionality as applied to derogations to the
principles of free movement of workers and of goods, in the context of
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is instructive. Here the
principle of proportionality is very strictly interpreted by the European
Court, when ruling on measures which discriminate on grounds of
nationality, but which Member States seek to justify. In particular it is
to be noted that the European Court will often suggest ways of achieving
the purpose for which the Member State seeks to justify the derogation
which will have a less discriminatory effect. If such an alternative is
successfully shown, then the measure in question will fail the
proportionality test.
For example, in Watson and Belmann63 the attempt of the Belgian state
authorities to expel a worker for failure to comply with certain
registration requirements failed. The Court explained that the Belgian
authorities could require registration formalities and could even impose
penalties for failure to comply with such formalities, but the penalty of
expulsion from the Member State was disproportionate to the end that the
Belgian authorities wished to achieve. Member States 'are not justified
in imposing a penalty so disproportionate to the gravity of the
infringement that it becomes an obstacle to the free movement of
persons. ,64 Other, less drastic, penalties could easily meet the required
objective.
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Where a fundamental right, enshrined in the Treaty, such as the right to
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, is derogated from in EC law,
in order that the derogation be lawful, its effects must be proportionate
to the reason for the derogation. The most important consideration here
is that if there is any other way to achieve the desired end which
justifies the derogation, then the requirement of proportionality has not
been met. Where derogation is from Article 119, this is also a situation
of derogation from a fundamental right, enshrined in the Treaty. There
is no reason to suppose that the European Court will be any less strict
in its application of the principle in such cases.
2.2.2 Equal Treatment Directive 76/207
The principles developed by the European Court for justification of
indirect pay discrimination were assumed also to apply to indirect
discrimination by unequal treatment of women and men. 65
 This was
confirmed in Danfoss66, where the Court applied the same guidelines in
a situation relating to unequal treatment. The discussion above applies
to justification for indirect discrimination in treatment of women and men.
3 Substantive Grounds of Justification for Unequal Treatment
As shown above, in certain circumstances, unequal treatment of women
and men in employment is justifiable in EC law. Various of these
circumstances (as regards discrimination in pay and in treatment) are now
discussed, by way of examples of types of justifications or grounds for
justification accepted by the European Court. As the rules have not had
a long period of time over which to develop, the number of relevant cases
is still small.
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3.1 Direct discrimination
3.1.1 Activities excluded from the principle of equal treatment
Article 2 (2) of the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207, allows Member States
to exclude from the application of the Directive those occupational
activities and where appropriate, the training leading thereto, for which
the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor.
The exception is applicable to individual activities only, and not to entire
occupations or professions. It must be read alongside Article 9 (2) which
requires Member States to assess periodically the activities in Article 2
(2) to decide whether it is necessary to maintain the exclusions and to
notify the Commission of those activities which still remain excluded from
the principle of equal treatment.
The UK succeeded in establishing an exception under Article 2 (2), on the
ground that 'public safety' justified direct discrimination, in Johnston v
RUG-7. It is the policy of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) that
women who are members of the force do not carry firearms, as it is
thought that this increases the risk of their assassination. In 1980, the
RUC began implementing a policy, the effect of which was that the
contracts of women members were renewed only in those cases where the
duties could only be undertaken by a woman member. This narrowed
considerably the number of posts available to women members of the RUC.
Ms Johnston's contract was not renewed. If she had been a man, it would
have been, as she would have been trained in the use of firearms and
therefore would have been able to undertake the same duties as a male
member of the force. She claimed this was sex discrimination under UK
law. However, this claim failed, as the Secretary of State had issued a
certificate under the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1986,
stating that the reason for this policy was the safeguarding of national
security and the protection of public safety and public order. This was
a complete defence to the claim of unlawful discrimination under the Sex
Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order.
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Having failed to establish a claim under UK law, Ms Johnston brought an
alternative claim under EC law, relying on the Equal Treatment Directive.
The UK government averred that Article 2 (2) of the Directive was an
adequate defence; in particular that the nature and context of the duties
of jobs concerned with policing Northern Ireland were such that the
firearms policy was appropriate, and therefore that the exclusion of
women from those duties in which it was necessary to carry firearms was
within the remit of the exclusion clause. The Industrial Tribunal referred
to the European Court for a preliminary ruling.
The Court held that in a situation such as that prevailing in Northern
Ireland, the carrying of firearms by policewomen carrying out particular
duties might create additional risks and might therefore be contrary to
the requirements of public safety. The sex of the police officer may then
constitute a determining factor for carrying out the specific duties. If
that is established, a Member State may restrict such tasks to men
(Directive 76/207, Article 2 (2)), provided that the principle of
proportionality is met.68
The decision in Re Sex Discrimination in the Civil Service: EC Commission
v France69 narrowed the scope of the Johnston decision. The
recruitment practices in France for 'head warders' (the governors of small
prisons) and five categories in the national police force were based on a
policy of separate recruitment competitions for women and men, with a
percentage of posts to be allotted to women and men respectively in each
competition.
The Court held that the quotas for the various grades of police officers
were not sufficiently related to the specific activities concerned, therefore
that a justification relating to 'public security' in general could not be
applied to employment in all posts in the police force of a Member State.
In assessing the justifiability of the requirement for the post of head
warder, the Court first examined the post of warder, from which
individuals are promoted to head warder. The Court ruled that the
specific nature of the post of warder, in particular, the conditions in
which warders carry out their duties, justifies the exclusion of women
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from posts in male prisons and men from posts in female prisons.
Because appointments of head warders are justifiably made from the pool
of warders, in particular given that head warders should have had
experience of the job of warder, this justified the discriminatory policy
vis a vis the appointment of head warders.
That 'public security' may be a ground for justification for direct
discrimination in certain specific policing and prison duties is accepted
by the European Court.
3.1.2 Pregnancy and maternity
Article 2 (3) of the Equal Treatment Directive allows justification for
direct discrimination on the grounds of 'special protection for women'.
This ground of justification is confined to special protection in the
specific case of pregnancy and maternity. Measures of positive
discrimination which favour women may be justified under Article 2 (3);
however, the provision may not be used to justify measures which operate
to the disadvantage of women.
The arguments that the prohibition of night-work for women was
consistent with the aims of protection of women, and 'special
considerations of a social nature', such as the risk of assault, were not
accepted by the Court, in Ministbre Public v Stoeckel°. As regards
protection of women employees, the risks incurred by women were not
different in kind from those incurred by men, except in the specific case
of pregnancy and maternity, for which derogation is allowed under the
Directiven. As regards the risk of assault of women, the Court held
that, even if this was greater at night than during the day, the exclusion
of women from night-work was a disproportionate measure to deal with
the problem.
In Johnston v RUGn, the European Court found that Article 2 (3) was to
be interpreted strictly, and that the provision was intended to protect
the biological condition of women in their child-bearing role, in particular
the special relationship between a mother and her child. A general
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protective provision for women, such as the one concerned in Johnston,
could not be justified under Article 2 (3).
This interpretation was upheld in Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkassel. In
its ruling, the Court emphasised the special nature of Article 2 (3). The
provision allows Member States to provide for protection for the biological
condition of women during and after pregnancy, and the special
relationship between mother and child during the period following
pregnancy and birth. These are specific, delimited grounds for
derogation, and may not be extended by liberal interpretation. In
particular, Article 2 (3) may not to used to advantage men.
German law granted six months maternity leave to working mothers.
Hofmann, the father of a child, asked to claim the maternity leave, so that
he could care for the child while the mother returned to work. Hofmann
claimed that the provision of German law was contrary to Directive 76/207.
The European Court disagreed, holding that the maternity leave fell within
the scope of Article 2 (3), as its purpose was the protection of a woman
in connection with the effects of pregnancy and motherhood. As only the
mother could undergo the pregnancy, the leave could legitimately be
granted to the mother, and refused to the father 74. The purpose of
Article 2 (3) is to protect the 'special relationship between a woman and
her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth'..
Pressure on a mother to return to work could have a detrimental effect
on this relationship.75
This narrow and literal construction of Article 2 (3) was confirmed by the
decision in Re Protection of Women: EC Commission v Franc?.
An argument based on the provision in Article 2 (4), which allows.
justification for discrimination in measures designed to promote equal
opportunity for women and men, was advanced by the French Government
in Re Protection of Women. However the argument was unsuccessful. The
European Court held that the privileges for women granted by the
legislation, such as an extra day's holiday per year for mothers, and
special allowances to pay for childminders, were not justified by the
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precise objective in Article 2 (4) of eliminating de facto inequalities.
Since there has been no decision in which reliance on Article 2 (4) has
been successful, one may only conjecture as to the types of provision
which would be regarded as justifiable as promotive measures for women
in EC law. Measures of positive discrimination which favour women (and
therefore operate to men's disadvantage), for example measures applied
in recruitment, might be justified. Inference from the decided cases on
subsections (2) and (3) suggests that any provisions would have to be
specifically designed and applied to meet a particular need of women, and,
as always, subject to the proportionality principle.
Pregnancy and maternity are accepted grounds in European Community
law for the justification of measures discriminating between women and
men, but which favour women employees; that is, measures of positive
discrimination. However, measures detrimental to women may not be
justified on grounds of pregnancy, as the following two decisions of the
European Court demonstrate.
The Dekkern case raised a number of questions focusing around whether
the fact that an applicant for a job is pregnant can constitute a
justification in EC law for refusing to employ the -applicant. Ms Dekker
was already pregnant when she applied for a post in a Youth Centre run
by VJV. Although the appointments committee considered Ms Dekker to
be the most suitable candidate for the post, the Board of VJV decided
they could not take her on as an employee. The reason for this,
according to the Board, was that their insurer would not reimburse them
for sickness benefits which they would have to pay Ms Dekker while she
was on maternity leave, on the grounds that this risk for the employer
was foreseeable at the time of appointment, and thus excluded from cover
under the insurance policy. The insurance policy treated maternity leave
in the same way as sick leave. The exclusion of liability was lawful,
according to the provisions of Dutch law which covered the insurers.
Ms Dekker claimed that the refusal to employ her was contrary to the
provision of Dutch law implementing Directive 76/207. Lower Dutch courts
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considered that there had been a prima fade breach, but that this was
justified by the relevant provisions of Dutch law.
The Dutch Supreme Court applied to the European Court for a preliminary
ruling, with the following question.
'Is an employer directly or indirectly in breach of the principle of
equal treatment referred to in Articles 2 (1) and 3 (1) of the
Directive if he refuses to enter into a contract of employment with
an applicant found suitable by him, where such refusal is on the
grounds of the possible adverse consequences for him arising from
employing a woman who is pregnant at the time of the application,
because of a Government Regulation concerning incapacity to work
which treats inability to work because of pregnancy and
confinement in the same way as inability to work because of
illness?'
Ms Dekker's contention was that because the disadvantage arising out of
a refusal of insurance cover for pregnancy and maternity leave is a
disadvantage which can only affect female employees, it is a sex-based
distinction. Such distinctions are not permitted by EC law, in particular
the Equal Treatment Directive. Once the principle of equal treatment had
been violated, Ms Dekker argued that the employer could not claim that
it would be too detrimental financially for the employer to accord to her
equal treatment.	 '
VJV argued that the requisite discriminatory motive on the part of the
employer was lacking. Discrimination in breach of the Directive could
only be established if the rejection of the female applicant was based on
the fact that the employer did not want the post to be offered to a
woman. In this case, the reason why Ms Dekker was not offered the post
was not because she was a women, or even because she was pregnant.
It was merely because of the financial risk which VJV might incur in
employing her, if it were not reimbursed in respect of the sickness
payments it would be obliged to make to Ms Dekker during her maternity
leave. The implication was that this financial risk was one which any
employer would be justified in seeking to avoid.
The Court held:
European Community	 81
'As employment can only be refused because of pregnancy to
woman, such a refusal is direct discrimination on grounds of sex.
A refusal to employ because of the financial consequences of
absence connected with pregnancy must be deemed to be based
principally on the fact of the pregnancy. Such discrimination
cannot be justified by the financial detriment in the case of
recruitment of a pregpant woman suffered by the employer during
her maternity leave.'"
The Court also rejected the idea that grounds existing in national law
could be accepted without further examination as grounds for justification
in EC law. 79 Pregnancy and maternity could not be grounds justifying
detrimental treatment of a woman employee.
The Court reasserted that discrimination on grounds of pregnancy of an
employee constitutes unjustified direct sex discrimination in EC law in the
case of Hertz", in the context of a dismissal.
'[T]he dismissal of a female worker because of her pregnancy
constitutes direct discrimination on gr9,unds of sex, as does also the
refusal to recruit a pregnant woman.'''
However, dismissal of a woman employee because of repeated absence due
to illness which appears after the period of maternity leave provided
under national law, even if this illness is attributable to the pregnancy,
is not discrimination, as the woman is being dismissed for illness under
the same conditions as a man 82.
3.2 Indirect discrimination
Indirect discrimination, in pay and in treatment, against women employees,
may be justified on a number of grounds. The grounds of justification
for indirect discrimination have been divided into three categories.
Justification may be based on a 'genuine need' of the employer related to
the particular duties of a job, or may be more general, relating to the
employer's enterprise as a whole. These two categories have been termed
'job related justifications' and 'enterprise related justifications'. The
third category is that in which the 'genuine need' is the need of the
State to maintain a measure of social policy which is indirectly
discriminatory, and which impacts on the position of women in employment.
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This type of justification has been termed 'public interest related'. The
European Court has ruled on justification in all three types of situation,
but does not distinguish between them in these terms.
3.2.1 Job related justifications
An indirectly discriminatory provision or policy of an employer may be
fairly readily accepted by the European Court as justified if the provision
relates directly to the performance of the job. The employer must show
that this is a real and not spurious relationship, and must, as for all
justification claims, satisfy the proportionality test.
3.2.1.1 Flexibility
If the employer can show that the activities of a job carry with them a
genuine need for 'flexibility', that is, the adaptability of the employee to
variable work schedules and places of work, then it may establish a
ground of justification in EC law.
This was accepted in the case of Danfoss83, even though such a
requirement could disadvantage women, who were -less likely to be able
to organise their working time in a flexible way because of their
household and family duties.
'[A]s in the case of Bilka, in which the Court held that there was
no infringement of Article 119 where an undertaking establishes
that a pay practice which affects a much higher number of women
than men was determined by objectively justified factors unrelated
to any discrimination based on sex, in the case of a pay practice
which gives special rewards for the adaptability of workers, the
employer may justify payment for such adaptability by showing that
it is of importance in the performance of the specific duties
entrusted to the worker concerned.'
It is noteworthy that the European Court insists that the requirement for
flexibility must be related to the specific activities of the job if a job-
related justification is to be established. A general requirement for a
flexible workforce would not be a ground for justification.
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3.2.1.2 Vocational training
Dan foss also established that in a pay system which discriminated against
women, by using, inter alia, the criterion of vocational training as
grounds for making additional payments to workers, the use of the
criterion of vocational training could justify the discrimination.
'The Equal Pay Directive must be interpreted as meaning that where
the worker's vocational training is used as a criterion for pay
increments and this works systematically to the disadvantage of
female workers, the employer may justify the use of the criterion
of vocational training by demonstrating that such training is
importanA for the performance of specific duties entrusted to the
worker.'"
With both the criteria of flexibility and vocational training, the employer
may only establish the justification if it satisfies the Court that the
application of the criteria is within the principle of proportionality. This
is effected by demonstrating a nexus between the qualities of the
employee which are rewarded by greater pay, and the specific duties of
the job undertaken by the employee. This factor in establishing
justification was stressed by the judgment of the European Court in
Dan foss.
3.2.1.3 Seniority
Paying a more senior worker at a higher level is a ground for
justification of indirect discrimination in EC law; this was also established
in Dan foss. The European Court also allowed the relaxation of the
proportionality test in this instance, on the assumption that seniority
always affects favourably an employee's ability to carry out the duties of
the job.
'... [T]he employer does not need to give any specific justification
for using the worker's seniority as a criterion for pay increments.
'Even though the criterion of seniority ... may result in less
favourable treatment of women workers than of male workers,
seniority goes hand in hand with experience which generally places
a worker in a better position to carry out his duties. Therefore
it is permissible for the employer to reward it without the need to
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establish the importance which it takes on f9F the performance of
the specific duties entrusted to the worker.'"
3.2.1.4 Physical ability to perform the job
As men, in general, have greater muscular strength than women,
employment conditions which require, or reward, muscular strength may
be indirectly discriminatory. The indirect discrimination is justified if the
duties of the job require the use of muscular strength. Physical ability
to perform a job provides a ground of justification. The higher payment
of staff who carry out heavy physical work may also be justified.
In Rummler v Dato Drucic86, the European Court ruled on the question of
whether a particular job classification system was compatible with
provisions of EC law, in particular the Equal Pay Directive 75/117. The
job classification system relied on such criteria as 'demand on the
muscles', 'muscular effort' and 'heavy work': it is more difficult for
women, in general, to carry out jobs which involve such muscular
activity. Moreover, the system used male standards as a point of
reference in evaluating muscular activity.
The Court, considering the provision in Article 1 of the Directive, which
states that a job classification system 'must be based on the same criteria
for both men and women and so drawn up as to exclude discrimination on
grounds of sex', held that,
'... the principle of equal pay requires essentially that the nature
of the work to be carried out be considered objectively. ... Where
a job classification system is used in determining remuneration, that
system must be based on criteria which do not differ according to
whether the work is carried out by a man or a woman and must not
be organised, as a whole, in such a manner that it has the practical
effect of discriminating generally against workers of one sex.'' -
In order to determine whether or not a particular criterion applied in a
job classification scheme is discriminatory, it must be considered in the
context of the scheme in its entirety. 88 The use of a criterion such as
muscular demand to determine pay, may be justified, according to the
European Court, if the pay difference relates to a genuine need of the
employer, in that it ensures a level of pay appropriate to the effort
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required by the work 89, with the proviso that the job classification
system as a whole must not be discriminatory.
With this guidance, the Court held that it is for the national court to
determine, on a case by case basis, whether or not a job classification
system, as a whole, is non-discriminatory.
3.2.2 Enterprise related justifications
This category relates to justifications which are not referable directly to
the duties of the job to be carried out by the employee, but relate to the
employer's enterprise as a whole. The Court, in the early judgment of
Bilks, suggested that justification might be established 'for economic
reasons' 90. The European Court has not explained which economic
reasons it is prepared to consider, nor whether reasons other than
'economic reasons' may be used by an employer to justify
discrimination91, nor what is the relationship between such economic
reasons and the principle of non-discrimination between women and men
on grounds of sex which is considered to be a central principle of the
Treaty of Rome. To date there are only a few decisions of the European
Court which address 'enterprise related' justifications.
3.2.2.1 Economic efficiency
In the leading case of Bilks Kauthaus v Weber von Hartz92, discussed
above, the employer claimed that the provision which disadvantaged part-
time employees was justified by the economic running of the business, in
particular, the need to have staff available to cover all opening times of
the enterprise.
Provisions excluding part-time workers from employment may be job
related, if the employer can establish that the duties of the job are such
that the job must be carried out by a full-time member of staff. However
provisions which disadvantage part-time workers relate more generally to
the employer's business, for example, the employer may treat full-time
staff more favourably on the grounds that it must retain some full-time
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staff for the proper operation of the business as a whole. This sort of
claim must be evaluated as an 'enterprise related' justification.
Because the percentage of women who work part-time is considerably
higher than that of men, and because women, due to family and child-care
duties, are in general less able than men to undertake full-time
employment, practices and policies which disadvantage part-time workers
may fall foul of the provisions of EC law prohibiting indirect sex
discrimination. This was accepted by the European Court in the Enka
case.93
On the question of justification for the policy excluding part-time workers
from an occupational pension scheme, the European Court examined the
arguments put forward by Bilks and by Ms Weber von Hartz.
'In its observations, Bilks contends that the exclusion of part-time
employees from the occupational pension scheme ems solely to
discourage part-time employment. In this connection it claims that
part-time employees normally refuse to work late in the afternoons
and on Saturdays. Consequently it was necessary for Bilks, in
order to ensure the presence of a sufficient number of employees
at these times, to make full-time work more attractive than part-
time work, by limiting admission to the occupational pension scheme
to full-time workers only. Bilks deduces from this that, on the
basis of the judgment in Jenkins, it cannot be accused of having
breached Article 119.
'With regard to the reasons invoked as justification for the
exclusion in question, Mrs Weber points out that Bilks is not
obliged to recruit part-time employees and that, if it decides to do
so, it is not authorised subsequently to limit the pension rights of
those employees, who already suffer nia curtailment of their rights
due to their shorter working hours.'"
The European Court ruled that the decision on justifiability was for the
national court, which has the competence to assess the facts.
'If the national court finds that the means chosen by Bilks meet a
genuine need of the enterprise, that they are suitable for attaining
the objective pursued by the enterprise and are necessary for that
purpose, the fact that the measures in question affect a much
greater number of women than men is nq sufficient to conclude
that they involve a breach of Article 119.'"
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Applying the ruling from the European Court, the BundesArbeitsGericht
(BAG) (Federal Labour Court) rejected the claims of the employer 96. As
regards organisational problems and higher costs to the employer in the
employment of part-time workers, the BAG held that the impact of part-
time workers on these could only be regarded as minimal, and in any case
was offset by benefits to the employer in employing part-time workers.
As for the necessity to encourage Saturday working, the BAG pointed out
that, even if this was a 'genuine need of the enterprise', the pensions
policy was not 'suitable for attaining the objective'. In particular there
was no differentiation in the pension scheme between Saturday workers
and part-time workers, neither was provision made in the scheme for
part-time workers to qualify for the scheme by working on Saturdays.
Justification for provisions which discriminate against part-time workers,
and therefore indirectly against women, has not proved easy so far to
establish in EC law. As the law stands, the employer would have to show
a specific need, more than a convenience, to treat part-time workers
differently, and to satisfy the requirement of proportionality.
3.2.3 Public interest related justifications
-
Where indirect discrimination arises from provisions of legislation or other
measures taken by the State which regulate the employment relationship,
the State may argue that the discriminatory effect of the measures is
justified by the benefit they provide to the public in general, or by
'social policy'. In the Rinner-Kiihn judgment, the European Court
suggested that an indirectly discriminatory legislative provision could be
justified if it was 'necessary for social policy' 91, adding this, as a
ground for justification, to the 'economic' ground put forward in Bilka
The Court has not distinguished its reasoning in Bilks, requiring
employers to justify indirect discrimination, for job related or enterprise
related reasons, from justification on grounds of 'public interest'.
Nevertheless, the issues arising in a purported public interest
justification may be different from those in the other types of
justification. In particular, the issue of what should be the requirement
on the State to justify the continued application of legislation which is
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indirectly discriminatory, where the issue is most likely to be raised in
a case between an employee, who disputes the compatibility of the
legislation with the equal treatment principle, and an employer who relies
on the legislation in its defence, must be dealt with.98
3.2.3.1 Social policy
In Rinner-KOhn v FWW Spezia1-Gebiludereinigung 99, the question as to the
compatibility with Article 119 of provisions of employment policy
disadvantaging part-time workers was referred to the European Court for
a preliminary ruling. As explained above 188, in this case, the provisions
were contained in German legislation. The Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz101
 (Act
on the Continued Payment of Wages) provided that the employer must
continue to pay wages for six weeks to employees unable to work, because
of illness: however, workers whose employment contract provides for a
normal working week not exceeding 10 hours a week, or 45 hours a month
are excluded from the provision.
Ms Rinner-Kiihn normally worked for 10 hours per week. Her request for
payment of sick pay, on her absence due to illness, was refused by the
employer. The German Labour Court, faced with the problem of
interpretation of the provisions of Article 119 and Directive 75/117,
referred to the European Court the following question.
'Is a legislative provision excluding from the principle of continued
payment of salary by the employer during illness those workers
whose normal period of work does not exceed 10 hours a week or
45 hours a month compatible with Article 119 ... and Directive
75/117 ... - although the proportion of female workers suffering
adverse effects. from this exclusion is much higher than that of
male workers?' 1u2
The German government claimed that the exclusion of part-time workers
Erom the provisions granting sick pay to employees was justified by the
fact that part-time workers were not integrated in or connected with the
indertaking in the same way as full-time workers. Therefore, the duty
)f care of the employer to its full-time workers, including an obligation
:o continue to pay wages in the event of illness of the employee, was not
'resent in the case of part-time workers.
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The Commission disagreed. The policy permitted by the legislation
amounted to the unequal treatment of women and men, which was not
objectively justifiable.
'It was hard to see why it should be economically defensible and
socially necessary to grant the benefit of six weeks' payment of
wages to full-time workers whilst those who are employed for
minimal periods, who are the socially weaker, should be refused
such payment. Social protection was being withdrawn exactly where
in practice one was most reliant upon it. The reason given by the
German Government - that the obligation of continued payment by
the employer in the event of illness flowed from his duty of social
care - could not be regarded as convincing. The legislature, in
dealing with the question of recognition of the duty of social care,
did not only have to be guided by the employer's willingness to
give st;41 care but equally by the need for such of the
worker.' 1"
The Court held that the measure in question was in principle contrary to
the provisions of Article 119. Court then turned to the issue of
justification, holding that the assertion of the German government, that
the lack of integration in or connection with an undertaking of part-time
employees justified the legislation, could not be accepted.
The Commission's reasoning focuses on the vulnerability of part-time
workers, most of whom are women, arguing that a policy such as the one
in question which disadvantages the very group most in need of
protection cannot be justified. The Court does not go this far. The
Court instead adds 'necessity for social policy' to the business necessity
test of Bilka. It is unclear whether the 'social policy' ground of
justification is available to employers for justification of individual
employment policies, or whether it will only apply to the justification of
legislative measures. The judgment leaves open the question of which
social policies might operate to outweigh the non-discrimination principle.
It is important in this context to refer to the other part of the Bilka test,
that requiring proportionality.105
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3.2.3.2 Special social needs
As there is little case law in the area of employment concerning
justification for indirect discrimination on 'public interest related' ground,
a brief examination of decisions of the European Court in the area of
social security is now undertaken. The decisions indicate that the answer
to the question of whether 'social policy' can operate to outweigh the
principle of non-discrimination turns on the purpose of the social security
provisions concerned. If the indirectly discriminatory provision operates
to alleviate a particular social need, then it may be justified. If the
European Court were to apply similar reasoning to the employment sphere,
then the purpose of the legislation in question would have to be assessed,
and balanced against the anti-discrimination provisions in EC law, that is,
equality of opportunity for women and men in employment.
Article 4 (1) of the Social Security Directive (79/7) provides that there
is to be no discrimination on grounds of sex, either directly or indirectly,
in regard to social security. If considerably more married men than
married women carry on occupational activities, and therefore considerably
fewer women have a dependent spouse, social security benefits linked to
marital status or family responsibilities in such a-way that dependents are
only entitled to the benefit if the income of their spouse is below a
certain level, have the effect of discriminating indirectly against women..
This was the case in Teuling v Bedrijsvereiniging voor de Chemische
Industriel°6. The Court held that
'In such circumstances a supplement linked to family responsibilities
is contrary to Article 4 (1) of the directive if the grant thereof
cannot be justitipd by reasons which exclude discrimination on
grounds of sex.'"'
In order to decide whether justification was established, regard must be
had to the purpose of the social security benefit supplements concerned.
The purpose of the supplements in this case was to provide a minimum
subsistence income for individuals who had no income from work. The
heavier burdens, or special 'social needs', borne by such individuals who
also had a dependent spouse or children, or both, justified the policy
under which the supplements were granted. The supplements were
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necessary for the purpose of providing a minimum subsistence income.'"
The ground for justification was the social benefit of the provisions.
The European Court followed the ruling in Teuling in its decision in
Commission v Belgiumi". The Belgian system of social security benefits
uses a classification of social security recipients which divides recipients
into three categories: workers cohabiting with a partner, a parent or a
child who has no income; workers living alone; and workers cohabiting
with a person who has an income. The rates of benefit vary depending
on the group to which an individual recipient belongs, and are calculated
by reference to previous income. The system operated so as to grant the
most benefit to those in the first group and least benefit to those in the
third group.
The Commission considered that this was indirectly discriminatory on
grounds of sex, since most of those who benefitted in the first (most
favoured) group were men, and the third (least favoured) group consisted
predominantly of women. The statistics provided by the Belgian
government supported this view. The question therefore turned on the
question of whether the policy was justified: the Commission argued that
it could not be justified in a case where previous income, and not the
needs of the recipients, was used in the calculations of benefits.
The Court noted that it was established that indirect discrimination in
provision of social security benefits was outlawed by Article 4 (1) of the
Social Security Directive.
The Court referred to its approach in the context of equal pay in the
Rinner-Kalin case, holding that, if a Member State can show that,
'the means chosen are necessary to fulfil an aim of its social policy,
and that they are indeed likely to achieve the objective sought by
that policy and are necessary to do so, the fact alone that a system
benefits a much higher number of men cannott n be considered as a
violation of the principle of equal treatment'.uu
The Court also noted the argument of the Belgian government that its
system was an integral part of its social policy, the purpose of which was
to provide a minimum replacement income. In order to do so, it was
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essential that the policy took account of the different needs of the
persons receiving the benefits. The Court was convinced that the system
fulfilled a legitimate objective of social policy and was necessary and
proportionate."
The characterisation by the European Court of the policy as having the
aim of guaranteeing a minimum income to families, that is, similar to the
system in Teuling, was crucial to the decision. The Court did not regard
it as significant that, in this case, the amounts of benefit could vary
according to the previous income of the breadwinner, and were not
calculated solely according to need.
The case law on the Social Security Directive is still in its infancy: it
remains to be seen how the Court will develop the rules, and therefore
which social security measures are acceptable with regard to the principle
of equal treatment of women and men in EC law. However, it seems likely
that 'legitimate needs' of social policy will encompass a wider scope of
needs than those of employers.
4 Conclusion
While the European Court has made a significant impact in developing
rules of EC law relating to the justifiability of unequal treatment of
women and men, it is fair to say that this development is still in its early
stages.
This is perhaps not so much the case for justification for direct
discrimination, particularly where the European Court is concerned with
interpretation of provisions of secondary legislation, for, in these
circumstances, clear and fairly tight rules, both on the standard for
justification, and on the grounds of justification, exist in the legislation.
The European Court has construed measures in secondary legislation with
a view to protecting the central principle of equality for women and men
in employment, which is enshrined in the Treaty. In particular, it is the
application of the principle of proportionality by the European Court to
situations in which employers (or Member States) seek to differentiate
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between women and men in an employment situation which has made it
difficult to establish justification for direct discrimination.
As regards justification for indirect discrimination, while the Bilka test
makes some contribution to development of EC rules, this contribution is
more directed towards establishing a framework for examination of
complaints, rather than laying down concrete and practical rules of
interpretation. The requirement that the discriminatory policy serve a
'genuine need of the enterprise' is a good example: while it forces the
employer to show what the purported need is for the discriminatory
policy, the European Court has not established clearly what type of needs
of an enterprise will be entertained as fulfilling this Bilka criterion. The
judgments in Jenkins and in Bilka itself suggest an examination of needs
limited to 'economic' needs: the judgment in Pinner-Kahn examines 'social'
policies. The link between the needs of an employer and the 'social
policy' of a Member State has not yet been explored. Neither has the link
between cases concerned with employment law, and those applying the
Bilka test in social security law, such as Teuling and Commission v
Belgium.
The most significant control introduced by the European Court in this
area is the proportionality requirement. The framework of Bilks, which
requires that employers show their justification in terms of the business
need, allows examination of the relationship of the means to this end in
accordance with the principle of proportionality.
The Bilka framework leaves much to the discretion of the courts of the
MS, especially because the context in which claims of discrimination come
before the European Court is usually Article 177 proceedings, where the
Court merely interprets the relevant provisions of EC law and leaves
application to the national court. This is usual in matters of EC law, and
is necessitated by the nature of the EC legal order. However problems
may arise where, as in some MS, especially the UK, the courts fail to
appreciate the significance of the principle of proportionality. 112
 The
need for the development of more precise rules on the standard of
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justification, and the grounds of justification acceptable in EC law, is
evident.
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Chapter 5
United Kingdom
1 UK law on employment: Sources and Structure
The main legislative sources of law relating to sex discrimination in
employment in the UK are the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975.
The Equal Pay Act 1970 provides that, in a woman's contract of
employment, there shall be a term that she is to be 'given equal treatment
with men in the same employment". If there is no such term, the Act
provides that an 'equality clause' is implied in the woman's contract of
employment. 2 The provisions apply when the woman is employed on 'like
work' with men, that is if 'her work and theirs is of the same or a
broadly similar nature' 3, when the woman is employed on 'work rated as
equivalent' to that of men, if the relevant jobs have been ranked as
equivalent in a job evaluation study4, or when the woman is employed on
work of 'equal value' to that of the man3.
The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 operates to proscribe sex discrimination
in a number of activities, including employment, which is covered in Part •
II of the Act. In the employment field, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
operates as a supplement to the Equal Pay Act 1970. The provisions of
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 cover a wider range of activities than the
Equal Pay Act 1970, which is mainly concerned with an existing
employment relationship. Section 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a
woman in offering employment, terms of employment, including access to"
opportunities for promotion, transfer or training, or any other benefits,
facilities or services, and in dismissal.
The experience of the US in dealing with sex discrimination was drawn on
for many provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 6. The British
experience of the earlier Race Relations Act 1968, which deals with racial
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discrimination, was also influential. This Race Relations Act was
subsequently amended by the Race Relations Act 1976, with many
provisions now identical to those of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, but
operating in the area of racial discrimination. This identity of the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1976 has been exploited
by judicial interpretation of both Acts: interpretation of provisions of one
Act is regarded as binding in interpretation of equivalent provisions of
the other Act.
Interpretation and enforcement of the legislative provisions relating to
discrimination in the employment sphere is dealt with by industrial
tribunal (IT). 7
 Appeal on a point of law is to the Employment Appeals
Tribunal (EAT) 8, and further to the civil courts. The effectiveness of the
industrial tribunals in sex discrimination cases has been the subject of
much research, the results of which have led to various criticisms of the
work of the tribunals, in general that they are not suited to
discrimination cases. 9 In particular, hindrances to the effective
enforcement by industrial tribunals of claims to equal pay or equal
treatment of women employees can be enumerated as follows:-
'(1) lack of expertise in discrimination cases, (2) the inadequacies
of the adversarial system in these cases, (3) the complexity of the
law, (4) the complex and unworkable procedure in equal pay cases,
and (5) the in problems of proof of direct and indirect
discrimination.'"
The first of these criticisms is perhaps the most serious: Alice Leonard's
work shows detailed examples of misunderstanding or misapplication of the
legislation, applidation of inappropriate legal standards and uncritical
analysis of employers' explanations of allegedly discriminatory conduct."
Although such criticism may undoubtedly be levelled at the tribunals, it
cannot be said that the ordinary courts are entirely free from similar
misapplication or inappropriate analysis in sex discrimination cases. The
problems of proof of direct and indirect discrimination are particularly
relevant to the question of justification, that is, the question of which
party is required to prove whether the discrimination is justified or not.
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Interpretation of the legislative provisions by the tribunals and courts
has filled out the 'bare bones' of the legislation, and, in effect, developed
the law on sex discrimination in employment in the UK. The bulk of this
chapter is, therefore, concerned with examination of these judicial
decisions.
2 Provisions of UK law establishing Equal Treatment of women and men
in Employment and justification for derogation from these provisions
The equal treatment of women and men in employment in the UK is
governed by two principal legislative provisions: the Equal Pay Act 1970
and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. These provisions now cover both
'direct' and 'indirect' discrimination, as they are part of 'one code'
against sex discrimination 12, although the concept of 'indirect'
discrimination was not introduced into UK legislation until the 1975 Act
came into force.
2.1 Direct discrimination
The Sex Discrimination Act 1975, section 1 (1)(a) provides that,
'A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances
relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if on the
ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or
would treat a man.'
This provision defines direct discrimination in the UK.
It is established that intention to discriminate on the part of the employer
is not an essential requirement of direct discrimination. 13
 Neither is
proof of lack of intention to discriminate a defence in a claim of direct
discrimination.14
The less favourable treatment of the complainant in a claim of direct
discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 must be 'on the
ground of' the sex of the complainant. In R v Birmingham City Council,
it was held in the House of Lords that,
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'there is discrimination under the statute if there is less favourable
treatment on ground of sex, in other words if the relevant girl or
girls would have received the same treatment as boys but for their
sex ...'
This 'but for' test was rejected by the Court of Appeal in James v
Eastleigh Counci115. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the correct
test to apply is 'what would the position have been but for the sex of the
plaintiff?'. 16
 Browne-Wilkinson VC disagreed, holding,
'What is relevant is the defendant's reason for doing an act, not
the causative effect of the act done by the defendant. ... The
relevant question is "did the defendant act on the ground of sex?",
not "did ttle less favourable treatment result from the defendant's
actions?"1'
The rejection of the 'but for' test in James, and the attempt to
distinguish that case from R v Birmingham City Council with the argument
that in the former case there was no 'overt' discrimination, have been
criticised. 18
 The 'but for' test is more consonant with the statutory
formulation of 'on the ground of'.19
The discrimination must be on the ground of 'her sex'. Section 3 extends
the application of the Act to discrimination on the ground of marital
status, outlawing discrimination between a married person and an
unmarried person of the same sex. This provision does not extend to
'family status': this leaves uncertain the question of discrimination against
a woman on the grounds that she is pregnant, or has small children.
There is no specific measure in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 rendering
unlawful discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy.2°
When the discrimination is on the ground of sex and also on another
ground, so the discrimination is against a sub-class of women, this is
known as 'sex plus' criteria.21
 The courts have held that the provision
of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, that the discrimination must be 'on the
ground of sex' includes the application of sex plus criteria. 22 By
extension, discrimination against a woman employee on the ground of
pregnancy could be direct discrimination under the Act. By the same
token, discrimination in favour of a woman on the ground of pregnancy
(positive discrimination) could also be covered by the Act.
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However, discrimination on the ground of pregnancy was not held to be
direct sex discrimination in Turley v Alders Department Stores Ltc#3, the
reason being that, as a pregnant woman, the employee concerned could
not be compared with a male comparator, as men cannot become
pregnant. 24
 The minority view in Turley, that the circumstances of a
pregnant woman employee could reasonably be compared with those of a
male employee who required time off work for medical reasons, for example
a hernia operation, was accepted by the EAT in Hayes v Malleable Working
Men's Club25. Distinguishing the ruling in Turley on the grounds that
it applied only where the reason for the discriminatory dismissal was the
actual pregnancy itself, and not a factor connected with pregnancy, the
tribunal held that a male comparator could be found for a pregnant
woman complainant. It seems now that a considerable bar to regarding
sex plus criteria as direct discrimination in UK law has been removed.26
In the subsequent case of Webb v EMO Air Cargd 7, the Court of Appeal
held that dismissal on grounds of pregnancy for a reason arising from or
related to pregnancy (therefore not on point with Turley) 'could in law
be, but was not necessarily, direct discrimination under section 1 (1)(a)
of the 1975 Act'. If this decision is extended to other cases of sex plus
criteria, it seems that the application of sex plus criteria does not always
constitute direct discrimination.
2.1.1 Equal Pay Act 1970
Under the Equal Pay Act 1970, section 1, it is provided that the terms of
employment of a woman, in particular those relating to remuneration, shall
not be less favourable than the terms of the contract of a man employed
on like work or work of equal value. If there is no such equality clause
in a woman's contract, the contract is deemed to include one. The
difference between the woman's contract and the man's will often be the
result of direct discrimination.
In general, direct discrimination in pay between a woman and a man, in
contravention of the Equal Pay Act 1970, may not be justified. If it is
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established that the woman and the man are employed on equal work, or
work of equal value, then the Equal Pay Act implies an equality clause in
the contract of the woman, guaranteeing her pay equal to that of the male
comparator.
While section 1 (3) provides that,
'An equality clause shall not operate in relation to a variation
between the woman's contract and the man's contract if the
employer proves that the variation is genujpely due to a material
factor which is not the difference of sex...'",
this need not be viewed as operating to justify the discrimination.
Rather, it is submitted, in a case of direct discrimination, establishment
of a 'material factor' to which the difference between the woman's
contract and the man's is referable, is best regarded as an indication that
there is no direct discrimination. Direct discrimination between a woman
and man employee in pay, which disadvantages the woman, can never be
justified.
However, the Equal Pay Act 1970 does include a small number of exemption
provisions, in which direct discrimination against women is justified,
where the discrimination is to the woman's advantage. Special measures
for women in connection with pregnancy and childbirth are exempted from
the Equal Pay Act 1970 by virtue of section 6 (1). This section also
provides an exemption in the case where the woman's employment is
governed by legislation regulating the employment of women, in other
words, protective legislation.
2.1.2 Sex Discrimination Act 1975
The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 provides that direct discrimination on
ground of sex is outlawed in various circumstances, including employment.
In general, direct discrimination which contravenes the Act may not be
justified. However, the Act contains a number of exemption provisions.
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2.1.2.1 Genuine Occupational Qualifications
Section 7 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 provides employers with a
defence justifying discrimination in certain circumstances. It applies to
discrimination in recruitment procedures 29, hiring30, training and
promotion31 of employees. This defence is available in limited, pre-
defined situations where being of a particular sex is a 'genuine
occupational qualification' (GOQ) for the job concerned.
In some situations the employer may be expected to reallocate the duties
for which sex is a GOQ pertaining to a particular job. Further, a GOQ is
not a defence where the employer already has employees of the particular
sex carrying out the duties concerned. In general the GOQ defence is a
narrow one, confined to an exhaustive list of situations and strictly
applied.32
2.2 Indirect discrimination
2.2.1 Sex Discrimination Act section 1 (1)(b)
The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 section 1 (1)(b). introduced into UK law
the concept of 'indirect discrimination'. Section 1 (1)(b) provides that a
person indirectly discriminates against a woman if,
'he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or
would apply equally to a man but:
(1) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply
with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of men
who can comply with it, and
(2) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the
sex of the person to whom it is applied, and	 •
(3) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it.'
In the terms of the section, a discriminator applying to a woman a
requirement or condition which is or would be applied equally to a man,
but which is such that fewer women than men can comply with it, must
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show that the requirement or condition is, 'justifiable irrespective of the
sex of the person to whom it is applied'33.
The burden of proof in a claim of indirect discrimination is initially on
the person alleging discrimination. The UK courts have been consistent
in their rulings that the burden then transfers to the alleged
discriminator; however, the standard by which this burden may be met
has been a matter of controversy. Held originally to be a 'heavy burden',
it is now only the burden of showing that the discriminatory action was
taken for 'sound and tolerable reasons'. 34 In some cases, this burden
is lightly discharged.35
The identification of a 'barrier, requirement or condition causing disparate
impact' is essential to a successful claim of indirect discrimination. A
mere factual difference in pay (or treatment) is not a sufficient
foundation for a claim. 36 The requirement or condition must be one with
which fewer women than men can comply. The 'pool' of persons examined
to ascertain whether fewer women than men can comply is important,
because the answer to the question of whether the number of women who
are able to comply with the requirement is sufficiently smaller than the
number of men who are able to do so, in order- to trigger a prima fade
case of indirect discrimination, may depend on the 'pool' of persons
examined. As an illustration using perhaps an extreme example, in Greater
Manchester Police Authority v Lea37, 99.4% of women and 95.3% of men
could comply with the requirement of not being in receipt of an
occupational pension. The pool used was the economically active
population. The EAT held that the IT had not erred in holding that the
proportion of men who could comply with the condition was considerably
smaller than the proportion of women who could comply. 	 The
determination of the 'pool' is a matter of fact for the IT, depending on
ithe circumstances of each case38 ; it is not certain which pool will be
used in a particular case. This is unsatisfactory, as a different pool
could result in a different conclusion on the proportion of women and men
who can comply with the condition.
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The requirement or condition must be one with which fewer women than
men 'can comply'. In Price v Civil Service Cominission39, in the context
of a requirement that applicants for the post of executive officer in the
Civil Service had to be under 28 years of age, this was construed as
meaning 'can in practice comply'.
'It should not be said that a person 'can' do something merely
because it is theoretically possible for him to do so: it is necessary
to see whether he can do so in practice. ... Knowledge and
experience suggest that a considerable number of women between
the mid-twenties and mid-thirties are engaged in bearing children
and in minding children, and that many ... find it impossible [to
take up employment].'
This construction of the phrase 'can comply' was approved by the House
of Lords in Mandla v Led°.
The word 'justifiable' was chosen and retained in the Act in preference
to the word 'necessary'. It has been suggested that 'justifiable' implies
a weaker standard than 'necessary' 41. Such a distinction is best
regarded as merely semantic42, as application of either word involves a
value judgment which cannot be defined for every case by statute. The
way in which the standard is applied is what is important. However, the
context in which the word 'justifiable' is ubed in the Acts can be
regarded as an indication of the way the UK Parliament intended that the
standard be applied. It can be inferred from the importance attached to
the eradication of indirect (as well as direct) discrimination by those
responsible for passing the Acts that the word 'justifiable' was not
necessarily intended to imply a lower standard or a weak test°.
The standard meant by the term 'justified' is, then, a matter for judicial
construction. The development of UK case law pertaining to interpretation
of 'justified' in the context of indirect sex discrimination in employment
is now examined.
In this context, the interpretation of 'justification' which results in the
strictest standard being applied to employers seeking to justify
discriminatory requirements or conditions is a standard which equates
'justifiability' with something akin to 'necessity'.
	 The EAT used a
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'business necessity' test in Steel v UP004. Ms Steel had been employed
as a post-woman since 1961. In 1975 she achieved 'permanent full-time
status', when the rule disallowing women from such status was abolished.
The status was important for Post Office employees for a number of
reasons, including the allotment of rounds or 'walks'. When Ms Steel
applied for a vacant walk, which was allotted to a postman, because he
had received 'permanent full-time status' in 1963, she claimed indirect
discrimination.
The EAT addressed itself to the issue of the relevant standard of
justification with the following reasoning:
'There is a heavy onus of proof on the employer to satisfy the IT
that the case is a genuine one where it can be said that the
requirement or condition is necessary.
'A distinction must be made between a requirement or condition that
is necessary and one which is merely convenient. A practice that
would otherwise be discriminatory cannot be justifiable unless its
discriminatory effect is justified by the need - not the convenience
- of the business. For this purpose it is relevant to consider
whether the employer can find some other non-discriminatory
method of achieving his object ... Moreover, in deciding whether the
employer has discharged the onus, the IT should take into account
all the circumstances, including the discriminatory effect of the
requirement or condition if it is permitted to continue, and weigh
the need for the requirement against its discriminatory effect.'
The case was remitted to the IT for a decision on justification, where,
applying the EAT's test, the IT found that the discrimination was not
justified.
In the early 1980s, another line of reasoning appeared, which gradually
became the dominant interpretation of 'justifiable'. Under this
interpretation, it was easier for employers to show that an indirectly
discriminatory requirement was justified. The new interpretation of
justification was concerned with 'reasonable commercial necessity' 45. The
result of this was a move to what amounts in practice to no more than a
'reasonableness' test.
The Singh" and Panesar47 cases (concerning racial discrimination)
involved 'no beards' rules, which operated to discriminate against Sikhs
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who are forbidden by their religion to shave their beards. It was
decided that a no beards rule was justifiable. Justifiable, according to
the EAT, did not mean necessary, in the sense that there was no other
way of achieving the desired object of the condition. However, 'mere
convenience' was not considered sufficient justification.
These cases represent a halfway house, which was a marked retreat from
the original business necessity test. The need for a decision on the facts
of each case was emphasised; the decision was to be as to whether the
grounds put forward for justification (for example, grounds of hygiene)
were 'right and proper in the circumstances'. The answer to the question
this begs, that is, 'right and proper to whom?', can only be 'the
reasonable (white, male) person'. The test had moved towards the
standard of reasonableness and away from the more objective standard
of necessity.
In Ojutiku v Manpower Services Commission", the Court of Appeal
expressly disapproved of the Steel decision". The facts of the Ojutiku
case concern the policy of the Manpower Services Commission in allocation
of grants for training. Mr Ojutiku came from West Africa, and had moved
to England in the 1960s. He applied for enrolment on a Diploma in
Management Studies, and to the Manpower Services Commission for a grant
so that he could undertake his studies. The application for a grant was
refused on the grounds that Mr Ojutiku lacked management expertise. Mr
Ojutiku contended that this requirement was racially discriminatory.
The Court of Appeal held that in order to prove a requirement is
'justifiable', it is not necessary to prove that the requirement is
'necessary for the good of the business'. Because of its limited funds,
the Manpower Services Commission must to some extent be selective, and
the requirement of management expertise was justifiable, as it ensured
that the funding would be likely to further the recipients' prospects of
employment.
Considering the standard implied by the word 'justifiable', Kerr, LJ
asserted that, 'justifiable implies a lower standard than the word
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necessary'. Eveleigh, I.,..T's statement that, 'if a person produces reasons
for doing something which would be acceptable to right-thinking people
as sound and tolerable reasons for so doing, then he has justified his
conduct', changed the standard of justification almost totally from the
Steel interpretation of the provision. The courts and tribunals were now
to decide the question of 'justifications' by reference to the standard of
'sound and tolerable reasons' for the indirectly discriminatory
requirement.
For example, in Rava150 a requirement of an English 0 Level as a
condition of entry into clerical grades of the Civil Service was regarded
as justifiable on the grounds of 'overall fairness'. The IT was to 'reflect
the attitude of society as a whole regarding the degree of justification
required to make distinctions of race or sex tolerable in an employment
context.'
There was no consideration of whether in fact the 0 Level requirement
was related to the job, or whether another means could be used to
achieve the desired end. The 'business necessity' test was in fact
reduced to scarcely more than justification by convenience.
The decision in Kidd51, that redundancy of part-time workers first (a
policy which is indirectly discriminatory against women because fewer
women than men can meet the requirement to work full-time) was
justifiable, represents the extent of the retreat from Steel. It was held
that 'marginal advantages in cost and efficiency', including the shorter
handling records, less frequent laundering of overalls, lack of 'a mild
degree of disruption' caused by changeover in shifts, and decrease in
administrative and personnel functions, to the employer in employing one
shift of full-time workers rather than two shifts of part-time workers,
represented 'sound and tolerable reasons acceptable to right-thinking
people as realistic and sensible.' The statement that these marginal
advantages, although appearing insignificant, may be crucial to the
employer in attracting and maintaining orders under the competitive
conditions of modern industry may represent the effect of 1980s
philosophy on the judiciary. A 'right-thinking person' has regard to the
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competitive market over and above the possibility of discrimination. The
UK standard for justification of indirect discrimination is not stringent.
Since employers in the UK are required to comply with EC law,
justification for indirect discrimination in the UK should be in compliance
with the standard set by the B11ks52 decision. 53 However, there appears
to be a reluctance on the part of the UK courts to adhere to the
standard of European Community law, with Bilka as its source. 54 The
failure of UK courts to apply the EC standard is due to a
misunderstanding of the difference between, on the one hand, an
objective justification based on a genuine need and effected
proportionately, and, on the other hand, a reasonable justification.
The House of Lords ostensibly applied the Bilka test in Greater Glasgow
Health Board v Carey55 .	 However, examination of the decision shows
that the UK standard is not synonymous with that of the European Court.
The case concerned discrimination against a part-time health visitor. The
EAT focused on the need for efficiency in the service provided by health
visitors. The needs of the Health Board in providing an efficient service
to the community could only be met if the indirectly discriminatory
requirement (that part-time workers be available for work on five days
a week) was applied by the employer. However the EAT failed to take
account of another health visitor employed by the Health Board, who was.
not constrained by the discriminatory requirement, as she only worked
a two and a half day week. The existence of this second employee should
have been evidence that there was no 'genuine need' for the requirement,
therefore that the Bilka standard of justification had not been met.
Hampson v DES% concerned a Hong Kong Chinese national who had
trained as a teacher in Hong Kong and subsequently applied for qualified -
teacher status to enable her to teach in British schools. Her application
was refused on the grounds that her training was not of a sufficiently
high standard, in particular that it was not of the duration of three
years. She claimed that she had been discriminated against on the
grounds of her race, contrary to the Race Relations Act, section 1 (1)(a)
and (b). The EAT was called on to decide whether inter alia the
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requirement for a three year course was a 'requirement or condition'
within the meaning of section 1 (1)(b) and if so whether it was
'justifiable'. The complainant appealed.
The Court of Appeal deliberately addressed itself to the question,
'By what test should it be considered whether the requirement or
condition was justifiable irrespective of the applicant's race?'
In providing an answer to this question, it would have been open to the
court to affirm the direct applicability of the Bi1ka test to sex
discrimination cases 57 in UK law, and to contrast this test with the
existing previous standard in UK law, as found in Ojutiku58. Balcombe,
L.I did neither. Instead he held that there was no difference between the
two tests, and consequently affirmed the Ojutiku test59. Both Nourse LJ
and Parke 1,..760 concurred.
In C1ymo v Wandsworth81 the court again stated (expressly following
Hampson) that the European Community principles found in Bilka do not
differ from the approach of the UK courts found in the line of case-law
culminating in Ojutiku. The EAT held
' ... [the Tribunal] must carry out a broad and objective balancing
exercise taking into account all circumstances of the case and
giving due emphasis to the disadvantage caused by the condition
or requirement against the achievement of the object sought.
'The well-known phrase comes to mind that there is no need to use
a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
'This in our judgment is to express in extenso the process which
a common lawyer in this jurisdiction is so often called on to follow
when deciding an issue of reasonableness. The civil lawyer of
Europe would no doubt describe it as applying the principle of
proportionality'
To equate proportionality and reasonableness in this way is a
misunderstanding of proportionality. In applying a reasonableness test,
the courts will only overturn a decision if it is unreasonable, that is such
that a reasonable person or administrative body could not have reached
such a decision. Otherwise, regardless of possible alternatives, also
reasonable and perhaps more appropriate, the courts will be reluctant to
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overturn the decision. Proportionality puts the burden on the person
making the decision. It requires that the means of achieving the aim for
which the decision is taken are fitting to its end. This examination of the
relationship between the means and the end necessitates account being
taken of alternative measures which would also achieve the end. If these
alternatives are less discriminatory in effect, the proportionality test is
not satisfied. The court will disturb the decision. Proportionality is thus
more rigorous than reasonableness 62. In stating that the two doctrines
are equivalent, the court in Clymo has compounded the confusion already
apparent over the correct interpretation of BiIke and its application in UK
law. The UK courts should apply the genuine need and proportional
policy test of Bilka to cases involving indirect sex discrimination, and may
not, if they comply with their duty to apply EC law, continue to use a
standard of reasonableness.
Similar confusion between the UK Ojutiku standard and the EC Bilka
standard is apparent in subsequent UK cases. 63 Unless the EC standard
is applied stringently, it seems that, in spite of the Bilka decision, UK law
on the interpretation of 'justifiable' in cases of indirect discrimination is
still governed by the reasonableness standard of Ojutiku.
2.2.2 Equal Pay Act section 1 (3)
In equal pay issues, in addition to the section 1 (1)(b)(ii) justification for
.indirect discrimination 64
 , there is a second provision under which
discrimination may be justified. The Equal Pay Act 1970, section 1 (3)
provides that
'An equality clause shall not operate in relation to a variation
between the woman's contract and the man's contract if the
employer proves that the variation is genuinely due to a material
factor which is not the difference of sex ...'
If the woman's and the man's work is 'like work' in terms of section 1
(2)(a) or 'work rated as equivalent' in terms of section 1 (2)(b), the
factor must be a material difference between the woman's case and the
man's. If the work is of equal value in terms of section 1 (2)(c), that is,
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is not 'like work' or work rated as equivalent in a job evaluation scheme,
the factor may be, but need not be, such a material difference.65
One way to regard this provision is to view the proof of a 'material
factor' resulting in the difference between the woman's contract and the
man's as proof that there is no discrimination. In view of the connection
between this provision and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 section 1
(1)(b)66, which prohibits indirect discrimination unless justified, it is
easier, it is submitted, in cases of indirect discrimination, to regard a
satisfactory showing of a 'material factor' defence as a justification of the
discrimination.
The Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 form part of
'one code against sex discrimination' 67. As far as possible they should
be construed together to produce a harmonious result. As the
Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) pointed out in Jenkins68,
'Indirect discrimination ... is rendered unlawful by section 1 (1)(b)
of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 ... Where indirect discrimination
is unintentional, to escape acting unlawfully the alleged
discriminator has to show that the requirement which operates in
a discriminatory fashion is justifiable, because viewed objectively,
the requirement is necessary to achieve some other purpose. To
make section 1 (3) Equal Pay Act 1970 accord harmoniously with
section 1 (1)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 requires that it
should be construed as imposing on the employer the onus of
proving that the variation in pay is in fact required to meet some
other objective.'
There is an indisputable link between Sex Discrimination Act 1975 section
1 (1)(b) and Equal Pay Act 1970 section 1 (3), and this link requires that
the standard, or 'legal test', for justification in one situation must also
apply in the other; a general interpretation applies to both equal pay and
equal treatment situations.
The 'material factor' of the Equal Pay Act was at one point thought to be
limited to what was termed the 'personal equation' of the woman, or of the
man. The 'personal equation' was never defined, but understood to
include factors intrinsic to an individual, such as qualifications, physical
characteristics or experience. In Shields v Coombes Holdings°, it was
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held that the subsection applied where the two jobs concerned were the
same or of equal value, but the man's personal equation meant that he
could be paid more than the woman. Fletcher v Clay Crossnl followed
Shields in asserting that, in the application of section 1 (3), it is
necessary to compare the personal equations of the woman and the man.
Further, it was held that extrinsic forces, such as the intention of the
employer and the employment market could not be relied upon by the
Tribunal making the decision.
'An employer cannot avoid his obligations under the Act by saying:
'I paid him more because he asked for more' or 'I paid her less
because she would come for less'. If any such excuse were
permitted, the Act would be a dead letter. Those are the very
reasons why there was unequal pay before the Statute. They are
the verv circumstances in which the statute was intended to
operate.'71
In Jenkins v Kingsgate72, it was averred (inter alia) that the difference
between part-time employees and full-time employees was a material
difference between the female (part-time) and male (full-time) employees
within the meaning of section 1 (3). After reference to the European
Court of Justice, the EAT held that, as the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 formed part of one code against sex
discrimination, indirect discrimination, such as in this case, could only be
justified under section 1 (3) if the difference of treatment between part-
time and full-time workers could be shown to be necessary to achieve a
need of the employer, which could be an economic need. It could not,
however, be justified on the grounds that the employer obtained cheap
female labour by giving less favourable conditions to part-time workers,
most of whom are women.
The decision of the European Court in Jenkins was clarified in Bilkal.
This latter decision was first applied in the UK in Rainey v Greater
Glasgow Health Board. The House of Lords was required to apply
section 1 (3) of the Equal Pay Act 1970, and to decide whether there was
a 'material difference' justifying the indirect discrimination between the
male and female employees concerned. The court indicated that the test
by which material difference was to be decided was as follows:
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'In particular, where there is no question of intentional sex
discrimination, whether direct or indirect (and there is none here)
a difference which is connected with economic factors affecting the
efficient carrying on lasf the employer's business or other activity
may well be relevant.'"
The court was of the opinion that this view was supported by the rulings
of the European Court in Jenkins and Bilka.76
The House of Lords, in Rainey, rejected the earlier UK interpretation of
the legal test for justification established in F1etcher.77 Justification in
section 1 (3) cases has now been effectively merged with justification
under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 section 1 (1)(b). The standard for
justification is the same in both, that of 'reasonableness'. In the
following section of the chapter, there is no separation of cases brought
under the Equal Pay Act 1970 from those brought under the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975.
3 Substantive Grounds of Justification for Unequal Treatment
In UK law, in certain circumstances, unequal treatment of women and men
in employment is justifiable. Various of these circumstances are now
discussed, beginning with those circumstahces in which direct
discrimination is justified, then examining circumstances in which a
condition or requirement of employment is indirectly discriminatory
against women, but justified in UK law.
3.1 Direct discrimination
Direct discrimination on grounds of sex in employment is justified by
various exemption provisions in the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975.
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3.1.1 Activities excluded from the equal treatment principle (GOQs)
The main exemption provision is section 7 of the Sex Discrimination Act
1975, which gives a list of certain employment situations in which the sex
of the employee is a genuine occupational qualification (GOQ).
The first GOQ of section 7 applies in employment such that,
'the essential nature of the job calls for a man for reasons of
physiology (excluding physical strength or stamina) or, in dramatic
performances or other entertainment, for reasons of authenticity,
so that the essential nature„of the job would be materially different
if carried out by a woman'''.
The typical example of a GOQ falling within this section is the requirement
of female actors for female roles and male actors for male roles.
The second GOQ is the need for a person of a particular sex in particular
employment in order to 'preserve decency or privacy' 79. The situations
in which this may arise are those in which physical contact is involved
in the job or in which employees are in a state of undress or using
sanitary facilities such that an employee 'might reasonably object' 99 to
members of the opposite sex being employed. .For example, in Sisley v
Britannia Security Systems81, where employees rested on beds provided
by the employer between shifts, removing their uniforms to prevent
creasing, the limitation of employees to one sex only was justified.
A related GOQ was added by section 1 (2) of the Sex Discrimination Act
1986, where the employee works in a private home, and the degree of
physical or social contact with, or knowledge of intimate details of a
person living in the private home is such that 'objection might reasonably
be taken' to a person of the opposite sex being employed. 	 -
Third, a GOQ may be established where
'the nature or location of the establishment makes it impracticable
for the holder of the job to live elsewhere than in premises
provided by the employer, and -
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i) the only such premises which are available for persons holding
that kind of job are lived in or normally lived in by men and are
not equipped with separate sleeping accommodation for women and
sanitary facilities which could be used by women in privacy from
men, and
if) it is not reasonable to expect the employer either to equip those
premises with such agcommodation and facilities or to provide other
premises for women.'"
This covers GOQ covers emploympnt on oil-rigs, lighthouses, ships and
some remote construction sites. The provisions in if), regarding whether
it is reasonable to expect the employer to provide accommodation for
female employees, is a question of fact to be decided by the IT in each
case83.
Sex is a GOQ where the establishment in which the work is done is a
single sex 'hospital, prison or other establishment for persons requiring
special care, supervision or attention' 84. Sex is a GOQ where the job
'provides individuals with personal services promoting their welfare or
education, or similar personal services, and those services can most
effectively be provided by a man' 85. The reason for this provision is
said to be to permit discrimination in the probation service88.
Where there are laws regulating the employment of women, such as coal
mining, sex is a G0Q87. Sex is also a GOQ where the job involves 'the
performance of duties outside the UK in a country whose laws or customs
are such that the duties could not, or could not effectively, be performed
by a woman' 88. This covers a jobs involving travel to several Middle
Eastern countries. Finally, sex is a GOQ where 'the job is one of two to
be held by a married couple'89.
3.1.2 Other grounds for exemption
Section 17 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 allows various exceptions to
the general principles of the Act for employees of the police force, for
example relating to height, uniform and equipment. Different height
requirements for entry into the police force may be applied to women and
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men respectively. Female police officers may be treated differently from
male police officers in that they may be required to wear different
uniform and carry different equipment. Section 17 also allows different
treatment of women police officers 'so far as special treatment is accorded
to women in connection with pregnancy or childbirth'.
Discrimination between female and male prison officers pertaining to
height requirements is permitted under Sex Discrimination Act 1975 section
18.
Ministers of religion are exempted from the provisions of the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 by section 18 of that Act, where employment of
ministers is limited to one sex as a matter of religious doctrine.
Although midwives are exempted from the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 by
section 20, the Midwives Act 1951 is amended by this section to make it
possible for men to qualify as midwives. In spite of this, it is still lawful
to discriminate against male midwives.
Section 85 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 excludes service in the
Armed Forces from the Act.
3.1.3 Pregnancy and maternity
Unequal treatment of women on grounds of pregnancy and maternity is
justified by various provisions of UK law. We have already noted" that
special treatment (in maternity pay) may be accorded to women in
connection with pregnancy and childbirth without breach of the Equal Pay
Act 1970. 91
 Measures designed to protect women as regard pregnancy
and maternity (and also other circumstances giving rise to risks
specifically affecting women) are justifiable according to section 51 of the
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 92.
There is no specific measure in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 rendering
unlawful discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy. 'Sex plus'
arguments have not been entirely successful in UK law. It seems that,
at least in certain circumstances, an employer may discriminate against a
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woman on ground of pregnancy 93 or a factor relating to pregnancy 94
and avoid direct discrimination in the sense of section 1 (1)(a) of the 1975
Act.
This was the case in Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) LtcP 5 where Ms Webb
was employed to replace an employee going on maternity leave. Ms Webb
was to be trained for the first few months of employment, working
alongside the other employee, then replace her, and it was envisaged that
her employment could probably continue after the period of maternity
leave was over. Two weeks after Ms Webb began her training, she
discovered that she also was pregnant. She was dismissed.
The Court was willing to compare Ms Webb's situation with that of a
hypothetical man, who, for medical reasons, discovered that he would
require leave of absence from work for the very time he had been
engaged to cover for another employee on maternity leave.
'Suppose that a man suffering from an arthritic hip, and who had
been engaged by EMO to replace Mrs Stewart when she went on
maternity leave, and in the meantime to train for the job, had
learned in July that a hip replacement operation would be available
to him in February 1988, and that he would then be absent from
the job for several months. It was clear that in such
circumstances the man also would have been dismissed.'
The Court held that dismissal for a reason arising out of pregnancy could
be direct discrimination, but was not necessarily direct discrimination, and
therefore that, on the facts, Ms Webb had not been discriminated against.
There was no need for discussion of whether such discrimination was
justified.
In response to the argument that the decision of the European Court, in
Dekker96, that refusal of employment to a woman on grounds of
pregnancy was direct discrimination in EC law should be applied in this
case, the Court of Appeal distinguished Dekker91.
'Dekker was not a case in which, by reason of her pregnancy, a
woman was incapable of doing the job offered to her. ... Ms Webb's
was such a case.'
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Dismissal of some (but not all) pregnant women employees is rendered
unlawful by the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 section 60
which provides that a woman is unfairly dismissed if the whole or
principal reason for her dismissal is her pregnancy or any other reason
connected with her pregnancy98. The dismissal may be justified, in
terms of the Act, where the woman is incapable of continuing to carry out
the work adequately or where it would be unlawful for the woman to
continue working. The burden is on the employer to show that one of
these defences applies. 99 In order to succeed in the defence, the
employer is under a duty first to offer the woman any other comparable
or suitable job for which there is a vacancy.
Section 60 only applies in the case of dismissal of an employee by reason
of pregnancy, and not if she is subjected to any other detriment, for
example refusal of appointment or promotion. It seems, therefore, that in
the case of discrimination against a woman on ground of pregnancy in
cases other than dismissal, there will be no need for justification of such
discrimination by the employer, as no case of discrimination may be
established in terms of UK legislation.188
Dismissal may be justified on grounds of pregnancy if the marital status
of the woman employee is such that she would provide an inappropriate
example to young people with whom the employee comes into contact as
part of her employment. In the case of Berrisford v Woodard Schools
(Midland Division) Ltd101, Ms Berrisford was employed as a matron at a
Church of England girls' boarding school. She became pregnant and was
dismissed, not because of the pregnancy itself, but because she had no
intention of marrying the father of the child. The employer considered
that the 'manifestation of extra-marital sex' was an inappropriate model
for the girls in the school, with whom Ms Berrisford had a special
relationship, and for whom she provided a role model, as a part of the
job.
The majority of the EAT, rather than considering the question of
justification, held that there was no prima fade discrimination, as Ms
Berrisford had not been treated more favourably than a man in a similar
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situation employed by the school. The male comparator was a teacher,
who, on taking up employment in the school, had been told to 'regularize
his relationship' with the woman with whom he was living at the time, by
marrying her. Therefore, the EAT reasoned, where evidence of continuing
extra-marital activity was present, a man would also have been dismissed.
Although the EAT reasoned in a different way, the effect of the judgment
of the EAT was to justify the discrimination, on the grounds that Ms
Berrisford's pregnancy was incompatible with the effective carrying out
of her job.
3.2 Indirect discrimination
The same approach as taken in the preceding chapter on EC law to
analysis of justification for indirect discrimination is taken in this
chapter. Justification for indirect discrimination is categorized into those
situations in which the 'genuine need' of the employer which results in
the discriminatory policy is related to the particular job, and those in
which the employer's need is not specifically job related, but pertains to
the efficient running of the enterprise. These categories are termed 'job
related justifications' and 'enterprise related justifications'. A further
category is where the indirect discrimination is justified by its general
'public interest'. This may come into play if a particular piece of
legislation has a discriminatory effect: public interest justifications may
also apply if the State is the employer. Similarly to the European Court,
the UK courts have ruled on justification in all three types of situation,
but do not distinguish between them in these terms.
3.2.1 Job related justifications
3.2.1.1 Seniority
Seniority, and the greater responsibility which is attached to a more
senior appointment will justify discrimination. In Edmonds v Computer
Services (South-West) Ltd102 the male comparator carried out work which
was not significantly different from that carried out by Ms Edmonds, but
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was paid more than she was. The employer argued that, as the
comparator was older and more experienced than Ms Edmonds, he had
been employed with the potential of carrying responsibility as the senior
member of the department. The exercise of actual responsibility would be
done as part of the work, and so would render the two jobs incomparable.
As for the potential to exercise responsibility, the tribunal was willing to
consider this a genuine material difference under section 1 (3) of the
Equal Pay Act 1970.
3.2.2 Enterprise related justifications
Justification for an indirectly discriminatory requirement which is not
related to the duties of the job, but to the running of the enterprise,
may be established in certain circumstances, some of which are discussed
below.
3.2.2.1 Grading and pay structures
If the woman and the man are placed at different points in a general
grading or pay structure, then this may justify discrimination in pay.
Waddington v Leicester Council for Voluntary- Services 103 concerned a
'Community Leader', Ms Waddington, who claimed equal pay with a male
'Play Leader' over whom she had control and was responsible. The EAT.
held that, because the male comparator was paid on the scale for 'Youth
Leaders', the difference in pay was due to a material difference other
than sex, and so was justified under the Equal Pay Act 1970 section 1 (3).
The EAT observed,
'Grading is not conclusive, but where widely used nationally
negotiated scales are concerned, it seems unlikely that a problem
caused bm grading would give rise to a remedy under the Equal-
Pay Act.' n4
This was confirmed in the Court of Appeal's decision in Leverton v Clwyd
County CounciP5 in which again the national applicability of the scales
was emphasised, although the House of Lords focused its decision 106
 on
the different hours and holidays of the woman complainant and the male
comparators. It may often be the case that a different grading of a
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particular job, or the placing of a job in a particular point on a pay
scale, at which pay is lower than that for another job is because the
second job is not like work or work of equal value to the first, due to
differences in duties, or terms and conditions.
3.2.2.2 Market forces operating on the enterprise
The operation of market forces as it concerns the availability of male or
female workers for employment cannot justify discrimination on the part
of the employer, as established in Fletcher v Clay Cross107.
However the operation of market forces on a business may be used to
justify discrimination if the employment of the two persons concerned is
not contemporaneous. Albion Shipping Agency v Az-nold l08 concerned Ms
Albion, who was employed at the branch office in Hull. A Mr Larsen was
the office manager. Due to economic circumstances, the company made Mr
Larsen redundant. Ms Albion then agreed to run the Hull office. She did
so at her previous rate of pay, £37 per week, whereas Mr Larsen had
been paid £73 per week. Ms Albion took over virtually all of Mr Larsen's
duties. She claimed equal pay with Mr Larsen.
-
The EAT held that a change in the employer's trading position leading to
reduced profitability could justify the pay difference. If a difference in
pay is shown to be due to a change in the economic circumstances of the
business in which a man and a woman are employed successively, this will
constitute a material difference under the Equal Pay Act section 1 (3).
In Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board", the higher payment of the
initial recruits (who were all men) to the newly set up NHS prosthetic
services was attributable to the operation of market forces, as the NHS
was required to recruit from the higher paid private sector. When later
recruits (who were women) were paid at the standard scale, a rate which
was lower than that of the male prosthetists initially employed, they
complained of indirect discrimination. The discrimination was held to be
justifiable, partly because of the prevailing conditions of the market when
the initial recruitment took place.
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Similarly, in Beneviste v University of Southampton11°, it was held that
financial constraints at the time of an employee's appointment may justify
discrimination in wages. However, when the financial constraints are
lifted, the justification ceases to be applicable, and there is no longer a
material difference between the complainant and other employees doing
like work who were appointed at a time when the financial constraints did
not apply.
3.2.2.3 Consistency of management
In an early UK case concerning part-time employment, the EAT was
required to consider whether the requirement that an employee work full-
time was justified. The Home Office v Holmes" concerned a woman
employee (executive officer) who took maternity leave and then wished to
return to work as a part-time, rather than full-time, employee. When the
employer refused, she claimed that this was unlawful discrimination. The
IT agreed.
The EAT upheld the decision of the IT, but stressed that the decision was
dependent on the particular facts of the case. The EAT even considered
that there would be other cases, not 'strikingly -different' from the case
in hand, where a policy favouring full-time staff would be justifiable.
Justification was not discussed explicitly in the judgment, however it
seems that it was implicit that at the particular grade concerned, a full-
time employee was necessary for management purposes. The decision as
to justifiability of discrimination against part-time workers was to be one
entrusted to the individual tribunal, and would depend entirely on the
particular facts of each case.
C1ymo v Wandsworth112 concerned inter ails the issue of whether refusal
on the part of the employer to allow a job share was justified. Ms Clymo
and her husband each held a job as a branch librarian. After having a
baby, Ms Clymo asked to share her job with her husband. The local
authority, as employer, did permit job sharing, but not at such a high
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level, so it refused the request. Ms Clymo resigned, alleging indirect
discrimination.
The employer argued that it could not allow job sharing in this
circumstance because the post of branch librarian required absolute
consistency of approach, especially in terms of supervision of junior staff,
who needed an individual person to whom they would be answerable.
Furthermore, the local authority required knowledge of where ultimate
113.responsibility iayThe duties of the job necessitated a full-time
employee, therefore no job sharing was possible.
The EAT held that the tribunal must apply the Bilka test by looking at
the object the employer sought to achieve, that is, consistency of
management, and deciding whether this was 'more than a matter of
convenience' with a 'proper purpose when viewed within the whole of the
business or organization for which the employer is responsiblet114.
Carrying out a broad balancing exercise, the EAT held that on the facts,
the discriminatory requirement was justified.
3.2.2.4 Efficiency in the administration of the enterprise
In a case concerning the discriminatory effect of grading systems,
National Vulcan Engineering Insurance Group v Wade115, Lord Denning
observed,
'If it were to go forth that these grading systems ... operate
against the Equal Pay Act 1970, it would, I think be disastrous for
the ordinary running of efficient business. It seems to me that a
grading system according to ability, skill and experience is an
integral part of good business management; and, as long as it is
fairly and genuinely Applied irrespective of sex, there is nothing
wrong with it at all."'"
There is a relationship between 'efficiency' or 'good business
management' and justification for indirect discrimination.
'Marginal advantages to the employers in cost and efficiency' were held
to justify indirect discrimination against a woman part-time employee who
was made redundant, under a 'part-time workers out first' redundancy
policy in Kidd v DRG (UK) Ltd117. The marginal advantages to the
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employer in operating one shift of full-time workers rather than two
shifts of part-time workers included avoidance of extra record taking,
laundering of overalls, and 'a mild degree of disruption' in changeover
of shifts. These small gains in efficiency represented, 'sound and
tolerable reasons acceptable to right-thinking people as realistic and
sensible', in line with the Ojutiku decision.
In Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board118, the decisions of the
European Court of Justice 119
 on justification for indirect discrimination
were applied by the House of Lords, in the context of recruitment of
prosthetists by the National Health Service.
In 1979, the Government established a prosthetic fitting service within the
National Health Service and no longer relied on private contractors. In
order to set up the service, the National Health Service recruited
qualified prosthetists on their existing pay scales. Those scales were
higher than the pay rates applied throughout the National Health Service
on the Whiteney Council Scale. After the initial recruitment of higher
paid prosthetists (who were all male), subsequent recruits were placed on
the lower, standard National Health Service scale, whether they were male
or female. Ms Rainey, one of the later recruits, claimed that her lower
salary was discriminatory on the grounds of sex, contrary to the Equal
Pay Act 1970 section 1. The House of Lords, in interpreting section 1 (3),
recognized the duty of national courts of MS of the EC to interpret
national law so as to be in conformity with EC law, and therefore applied
the Bilka test:
'... the new prosthetic service could never have been established
within a reasonable time if [the earlier employees from the private
sector] had not been offered a scale of remuneration no less
favourable than that which they were enjoying. That was
undoubtedly a good and objectively justified reason for offering
[them] that scale of remuneration.'
The need to employ qualified prosthetists from the private sector was a
genuine one, if the National Health Service was to set up its own
prosthetic service. Offering higher salaries than those enjoyed by other
National Health Service employees was necessary to attain this purpose.
Once the prosthetic service was set up, these considerations no longer
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applied, and the lower wages of those prosthetists later employed,
including Ms Rainey, were justified by the fact that
'... from the administrative point of view, it would have been highly
anomalous and inconvenient if prosthetists alone ... were to have
been subject to a different scale.'
A difference in pay connected with economic factors affecting the efficient
carrying on of the employer's business may justify discrimination.
Although in the Bilka120 judgment, the European Court refers to
'economic' grounds for justification, it was held in the House of Lords
that,
'... read as a whole the ruling of the European Court would not
exclude objectively justified grounds which are other than
economic, such as administrative efficiency in a concern not
engaged in commerce or business.'"1
Administrative efficiency, according to the House of Lords, operates as a
'genuine need of the enterprise'. This sort of justification was
particularly appropriate for a concern not engaged in commerce or
business.
The decision in Rainey that administrative efficiency could constitute a
genuine business need was upheld in the case of Reed Packaging Ltd v
Boozer and EverhurstI22. Reed Packaging concerned two women who
claimed equal pay with a man employed on like work. The employers
submitted that the variation in pay was due to separate pay structures
and that this constituted a defence under the Equal Pay Act section 1 (3).
The IT rejected this submission of the employer. The EAT, overturning
the decision of the IT, held that there was no reason why separate pay
structures could not constitute a 'material factor', and that the employer
had shown an 'objectively justified administrative reason' for the
difference in pay in accordance with Rainey.
From these decisions it seems clear that the ground of efficiency of the
enterprise can be a 'genuine need of the enterprise', justifying indirect
discrimination in UK law, and that, at least in the case of a 'non-
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commercial' employer, such as a Health Authority, efficiency in this sense
does not mean economic efficiency alone.
3.2.3 Public interest related justifications
Legislation or other measures taken by the State which regulate the
employment relationship may have an indirectly discriminatory effect.
These discriminatory measures may be justified if the purpose of the
legislation, a general benefit to the public, or a particular group of
members of the public, is judged to have greater importance than the
principle of equal treatment for women and men in employment in the
particular circumstance concerned.
3.2.3.1 Reduction of available employment opportunities
The UK courts were required to rule on the compatibility of UK
legislation, which disadvantaged part-time employees, with the principle
of equal treatment for women and men in employment in EC law, in a
recent decision. The Court of Appeal held in R v Secretary of State ex
parte E0C123 that legislation discriminating between full-time and part-
time workers was not in breach of the UK's obligations under EC law to
accord equal treatment to women and men in employment.
The provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978
delimiting part-time employees from various rights on unfair dismissal
were held to be justified on grounds of social policy. Evidence that
amendments to the legislation would have adverse consequences for women
seeking part-time employment, because if extra administrative and cost
burdens were imposed on employers, 'employment opportunities in part-
time work would be reduced' 124 was accepted by the court. In spite of
counter evidence, the court assumed not only that the proposed
amendment would lead to a reduction in the number of part-time jobs
available, but also that 'any reduction hi the number of employment
opportunities would be socially undesirable,125.
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3.2.3.2 Special social needs
An example of a public interest related justification in UK law was found
in measures, designed to alleviate long term unemployment, which targeted
a particular group of unemployed people, which consisted mostly of men.
Cobb v Secretary of State for Emp1oyment126 concerned the targeting of
the 'Community Programme' to those in receipt of unemployment or
supplementary benefit. It was conceded that as more men than women
could comply with the condition of being in receipt of one of these
benefits, the scheme was indirectly discriminatory, but the Secretary of
State argued that this was justified as being the most economical use of
available resources. It was held that the test was justified on these
grounds, as it avoided the need to create a new administrative structure,
which would have had to be funded by the already limited resources of
the Community Programme fund. The need to target a particular sector
of the unemployed was achieved by this use of resources. The special
social needs of those who benefitted from the measures justified their
discriminatory effect.
4 Conclusion
Since the 1970s, when the main provisions of UK legislation relating to
equal treatment of women and men in employment were brought into force,
the bare bones of these rules have been fleshed out by judicial
interpretation, in particular through the work of the industrial tribunals.
The issue of whether discrimination is justified is said to be a 'question
of fact' for the tribunal of first instance to determine. However, the
courts have developed a particular approach to the question of
justification - both the standard required and the grounds available -
which in practice amounts to a 'legal test' for justification.127
There exist a number of exemption provisions which justify direct
discrimination between women and men in employment. Different
standards of justification apply to these. Some justifications for direct
discrimination, for example the GOQ relating to privacy and decency, are
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subjected to some judicial scrutiny in that they must not be
'unreasonable' restrictions on women in the employment sphere. Others,
for example the different treatment of women and men in the police force
and prison service, apply, if the factual circumstances are those
envisaged by the legislation, whether or not they are necessary or
proportional to a justifiable purpose.
The issue of justification is central to the concept of indirect
discrimination. The standard accepted by UK courts and tribunals for
justification of indirect discrimination has developed over twenty years,
yet it still cannot be said to be irrevocably fixed. The ruling of the
European Court in Bilka is accepted in the UK, but is understood and
applied in a different way to that of the European Court. The UK courts,
in line with Ojutiku, focus on the standard of 'reasonableness', rather
than 'proportionality'. Reliance on the former standard renders easier the
burden on employers seeking to justify discriminatory practices.
The grounds available for justification in UK law encompass a number of
situations, and may not be regarded as a fixed or closed class. Admission
of 'efficiency' or 'administrative efficiency' as a ground of justification
for a discriminatory policy allows justification in a broad category of
cases. The indications that efficiency in running the enterprise may be
more appropriate for a non-profit making enterprise, such as the National.
Health Service (Rainey) or the Manpower Service Commission (Cobb), than
for a private employer lack a logical basis. Recognition of the conceptual
difference between enterprise related and public interest related
justifications would clarify the distinction it seems that the UK courts
may be approaching.
The influence (and direct effect) of EC law on UK social law is significant..
According to EC law, UK law must conform with provisions of EC law, and
national law may not be interpreted or applied in such a way as to
conflict with EC law. It is possible that the European Court may rule
more clearly on the standard for justification, requiring the UK courts to
apply correctly the proportionality test. The European Court may also
develop an understanding of which substantive grounds justifying
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discrimination are acceptable. Developments of this nature would affect
fundamentally the current position of UK law.
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Chapter 6
United States of America
1 Federal Employment Law of the US: Sources and Structure
This section provides a brief overview of the provisions of federal law of
the United States of America (US) which are pertinent to the issue of sex
discrimination in employment. Sources of this federal law include federal
statutes (the most significant of which is the Civil Rights Act of 1964),
the Constitution and the decisions of federal courts.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) is the most wide-
reaching and comprehensive provision of US federal legislation on
discrimination in the employment sphere. Sex is one of the 'forbidden
grounds' for discrimination proscribed by Title VII; the others are race,
colour, religion and national origin. Originally sex was not included in
the provisions of the Bill, but was added as a 'wrecking' amendment while
the Bill was passing through the legislative process.' Title VII covers
all aspects of the employment relationship from the advertisement of
posts, to promotion and discharge of employees. - It applies to virtually
all employers, with only a few exceptions. Defences provided in Title VII
are expressed narrowly and have been given a narrow interpretation: the
employer must show that sex is a 'bona fide occupational qualification' for
the activity concerned.
Other legislative measures include the Equal Pay Act 1963 and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978, which amends Title VII.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (1868) was enacted after
the end of the Civil War and was designed to protect the rights of newly
freed black slaves. Section 1 of the Amendment provides that,
'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.'
United States of America	 141
Although this provision was intended to provide full equality for men of
all races, originally it was not interpreted to extend to sex discrimination.
Nevertheless, the provisions of the Amendment have since been applied
to legislation and other 'state action' which discriminates against women.
Claims that a state measure breaches the Equal Treatment clause may be
successful before the courts. Although the courts will not normally
substitute their opinions, regarding which policies should be effected by
legislation, for the opinions of elected legislatures, legislation may be
challenged as unconstitutional if it denies equal protection of the law
(provided for by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) to a category of
persons in a way which is arbitrary and has no legitimate purpose.2
The US system can be characterised as a common law system, in the sense
that courts are 'law-makers' in their role of developing the common law.
Of course, the interpretive function of courts is also highly significant,
particularly in an area such as discrimination law where most legal
provisions are found in statutes.
Each State has its own separate system of courts; discussion of their
jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this work, the focus of which is
Federal law. At the apex of the Federal system I's the Supreme Court of
the United States. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is spelled out
by Art III (2) of the Constitution: the Court has jurisdiction in a bona
fide controversy between two opposing litigants with a genuine conflict
of interest where the subject matter involves the Constitution, a Federal
law or a treaty3. The decisions handed down by the Supreme Court have
played a crucial part in the development of sex discrimination law in
employment4. Decisions of the Supreme Court are binding as precedent
for lower courts. The Supreme Court regards its own previous decisions
as binding under a version of stare decisi4 they may only be overturned
in certain narrow circumstances.
Appeal to the Supreme Court is not as of right, but is open to the
Court's discretion. The Supreme Court may decline to hear any case
presented to it. If the Court decides to hear an appeal, because it
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considers the case to be of particular importance or interest, a writ of
certiorari (to make more certain) will be granted.
Due to the broad scope of its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court does not
hand down many decisions in any one area of law. Because of this, and
also because there is no appeal as of right from the appelate level of the
federal courts, the decisions of the courts immediately below the Supreme
Court in the federal system are extremely important. At this appelate
level are the Courts of Appeals (Circuit Courts). These are arranged in
eleven numbered 'Circuits' on a geographical basis, plus two others. In
the present study, discussion of decisions of the Circuit Courts will be
central in providing examples of the attitudes of federal courts to
justification of sex discrimination. The role of the Court of Appeals has
been described as that of 'a mini Supreme Court in the vast majority of
cases' 5
At the trial court level in the federal court system is the District Court.
Decisions of District Courts will be discussed if they are of particular
interest.
Litigation in the US on sex discrimination in employment is voluminous.
The amount of available material, in terms of case reports, and literature,
is enormous, and no attempt to provide an exhaustive view of sex
discrimination law in the US is made here. Rather, discussion of
justification for sex discrimination is informed by a selection of material,
which aims to be representative. First, the main legislative provisions,
and their operation, in providing the standard of justification for sex
discrimination, are discussed in some detail.
2 Provisions of US law establishing the Equal Treatment of Women and
Men in Employment, and justification for derogation from those provisions
The equal treatment of women and men in employment in the US is
governed principally by legislative provisions, in particular, the Equal
Pay Act 1963 and the Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII, as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978. These provisions together cover
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discrimination on ground of sex by 'disparate treatment' 6 (similar to the
European concept of 'direct discrimination') and by 'adverse impact'
(similar to the European concept of 'indirect discrimination'). The terms
'disparate treatment' and 'adverse impact' are not statutory in source;
they are judicial constructs.
2.1 Disparate treatment
Discrimination by disparate treatment under the Civil Rights Act 1964,
Title VII, is intentional different (detrimental) treatment of an individual
by reason of their race, colour, sex or religion. In employment, disparate
treatment is analogous to the concept of direct discrimination in pay and
treatment of EC law. To establish disparate treatment, the employer's
motive must be examined. McDonnell Douglas Corporation v Greed sets
out the order of proof by which, in a situation concerning alleged
disparate treatment in an employment situation, the motive or intention of
the employer is shown. The plaintiff must first establish a prima fade
case. This is effected by showing that the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, applied for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants, had the required qualifications for the job, was denied the job
and the employer continued to seek applicants for the job. The
defendant employer may then 'articulate legitimate and non-discriminatory
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection'. The plaintiff, in order to succeed,
then has the burden of establishing that these reasons are in fact a
pretext to mask an illegal motive.
The decision in McDonnell Douglas has been extended to circumstances
other than refusal to appoint a prospective employee in the protected
class. In Flowers v Crouch-Walker Corporation'', the approach in
McDonnell Douglas was applied to the discharge of a person in a category
protected by Title VII. The plaintiff must show that, although still
satisfying the normal requirements of the job, the employer discharged
him or her, and that a person not in the protected category was given
the work. The employer then has the burden of production to show that
there were legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the discharge. The
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definition of disparate treatment applies in all circumstances where there
is discrimination on ground of sex in an employment situation.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act, Title VII provides that it is unlawful
for an employer 'to discriminate ... because of ... sex'. The discrimination
must be because of the plaintiff's sex. Title VII does not define this
provision: judicial interpretation has developed a definition.
The Supreme Court first tackled the issue in Phillips v Martin Marietta
Corp9. The employer in this case argued that its decision not to employ
women with pre-school age children (there was no equivalent provision
for men) was not in breach of Title VII, since the decision was not only
because of the plaintiffs' sex, but also because of a sex-neutral factor
(pre-school age children). The Court of Appeals accepted that, since it
was not sex alone that motivated the employer's hiring criteria, but sex
plus another neutral factor, there was no breach of title VII. The
Supreme Court did not agree, holding that,
'section 703(a) ... requires that persons of like qualifications be
given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex. The
Court of Appeals therefore erred An ... permitting one hiring policy
for women and another for men.'"
II•
In contrast, similar reasoning was used successfully in General Electric
Co v Gilbertil. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine, for
breach of Title VII, a health insurance plan which provided for all
disabilities, including coverage for circumcisions, vasectomies, and
prostatectomies for men, but did not provide cover for pregnancy of
women employees. In a difficult judgment, Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, viewed the health insurance plan as dividing employees into
pregnant and non-pregnant persons. The health insurance plan did not
discriminate against pregnant persons, as it gave them exactly the same.
benefits as it gave to non-pregnant persons. There was no breach of
Title VII by the failure to compensate pregnant women with additional
benefits.
As Gerald McGinley points out,
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'Implicit in the reasoning of Gilbert is that the group disfavoured
by a particular classification must be completely co-extensive with
the class protected. Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is
not sex diperimination because not all women are or will become
pregnant.'"
Congress reversed the effect of the Gilbert judgment by passing the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978, which adds section 701(k) to Title
VII13 . The provision reads as follows:
'The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include ...
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or other
related medical conditions ...'
Although unsuccessful in other areas, 'sex plus' arguments have been
successful in cases where an employer seeks to impose different grooming
standards on the sexes, for example, men are not permitted to have long
hair. The employer's refusal to employ a male applicant with long hair
was upheld in Willingham v Macon Telegraph Pub. Co 14. The Court of
Appeal distinguished the decision in Phillips v Martin Marietta, as
pertaining to a rule concerning a fundamental right, such as the right to
marry or found a family. Hair length is neither a fundamental right, nor
is it an immutable characteristic. The grooming code did not discriminate
against men; rather it discriminated against men .with long hair.
If the criteria by which the employer discriminates is sex plus another
criterion, this is not always regarded as disparate treatment by the US
courts. It seems that whether it is disparate treatment or not depends
on whether the second criterion can be characterised as a 'fundamental
right' or 'immutable characteristic'.
2.1.1 Equal Pay Act 1963
The Equal Pay Act amends the Fair Labour Standards Act 1938, which
regulates minimum wages, overtime and child labour. The scope of the
FLSA is extremely complex15. Put simply, the Equal Pay Act covers state,
local and federal government, and private employees. It requires equal
pay for women and men undertaking 'equal work', in the same
'establishment', by prohibiting an employer from discriminating,
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'between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees in such establishments at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (11i) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of productiqn; or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex.'"
The Equal Pay Act applies where the duties of the jobs concerned are
'substantially equal' in 'skill, effort and responsibility' and working
conditions 17 . The terms of the original Bill sought to prescribe 'equal
pay for comparable work'; however Congress, fearing that this choice of
wording would be too wide, changed the word 'comparable' to 'equal'.
The courts interpreted 'equal work' as indicating not identical work, but
work that is 'substantially equal'. In Shultz v Wheatson Glass Co.,la  the
court was of the opinion that the few insignificant extra tasks undertaken
by male packer-inspectors in a warehouse did not render their work
different from that of female packer-inspectors and therefore that the ten
per cent pay differential between women and men was in breach of the
equal pay legislation. The titles, classifications or descriptions of jobs
are irrelevant in determining whether two jobs are 'substantially equal':
it is to duties and activities of the employee that- the courts look19.
'Application of the equal work standard is necessarily a case-by-
case, largely factual evaluation. The degree of 'equality' that is
greater than 'comparability,' but less than 'identity,' is not
susceptible to a precise formula. Consequently, trial courts are
given a measure of fact finding discretion which will be reviewgd
by the appellate courts upon a standard of 'clearly erroneous'.'"
The lack of provision in the Equal Pay Act 1.963 for equal pay for work
of equal value is noteworthy.
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2.1.2 Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a comprehensive measure of federal
legislation. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 21 covers discrimination in
employment. It proscribes discrimination only in certain specific
situations delimited by the provisions. Title VII covers discrimination on
the part of an 'employer'22, 'employment agency' 23 or 'labor
organization' 24 . The federal government is exempted from the general
provisions; however section 717 covers non-discrimination in federal
employment. A 'bona fide private membership club (other than a labor
organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code' is also exempted. This provision has been
narrowly construed25.
The discrimination must be on a 'ground' recognized by Title VII. The
grounds are race, colour, religion, sex, and national origin 26. Title VII
protects all 'individuals' from these types of discrimination. Judicial
interpretation of the provisions has established the same standards and
burdens of proof for establishing justification of discrimination on any of
the grounds. Therefore, although the focus of this chapter is sex
discrimination, decisions involving discrimination on other grounds will be
relevant to issues relating to sex discrimination.
The discrimination must occur in an 'issue' recognized by Title VII. The
Issues are hire, discharge, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employmentn; limitation, segregation or classification of membership or
applicants for employment 28; failure to refer29; exclusion or expulsion
from membership 38; limitation, segregation or classification of membership
or applicants for membership3I; causing an employer to discriminate32;
retaliation33 ; and printing or publishing a discriminatory employment
notice of advertisement34 .
The provisions relating to sex discrimination in compensation, or pay, are
complicated by a clause of section 703(h), linking Title VII to the Equal
Pay Act, known as the Bennett Amendment. The clause provides,
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'Ii shall not be an unlawful employment practice under the title for
any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining
the amount of the wages or compensation paid to employees ... if
such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal
Pay Act]'
The purpose of this Amendment is to fill loopholes and to avoid
inconsistencies between the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act.
There are two analyses of the Bennett Amendment which have received
judicial support by the Courts of Appeals. The first, and most obvious,
interpretation is that the Bennett Amendment incorporates the 'equal pay
for equal work' formula of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII; if the work
carried out by women is not 'equal' to that carried out by men, there can
be no claim for discrimination in pay based on Title VI135. This first
interpretation results in no inconsistency between the two Acts. As it
was the prime purpose of the Amendment to avoid inconsistency36, for
this reason alone, it seems reasonable to regard this interpretation
favourably.
The alternative analysis, which is more problematic, in that it produces
the very inconsistency the Bennett Amendment sought to avoid, is that
the Bennett Amendment only protects that which is specifically sanctioned
by the Equal Pay Act. It will only apply in the case of discriminatory
activities of the employer which fall within the defences provided by the
Equal Pay Act; seniority, merit, quality or quantity of work or 'other
factors other than sex'. If an employer intentionally discriminates
between women and men in granting salaries, this will violate Title VII
even if the duties of the jobs are not 'equal' in the sense of the Equal
Pay Act. This was the interpretation applied in Gunther v County of
Washington37 in which, although the duties of a jail matron were held to
be substantially different from the duties of jail guards, sex based salary
distinctions were held to be cognisable, as disparate treatment, under
Title VII. In effect, this allowed an 'equal value' claim, which is not
admissible under the Equal Pay Act 1963.
The relationship of the Bennett Amendment to Title VII remains unclear;
it seems reasonable, however, to regard with some reservation the latter
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interpretation, given the legislative intent of removing inconsistencies
between the Equal Pay Act 1963 and Title VII.
It should also be noted that Title VII can be used to challenge
segregation of the workforce into unequal jobs, and can also reach
unequal pay of women and men in different 'establishments' of one
employer38. In these matters, Title VII is wider in its application than
the Equal Pay Act.
In general, Title VII operates as an extensive measure to proscribe
discrimination, including discrimination on ground of sex, by disparate
treatment. However, in certain circumstances, disparate treatment may be
justified.
2.1.2.1 Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Disparate treatment in breach of Title VII may be justified is if the
forbidden ground (in this case, sex) is a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) for the job. Title VII, section 703(e) provides,
'Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees ... on the basis of religion, sex or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex or national origin is
a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise...'
This provision is the major statutory defence incorporated in Title VII.
Only religion, sex and national origin are listed as possible BFOQs in
section 703. Race and colour are not available 39. Furthermore, BFOQs
are only available as a defence in situations of hiring or referral.
The exception is intended to be a narrow one; as the Committee Report to
the Bill reveals,
'[I]t provides for a very limited exception to the provisions of the
title. Notwithstanding any other provisions, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to employ persons of
a particular religious or national origin in those rare situations
where religippn or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification'''.
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In Rosenfeld v Southern Pacific Co41, the employer attempted to use the
BFOQ defence to exclude women from a job requiring the lifting of heavy
weights. The Court held that, since the capacity to lift heavy weights
was not a trait confined to members of one sex, each prospective employee
for the job must be evaluated separately, and the employer could not
lawfully apply a blanket prohibition to all prospective employees who were
women.
'BFOQ [is] limited to those instances where the generic sexual
characteristics of the employee - as distinguished from
characteristics which correlate with a particular sex - were crucial
to the performance of the job. Where there was simply a high
degree of correlation between a particular sex and the ability to
perform a particular job, there had to be an individual evaluation
of the employee's ability to perform.'
This has been characterised as the 'narrow view' of the BFOQ defence;
it requires a very high standard of justification. The broader view is
found in the case of Weeks v Southern Bell Telephone Co43, where it was,
in fact, again held that BFOQ could not apply in a situation where the
employer prevented women from holding jobs which required the lifting
of weights over thirty pounds. However, the Weeks ruling would have
permitted a finding of BFOQ where 'all or substantially all women would
not be able to perform safely the duties of tile job involved'. This
application of BFOQ,
I
— would appear to permit some utilization of the BFOQ defence
short of direct proof disqualifying 100% of a given sex. But even
this use of BFOQ may be illusory since the 'all or substantially all'
test is qualified by footnote 5 [p 235] indicating that where it is
possible to evaluate individual capacities to perform the job in
question, tbpn the employer must do so, and cannot exclude women
as a class.'"
The 'all or substantially all' standard, coupled with the requirement to.
individuate if possible, is also a fairly high standard of justification. The
two interpretations of the standard of justification required by the BFOQ
defence seem to share the common thread that it is the inability of a
particular sex to carry out a particular job which justifies their
exclusion.°
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2.1.2.2 Testing or seniority
The other two principal statutory defences46, available to employers to
justify disparate treatment, are found in section 703(h), which reads as
follows:
'[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to apply different ... terms, conditions or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... nor shall it be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act
upon the results of any professionally developed test, provided that
such test ... is not designed, intended or used to discriminate
because of race, colour, religion, sex or national origin.'
The standard of justification here is limited to whether the testing or
seniority system is 'bona fide', that is, operated without discriminatory
intent, and applied in a non-gender specific way.47
2.1.2.3 'Legitimate non-discriminatory reasons'
Different treatment of an employee or employees in a protected category
is justified if the employer shows 'legitimate non-discriminatory reasons'
for the difference". The plaintiff will not succeed, unless the plaintiff
can prove that the justification advanced is merely a pretext for the
discriminatory motive of the employer. This justification is not provided
for in Title VII, but has developed as a result of judicial interpretation
of its provisions. Legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for failure to
hire an individual would include 'comparison of relative qualifications,
past experience, seniority, performance on an objective ability test, past
.work record and letters of recommendation' 49
 . Reasons for laying off or
discharging an individual include 'breach of work rules, insubordination,
absenteeism, poor work performance or lack of work'50.
The reason put forward need only be related to a bona fide, legitimate
interest of the employer. The requirement need not be related directly
to performance of the tasks of the job. The standard for justification is
therefore less stringent than that for justification in the case of a BFOQ.
In McDonnell Douglas51 the employee concerned had taken part in an
illegal 'stall in' at the premises of the employer. The Court of Appeals
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held that the refusal of the employer to rehire the plaintiff was
'subjective' and not related to performance of the job. The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that,
'Nothing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and rehire one
who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful activity against it'.
Where the skills required for the job are minimal, or where they can be
objectively tested, the courts do not accept subjective evaluations, such
as 'employee potential', as bona fide 52. But where the skills required for
a job are such that the suitability of candidates is a matter for
subjective evaluation, the courts allow more latitude. For example, in
Powell v Syracuse University53, tenure was held to be lawfully denied to
a professor whose teaching performance was given a poor evaluation by
peers.
The fact that the employer could have used an alternative, less
discriminatory technique for employee selection does not prima fade
render a legitimate non-discriminatory business reason illegitimate.54
Neither are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons balanced against their
discriminatory effect on the plaintiff or others in the class of which the
plaintiff is a member, in order to evaluate their legitimacy.55
Purported 'legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons' will be rejected if the
plaintiff shows that they are merely a disguise, or 'pretext', for a
discriminatory motive. A common means of proving pretext is to show
that the criteria concerned were not applied in the same way to all
applicants in the case of hiring or all employees in the case of discharge.
It is irrelevant how legitimate the action of the employer was, if it is not
applied uniformly to all employees concerned. Corley v Jackson Police
Dept concerned the dismissal of black police officers who had accepted
bribes; a legitimate reason indeed for dismissal. However it was shown
that white officers also named by the same informant had not been
investigated as carefully as the black officers, and as a result, were not
discharged. Pretext was established.
'When evidence of pretext is presented the court must then examine
all of the evidence and the competing inferences to make the
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determination of whether the action was motivated by improper
class-based animus or was based on the legitimate reasons
presented. This finding is one of fact and will be subject to
review under the 'clearly erroneous' standard.'"
2.1.3 Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978 adds section 701(k) to Title VII.
The provision reads as follows:
'The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include ...
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or other
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ...'
Before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act came into existence, the Supreme
Court had distinguished 'discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy'
from 'sex discrimination'. In a constitutional context, Geduldig v Aiello57
established that pregnancy was not, of itself, a sex-based classification.
Rather, pregnancy was viewed as an,
objectively identifiable physical condition with unique
characteristics ... There is no risk from which men are protected
and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women
are protected and men are not.'
The Supreme Court followed this reasoning in General Electric Co v
Gilbert58 where the Court held that protection against all disabilities
except pregnancy in a health insurance plan provided by the employer
(a 'fringe benefit') was not sex based discrimination. The majority
judgment characterised such insurance plans as dividing potential
beneficiaries into pregnant and non-pregnant persons. The plan gave the
same benefits to pregnant persons as it gave to persons who were not
pregnant; therefore it did not discriminate against the former group.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act had the effect of reversing the decision
In Gilbert. Section 701(k) defines sex to include pregnancy and
childbirth. Disabilities affecting the ability to work arising out of the
pregnancy of an employee are to be treated the same as other similar
disabilities. Therefore, discharging women who become pregnant because
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of the pregnancy, where a 'similarly situated' man would not have been
discharged, is a form of sex discrimination, subject to the provisions of
Title VII.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act specifically states that if employers
provide medical or disability insurance schemes for their employees, these
schemes must treat pregnancy and childbirth in the same way as other
similar disabilities.
The effect of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is to equate discrimination
on grounds of pregnancy with discrimination on grounds of sex. This
means that the normal standards for justification of discrimination against
pregnant women, as discussed above, will apply in pregnancy
discrimination cases. 59
2.1.4 Constitutional Provisions concerning Equal Treatment in Employment
The equal treatment of women was not included in the Constitution of the
United States. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, including
the 'Equal Protection' clause, was not originally intended to apply to
women. It was generally believed that the Equal Protection clause had
little or no application other than to racial discrimination°.
A particular problem for women seeking to claim equality in the sphere
of employment in the early part of the twentieth century was the
existence of state protective legislation, prohibiting women from working
in certain trades, at certain times or for longer than certain periods of
time per day or per week. Although the Supreme Court, in Lochner v
New York61, struck down a New York regulation prohibiting bakeries from
permitting employees to work for more than ten hours a day or sixty
hours a week, on the grounds that the restriction was unnecessary,
unreasonable and arbitrary interference with the freedom of contract, and
was thus a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a similar
regulation prohibiting the employment of women in mechanical
establishments, factories and laundries for more than ten hours per day
escaped such treatment. In Muller v Oregon62, the Supreme Court held
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that the differential treatment of women in the area of employment by
state legislation was justifiable and constitutionally sound. The opinion
of the Court focused on the 'obvious' differences between women and men.
'That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens
of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant
testimony of the medical fraternity, continuance for a long time on
her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious
effects upon the body, and, as healthy mothers are essential to
vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of the mother becomes
an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigour of the race.'
Such sex-based classifications by legislative and other governmental
regulations were regularly upheld by the courts until the 19605 63, using
reasoning similar to that in Muller, on the grounds that women's physical
differences from men are obvious, and justify all sorts of different
treatment, and also on the grounds that the societal roles of women differ
from men64. This type of reasoning is no longer acceptable.
As noted above65, claims that a state measure breaches the Equal
Treatment clause can be sucessful before the courts if the measure denies
equal protection of the law (provided for by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments) to a category of persons in a way which is arbitrary and
has no legitimate purpose.
Application of the Equal Protection Clause depends on labelling of an
official classification, for the purpose of differentiation between different
people or groups, as 'suspect' or 'non-suspect'. Most classifications used
by legislatures are not challengeable as unconstitutional, unless they fail
the 'rational relationship test'. In order to meet this test, the challenged
classification must merely meet the standard of bearing a possible or
conceivable relationship to a legitimate, valid legislative goal. These are
the 'non-suspect' classifications. 'Suspect' classifications (which include
race, religion and national origin) cover those classifications which isolate
for special or different treatment persons belonging to groups which have
been historically disadvantaged66.
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'The practical result of labelling a class 'suspect' is that, any time
a law is passed that discriminates in its language or has a
discriminatory effect on a suspect class of persons, the state must
not simply show that the law is rational, but instead it must prove
that the law serves a compelling governmental interest and ttiat no
non-discriminatory law could accomplish the same purpose'.°I
The standard of jutification for 'suspect' classifications is high.
The 'suspect' label was never applied to sex discrimination by the
majority of the Supreme Court 68. Instead, by way of compromise, the
Court settled for an 'intermediate' classification for sexually discriminatory
state action. This special standard, which only applies to sex
discrimination, requires the government to demonstrate that sex
classifications have a 'fair and substantial relationship to the object of
the legislation' 68.	 This standard requires a demonstration of the
relationship between the rule and its purpose.
The 'intermediate' classification was used to challenge successfully a
broad statutory prohibition of women from working on vessels in the U.S.
Navy, in Owens v Brown70. It was held that the provision was too broad
to serve the state purpose. However, it is clear that the intermediate
standard does not require a justification for discriminatory state action
as strict as that required if the classification is 'suspect'. Given the
existence of a generally acceptable purpose for the legislation, measures.
of state action which discriminate on rounds of sex are unlikely to be
found unconstitutional.
In fact, most exclusions of members of one sex relating to employment
(such as prohibiting women from being prison guards in male prisons) will
be covered by the provisions of Title VII. Section 717 prohibits
discrimination by the federal government based on, inter alia, sex;
including discrimination in employment, although the section provides
different procedures for enforcement from those in the rest of the Act.
State and local governments are included in the definition of 'employer'
and are subject to the general provisions of Title VII. The provisions of
the Constitution relating to equal treatment of women in employment are
thus not central to the discussion in this chapter.
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2.2 Adverse or disparate impact
Discrimination by adverse impact (or disparate impact; either term is
acceptable) occurs when a criterion, neutral on its face, is applied such
that a significantly lower proportion of those in the group discriminated
against (for example, members of a particular racial group or women) can
comply, the criterion is not otherwise justified, and the purpose for which
the criterion is applied could not be achieved in a less discriminatory
way. The concept of adverse impact is analogous to the concept of
indirect discrimination in EC law. The three steps required to show
adverse impact were established by the Supreme Court in two decisions
(Griggs v Duke Power Con and Albemarle Paper Co v Moody72) which are
discussed below. 73
2.2.1 Equal Pay Act 1963
The Equal Pay Act contains four defences which justify pay differences:
these are (i) seniority; (II) merit; (ill) quantity or quality of production;
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex. The
three specific exemptions are examples of 'factors other than sex'. In
establishing justification by one of these defences, the onus is on the
employer to prove that one of the defences applies, and moreover that the
discrimination was motivated by a factor other than sex. Thus a
seniority, merit or production evaluation system must be applied in a non-
gender specific way74 .
Although not concerned with sex discrimination, the case of International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v U.S.75 sets out the standard by which
seniority systems (and by inference, other provisions of adverse impact)
will be judged as to whether they are bona fide, and therefore justifiable.
The seniority system must not operate with discriminatory intent, and
must be applied equally to all employees76.
Judicial attitudes to defences advanced as 'other factors other than sex'
justifying pay differentials are fairly clear. Defences focusing around the
'willingness of women to work for a lower wage' and those based on
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stereotypical views of women as a class are rejected. To allow these as
justification for unequal pay of women and men would completely
undermine the purpose of the Equal Pay Act77.
2.2.2 Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII
The leading case of Griggs v Duke Power Con established that Title VII
'proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also practices that are fair
in form but discriminatory in operation' 79. Griggs concerned black
workers who were excluded from employment with a power company on the
grounds that they did not possess high school diplomas or that they did
not score a pass rate on two professionally recognised intelligence tests.
The workers complained that there had been a breach of the provisions
of Title VII. The Supreme Court reasoned that Title VII was directed
against 'the consequences of employment practices, not simply
motivation' 89. The use of the criteria by the employer had a
disproportionate impact on black applicants, as 34% of white males, as
against 12% of black males, in the state, had completed high school
education. Given this disproportionate impact on a group protected by
the legislation, the Supreme Court held that,
'Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that
any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question ... The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown ito be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited.°4
The defendant in Griggs claimed that the tests used were lawful under
the express provision of Title VII (section 703(h)) that,
'it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate
...,.
On examining the legislative history of this provision, the Court held that
the provision meant that scored tests were subject to the requirement of
job relatedness". 'Any tests must measure the person for the job, and
not the person in the abstract.'"
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The Griggs test was applied in the case of Albemarle Paper Co v Moody84
where the Supreme Court, referring to McDonnell Douglas Corp v Greer-185,
added the third step to the test.
'If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests
are 'job-related', it remains open to the complaining party to show
that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in
'efficient and trustworthy workmanship'. (footnote omitted) Such
a showing would be evidence that the eniployer was using its tests
merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination.'°u
Thus the burden of proof in an adverse impact case is initially on the
employee who alleges discrimination, then transfers to the employer to
show justification, and finally may transfer back to the employee to show
that the justification is mere 'pretext'. These three steps for establishing
discrimination by adverse impact are now discussed in detail.
2.2.2.1 Adverse effect on those in the protected group
To establish adverse impact, it must first be shown that the
disadvantageous effect of the provisions or requirements imposed by the
employer is greater on the protected group than on the group used for
comparison. In the case of sex discrimination, the provisions or
requirements will usually be more difficult for women to meet than for
men. The Supreme Court has given no definite arithmetical rule as to
what constitutes a sufficiently adverse impact, rather the Court refers to
a 'significantly different' 87
 selection rate or a 'substantially
disproportionate'88
 disqualification rate.
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures" propose a
rule that a procedure which produces a rate of selection for a protected
group which is less than 80% of the rate for the group with the highest
rate of selection will be regarded as having an adverse impact 90. This
is known as the 'four-fifths rule'.
The Uniform Guidelines were adopted in 1978 by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Civil Service Commission, the
Department of Labor and the Department of Justice. They are a
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consolidation of previous guidelines. They provide a 'framework for
determining the proper use of tests and other selection procedures' 91 to
assist employers in complying with the law on discrimination in
employment. Courts differ as to the weight to be accorded to the Uniform
Guidelines. The Guidelines do not have the force of legislation: however,
in both Griggs and Albemarle the Supreme Court treated them with 'great
deference'. The Circuit Courts differ in their attitudes; for example the
8th Circuit regards adherence to the Uniform Guidelines as 'mandatory',
whereas the 5th Circuit regards this as 'directory only', but 'should be
followed absent showing that some cogent reason exists for non-
compliance'92.
Further to the question of the proportion required to trigger the adverse
impact of a particular hiring or firing policy, is the problem of which
group is to be used for comparison. Is the group for comparison those
who apply for the job, those in the population, those in the applicant
pool, or those in the population pool? The results may differ widely,
depending on which group is used. The Uniform Guidelines, with
reference to 'a selection rate', suggest the first option; the selection rate
is determined by comparing the percentage of successful applicants in the
non-minority group to the percentage of successful applicants in the
minority group. As the courts defer, in general, to the Uniform
Guidelines, this is the pool most often used.
In a few cases, a different pool is used. The comparison has also been
made between the percentage of those in the minority group hired and
the percentage of the minority group in the population of the area. If
25% of the people hired by the employer are black and the population of
the area is 26% black, this tends to indicate no adverse impact 93. The
Supreme Court accepted this approach in Hazelwood School Dist v U.S.94.
In Griggs, the Court accepted an argument based on the potential
applicant pool. The requirement for high school education could be met
by 34% of whites in the area, contrasted with 12% of blacks. The height
and weight requirements for prison guards in Dothard v Rawlinson95
were tested on the basis of national statistics as to the comparative
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height and weight of women and men. It was found that the standards
set would exclude over 40% of women but only 1% of men, and that
therefore a prima facie case of discrimination was established.
Use of the population pool for comparison compares the percentage of the
company employees who are in the minority group with the percentage of
the minority group in the population (either local population or general
population may be used for comparison). section 703(j) of Title VII states
that,
'Nothing contained in this Title shall be interpreted to require any
employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
group ... on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex or national origin employed by any employer ... in
comparison with the total number of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex or national origin in any ... area.'
This means that a mere disparity in the proportion of minority employees
as compared to the population as a whole is insufficient evidence to
establish a breach of Title VI1 96. However, as International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v U.S97 establishes, such a disparity, in conjunction with
evidence of individual acts of discrimination, indicates a prima fade
showing of a 'pattern or practice' of discrimination.
The sample used to show adverse impact must be 'statistically significant',
that is, taken from a group large enough to show the adverse impact98.
There is dispute over whether the hiring or promotion procedure as a
whole must not have an adverse impact, or whether each part of the
procedure must pass the adverse impact test.
'Thus, an employer who had a two-step procedure under which a
disproportionate number of minorities were screened out by step
one, but the discrepancy was wiped out by step two, could argue
that, at the end of the selection procedure, there was no
discriminatory mpact, an argument often referred to as the bottom
line approach.' 77
The Uniform Guidelines do not address the question of whether the
reasoning behind the bottom line approach is correct. However, the
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Guidelines indicate that if the total selection process for a job does not
have an adverse impact, individual components having such an impact
need not 'in usual circumstances' be specially validated in. Connecticut
v Tea1101 concerned a test selection process with many components, the
first of which was a pass/fail barrier with adverse impact. The Supreme
Court rejected the bottom line approach in these circumstances. There
are Court of Appeals decisions supporting both viewsle2.
2.2.2.2 Business necessity
Once the plaintiff has established, in one way or another, the adverse
impact of the policy of the employer concerned, the burden shifts to the
defendant employer to show that this policy is justified. The nature and
standard of proof required to establish such justification is uncertain.
Griggs, although it established the standard as 'business necessity',
actually did little to define it.
'The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited... Congress has
placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given
requiremerg must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question.'"
The Courts of Appeal (Circuit Courts) applied the Griggs standard in such
a way as to emphasise the 'necessity' aspect of the standard. According
to the Court of Appeal in Robinson v Lorillard Corpl", there are three
aspects to business necessity:
'The business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override
any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out
the business purpose ...; and there must be available no acceptable
alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the
business purposes advanced...'
On this analysis, all these aspects of business necessity, including the
lack of availability of less discriminatory alternatives, are part of the
employer's burden of proof. The cumulative effect of these requirements
is the imposition of a strict standard for justification on the employer.
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However, this postion is in contrast to more recent developments of the
standard.
The Griggs standard has been placed in doubt by the more recent
decisions of the Supreme Court in Watson v Fort Worth Bank and
Trustl05 and Wards Cove Packing v Atonion6. These decisions warrant
a more detailed examination.
The plaintiff in Watson was a female black bank teller who was passed
over four times for promotion to a supervisory position. A white male
was successful in each case. The bank had no formal system or criteria
for evaluating candidates for supervisory posts, but instead relied on the
subjective judgement of supervisors who were acquainted with the
candidates and with the nature of the jobs to be filled. All the
supervisors involved in denying Ms Watson promotion were white.
At the Court of Appeal level, Ms Watson argued that the District Court,
in its ruling on her case, had erred in failing to apply a disparate impact
analysis. Previous Supreme Court decisions, subsequent to Griggs, in
common with that decision, had all involved standardized employment tests
•or critena107 . There was a divergence among the_ various Circuits as to
whether a disparate impact analysis could properly be applied to a hiring
or promotion system which involved the use of 'discretionary' or
'subjective' criteria. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
resolve the conflict.
The Supreme Court accepted that Griggs could apply to subjective tests.
'We are persuaded that our decisions in Griggs and succeeding
cases could largely be nullified if disparate impact analysis were
applied only to standardized selection practices. However one might
distinguish 'subjective' from 'objective' criteria, it is apparent that
selection systems that combine both types would generally have to
be considered subjective in nature. Thus, for example, if the
employer in Griggs had consistently preferred applicants who had
a high school diploma and who passed the company's general
aptitude test, its selection system could nonetheless have been
considered 'subjective' if it also included brief interviews with the
candidates. So long as an employer refrained from making
standardized criteria absolutely determinative, it would remain free
to give such tests almost as much weight as it chose without
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risking a disparate impact challenge. If we announced a rule that
allowed employers so easily to insulate themselves from liability
under Griggs, disparate impact analysis might effectively be
abolished.'"°
The Supreme Court then turned to the evidentiary standards of
justification to be applied in adverse impact cases. Ms Watson contended
that once adverse impact was established, the defendant should only be
able to rebut this showing by justifying the challenged practice in terms
of 'business necessity"" or 'job relatedness' 110. The bank warned that
subjective criteria could not, in practice, be 'validated' in the same way
as objective tests, to show whether they give an accurate prediction of
how a candidate will perform on the job. To apply the disparate impact
analysis of Griggs to subjective hiring or promotion decisions would be
tantamount to imposing quotas, as employers would find it expensive and
difficult to validate such decisions in litigation, therefore would adopt
quota systems to ensure that no employee could establish a prima facie
case. Such a result would be in violation of both Title VII, which
prohibits preferential treatment on the forbidden grounds", and the
Constitution112.
The Supreme Court took this reasoning seriously and proceeded to show
why disparate impact theory need not necessarily result in the use of
quotas and preferential treatment. First the court explained that 'the
plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima fade case goes beyond the need
to show that there are statistical disparities in the employer's workforce'.
Second, the court examined the nature of the business necessity or job
relatedness defence.
'Although we have said that an employer has 'the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question', Griggs, 401 U.S., at 432,
such a formulation should not be interpreted as implying that the
ultimate burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant. On the
contrary, the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against
a protected group has been caused by a specific employment
practice remains with the plaintiff at all times. Thus, when a
plaintiff has made out a prima fade case of disparate impact, and
when the defendant has met its burden of producing evidence that
its employment practices are based on legitimate business reasons,
the plaintiff must 'show that other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
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employer's legitimate interest in effective and trustworthy
workmanship.' Ablemar1e Paper Co, 422 U.S., at 425. Factors such
as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection
devices are relevant in determining whether they would be equally
as effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer's
legitimate business goals.'1"
In fact, this demonstrates that the court used a version of disparate
treatment theory, requiring the plaintiff to show other non-discriminatory
tests or selection devices available to the employer - in short, more or
less to establish pretext. In other words, the extension of adverse impact
analysis to situations where the 'subjective' selection criteria, in contrast
to the 'objective' selection criteria of a high school diploma and
intelligence test of Griggs, was acheived at the cost of the addition to
adverse impact analysis of the 'pretext' part of 'business necessity'. This
part of the employer's burden of proof was shifted to the employee. If
the employee does bring forward evidence of less discriminatory
alternatives, the court may then balance the costs, or other burdens, of
the proposed alternatives, in determining whether they would indeed by
equally as effective in achieving the employer's aim.
The second case which puts to test the currency of the Griggs standards
for justification in adverse impact analysis is Wards Cove Packing v
Atonio, which concerns a class action brought by employees at two salmon
canneries in Alaska. Jobs at the canneries fell into two general types,
'cannery jobs', on the cannery line and regarded as non-skilled, and
'non-cannery jobs', a variety of positions, generally regarded as skilled.
Non-cannery positions were remunerated at a higher rate than cannery
positions. The cannery jobs were filled predominantly by non-whites,
Filipinos and Alaskan Natives; the non-cannery jobs were filled with
predominantly white workers, who were recruited from the companies'
offices in Washington and Oregon. The plaintiffs in the original action
complained that a variety of the employers' promotion or hiring practices,
or both, were responsible for the racial division of the categories of
employees. The practices of the employers challenged included a lack of
objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, and a practice of not
promoting from within the company. The plaintiffs advanced both
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.
United States of America	 166
The Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case en banc114, with reference
to the question of whether subjective hiring practices could be subject
to the Griggs model of adverse impact discrimination. This question was
answered in the affirmative115.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, as some of the issues were those
on which the members of the Court were divided in Watson v Fort Worth,
in order to address those disputed questions relating to the proper
.application of the disparate impact theory116
On the issue of justification for hiring and promotion practices with a
prima fade disparate impact, the Court ruled as follows:
'Though we have phrased the query differently in different cases,
it is generally well-established that at the justification stage of
such a disparate impact case, the dispositive issue is whether a
challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer (footnotes omitted). The
touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's
justification for his use of the challenged practice. A mere
insubstantial justification in this regard will not suffice, because
such a low standard of review would permit discrimination to be
practised through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral
employment practices. At the same time, though, there is no
requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or
'indispensable' to the employer for it to pass muster: this degree
of scrutiny would be almost impossible jpr most employers to meet,
and would result in a host of evils ...'"'
Acknowledging that some earlier decisions of the Supreme Court suggest
otherwise, the Court in Wards Cove reiterated its ruling in Watson that
the burden on the employer in justifying a practice (whether concerning
application of 'objective' or 'subjective' criteria), which is discriminatory
in effect, is one of production, not of persuasion 118. Whereas originally
the employer had the final burden of proof in adverse impact analysis,
now in both disparate treatment and adverse impact analysis, it seems the
employee has the final burden.
The standard of justification, while not being so low as to allow any
purported justification to be acceptable, is based on 'a reasoned review'
of the employer's justification. The standard is not so high that the
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requirement with adverse impact must be essential or indispensible to the
employer.
2.2.2.3 Pretext
As explained above, discrimination by adverse impact occurs when a
criterion, neutral on its face, is applied such that a significantly lower
proportion of those in the group discriminated against can comply. The
employer may rebut this inference by establishing justification, with a
showing of necessity, for the criterion with adverse impact. However,
even if the employer is successful in so doing, the plaintiff may still
prevail by showing that the rule has been applied in a discriminatory
way, and in fact is 'pretext' for the discrimination. One way to indicate
this is to show that the purpose for which the criterion was applied could
have been achieved in a less discriminatory way119. Because the
establishment of 'pretext' is deemed to indicate the employer's intention,
at this stage, the discriminatory motive or intent of the employer becomes
relevant. The confusion of disparate treatment and disparate analysis in
some judgments owes much to the relationship of pretext to both types
of analysis.
-
What may be considered as evidence at this stage was indicated by the
Court of Appeal in Chrisner v Complete Auto Transit Co Inc120 to include,
'any subsequent practices adopted by the company ... The hiring
practices of comparable business might also shed some light on
what constitutes a feasible alternative. Of course, the marginal cost
of another hiring policy and its implications for public Rafety are
factors which should not be omitted from consideration.'"'
2.2.2.4 Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
It should be noted that the BFOQ defence may also apply as a defence in
adverse impact claims. The same standards of justification as for
justification of disparate treatment apply.
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3 Substantive Grounds of Justification for unequal treatment
In the federal law of the US, certain substantive grounds of justification
are available to defend the unequal treatment of women and men in
employment. Various of these grounds are now discussed in some detail.
Circumstances in which disparate treatment of women and men is justified
are examined first: this is followed by a discussion of various situations
in which adverse impact discrimination is justified. However, as it is
usual for both disparate treatment and adverse impact analysis to be
applied alongside one another in Title VII claims, absolute separation of
the types of justification is an unrealistic task if the case law is to be
examined. Moreover, a conceptual confusion between justification for
legitimate business reasons (disparate treatment analysis), and
justification by business necessity (adverse impact analysis), compounded
by the relationship of 'pretext' to both concepts, is evident from some
court decisions. Analysis of the BFOQ exception is also informed by those
concepts122 .
3.1 Disparate treatment
3.1.1 Exclusion of activities from the equal treatment principle
Certain activities are excluded from the principle of equal treatment of.
women and men in employment, on various grounds.
3.1.1.1 Religious organisations
Although religious and educational organisations are within the definition
of employers in section 701, by an amendment of 1972, section 702 and
section 703 (d)(2) allow religious organisations to discriminate in their-
hiring policy on the basis of religion. Religious organisations and
educational establishments owned, supported, controlled or managed by a
particular religious organisation, where the curriculum is directed towards
the propagation of a particular religion, may hire and employ employees
of that religion. This exemption does not however reach discrimination
on other bases, including sex.
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In spite of this provision in Title VII, the Constitutional guarantee of
'free exercise' of religion, provided for in the First Amendment, has been
relied on, as a ground of justification for discrimination, to preclude
interference with all matters concerning the appointment or ordination and
pay of ministers of religion. 123
 Thus, religious organisations may
continue to discriminate against women in denying them the opportunity,
open to men with a vocation, of becoming ministers or priests.
3.1.1.2 Employment of women in the Armed Forces
The application of Title VII to the uniformed military has caused some
controversy124. The District Court in Hill v Berkman125 decided that
Title VII did apply to the 'uniformed services', but then proceeded to
hold that the Army had a BFOQ defence to the discrimination claimed.
The plaintiff had joined the army to become a 'Nuclear Biologist and
Chemical Scientist', a job that was subsequently reclassified to a 'combat
support role', resulting in her exclusion from the post. The Court
concluded that the military,
'may exclude women from combat and combat support positions,
because being male is a bona fide occupational qualification for a
job at is by federal law and present national policy restricted to
men'i".
3.1.1.3 Privacy
If the duties of a job entail invasion into the privacy of a third party,
for example in the instance of strip searchers, nurses, or toilet
attendants, it may be a BFOQ that the employee is the same sex as the
person whose privacy may be invaded. In Carey v New York State Human
Rights App. Bd.127, it was held that the intimate care being provided to
patients by nurses meant that sex could be a BFOQ for the performance
of those duties.
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3.1.1.4 Security
If the threat to security is sufficiently severe, such as in the case of
employment of prison officers in an all-male peneteniary, then it may be
a BFOQ to employ a man to perform the job. This was held to be the
case in Dothard v Raw1inson128. Stressing that the case in point
concerned an unusual factual situation, the court held, that, in general,
the exclusion of women from a particular job because the job is deemed
to be dangerous, is not justifiable. It is for the individual woman to
decide whether she wishes to accept the risk, and take on the job.
Dothard128 was different, however, because the threat to security in a
male, maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary, if a woman were to be
employed in the job of 'correctional counsellor', was significant.
The Court held that it was 'the employee's very womanhood' that would
'directly undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the
essence of a correctional counselor's responsibility.,130
In subsequent cases concerned with law enforcement and public safety,
Dothard has been construed narrowly. In particular, courts have been
unwilling to extend the ruling in Dothard to prisons of other types or to
exclude women from all jobs as prison guards. For example, in Gunther
_v Iowa State Men's Reformatory131 , the District Court did not apply
Dothard in the case of a medium security prison, holding that,
'The Supreme Court painstakingly limited its decision in upholding
the male BFOQ in the Alabama penitentiaries to that 'particularly
inhospitable' environment. Anamosa [the prison concerned] is no
rose garden; neither is it nthe stygian spectre which faced the
Supreme Court in Dothard.'"
The Court of Appeal agreed with this analysis, explaining that, in the
balancing test between equal treatment for women and public safety, in
a normal prison situation, the balance favours equal treatment and
evaluation of individual capabilities. 133
 The ground of public security
is available only in narrow situations.
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3.1.2 Pregnancy and maternity
As we have already noted, after woman plaintiffs had been unsuccessful
in countering sex plus arguments in cases where the discrimination was
on grounds of pregnancy, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978 came into
effect. This Act operates to include discrimination on grounds of
'pregnancy, childbirth or other related medical conditions' in the terms
'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' of Title VII. The relevant
provision reads,
'... [W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work ...'
Discrimination on ground of pregnancy is to be treated as the equivalent
of direct discrimination on ground of sex. Nevertheless, there are
situations in which such discrimination is justified. The purported
justification may not be the pregnancy itself; it must be another reason.
Treatment of a pregnant woman employee in a disadvantageous manner
may be justified if there exist grounds for similar treatment of a
'similarly situated' man. For example, to treat unfavourably a woman who
could not carry out the duties of her employment due to pregnancy-
related absence from the workplace would not be unlawful, if a man who
suffered an illness-related absence from work would be treated in the
same way.
Chambers v Omaha Girls Club134 saw application of justifiable
discrimination against a pregnant woman on moral grounds. It was held
that the club's rule of excluding from employment single women who
became pregnant and men who caused pregnancy outside marriage did not
violate Title VII. Under disparate treatment analysis, the court held that
the employer had established a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
the rule; the club had as a specific aim the provision of role models to
discourage teenagers from becoming pregnant.
'Under the disparate impact theory the court said that the
defendants could rely on either business necessity or a BFOQ to
rebut the plaintiff's case, and that the burden was essentially the
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same under either defence: either to demonstrate "a close nexus
between the policy ... and 'a substantial end goal' of the employer"
or to show that the BFOQ was "related and necessary to the
operation of the defendant's business" [at 949 - 50]. Here, because
the purpose of the Club was to foster growth and maturity in
young girls by exposing them to "the greatest number of available
positive options in life", and because the policy was based on the
belief "that teenage pregnancies severely limit the available
opportunties for teenage girls," the court concluded that "a
manifest relationship exists between the Girls Club's fundamental
purpose and its single pregnancy policy." [at 950] Because the
finding of business necessity was dispositive of the case, the court
observed that it was "not necessary to determine whether the
evidence would satisfy a bona fide occupggonal qualification,
although presumably it would." [at 951, n 51]'"
It was essential to the defence that the rules of the club applied equally
to women (who became pregnant) and men (who caused pregnancy).
Positive discrimination on grounds of pregnancy may be justifiable in US
law. Section 701(k), which provides that sex discrimination is to include
discrimination on the ground of pregnancy, operates to require employers
to treat pregnant employees in the same way as other employees with a
similar disability or condition, in the provision of health plans and paid
leave. This 'special treatment' of women is justified.136
3.2 Justification for adverse impact
Justification for criteria, imposed by employers on employees, which have
an adverse impact on women may also be established if the employer
meets the 'business necessity' test of Griggs, or the revised standard put
forward in the Watson and Wards Cove decisions. It is then open to the
employee to show that the purported justification is 'pretext' for a
discriminatory intent. Adverse impact in situations concerning the pay of
employees may be justified by the specific defences provided by the
Equal Pay Act 1963.
The Supreme Court did not indicate, in Griggs, Watson, or Wards Cove,
which aims of employers would be regarded as an acceptable grounds for
justification of adverse impact discrimination. In Watson, the Supreme
Court suggested that employers should, in most cases, be given the
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benefit of the doubt, that the ground for justification was acceptable:
'courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure
business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress, they
should not attempt it'137.
The different types or grounds of justification for discrimination by
adverse impact have, as in the previous chapters, been divided into those
where the justification is related to the duties of the job concerned,
those where it is a broader justification, relating to the enterprise as a
whole, and those where the justification relates to a 'public interest'.
3.2.1 Job related justifications
3.2.1.1 Height and weight requirements
Absolute height or weight requirements applied in a hiring policy are
certain to have an adverse impact on women, who, as a class, are shorter
in height and weigh less than men. Minimum height requirements are
subjected to fairly strict scrutiny by the courts: even where it is
recognised that some standard is justifiable, the courts may attempt to
ensure that the impact of its application excludes as few women as
possible. In Boyd v Orzak Airlines138, the court accepted that the
constraints of cockpit design necessitated employment of pilots whose
heights were within certain limits, but held that the height requirement
should be lowered to comply with the equal treatment legislation.
'The cockpit can only accommodate a range of heights. Defendant
has chosen to draw the line at 5'7'. The evidence established,
however, that a requirement of 5'5' which would lessen the impact
for women, would be sufficient to ensure the requisite mobility and
vision. Accordingly,,She Court will order defendant to lower its
height requirements.'"'
Some federal courts have regarded more favourably the imposition of
minimum weight requirements, even where these have adverse impact on
women. The reasoning behind this is that weight is more subject to
individual control than height, therefore the requirements are more akin
to personal appearance and grooming than physical qualifications.
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'Defendant maintains weight standards for its female flight
attendants which differ from the standards which defendant
maintains for its male flight attendants. However, such a difference
in weight standards does not constitute sex discrimination violative
of Title VII, because how much one weighs: a) is an aspect of one's
personal appearance that is generally subject to one's own control;
and b) is not a fundamental aspect of life in the sense that, eg
marriAge, pregnancy and child-rearing are fundamental aspects of
life.'14U
Other courts reject this reasoning and do not regard the subjection of
women and men to different weight requirements as justifiable. This was
the case in Gerdom v Continental Airlines141 where the employer enforced
a policy requiring employees classified as 'flight hostess' (a position held
only by women) to comply with strict weight requirements as a condition
of their employment. No similar requirements were imposed for any job
classifications which included men, even men working side by side with
and carrying out the same tasks as the women concerned. The plaintiff's
employment contract was terminated because her weight exceeded that
specified in the employer's policy. She brought a claim under Title VII.
The court held that the case could not fall within the area covered by
the 'grooming' cases 142, and therefore outside the purview of Title VII,
since in those cases different grooming standards (eg permitting long hair
on women, but not on men) placed no greater burden on one sex than the
other, which was not so in the present situation. On the contrary, in the
present situation the weight requirements were not imposed on male.
employees, and therefore constituted a prima facie breach of Title VII.
The employer argued that the policy was justified by its view that female
hostesses were central to its business image. The court applied disparate
treatment analysis and held that the employer would have to rebut the
Inference of discriminatory intent which arose from the different
treatment of female employees, by raising a genuine issue of fact as to
the existence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the policy. -
'In this case that would entail a showing that persons of either sex
who exceed the weight limits imposed on these flight hostesses
would be less able to perform their duties. Continental, however,
has never attempted to assert such a justification. It concedes
that the weight program id not improve the ability of attendants
to perform their duties.'14.1
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The purported justification that the weight requirements were motivated
by Continental's desire to compete with other airlines by featuring
attractive flight attendants was rejected. 'The difficulty with the
justification is that it is not neutral.' 144
 Sex discrimination cannot be
upheld on the ground of customer preference unrelated to the ability to
perform the job.145
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of height and weight
requirements in Dothard v Rawlinson146 in which an applicant for a post
as a 'correctional counsellor' (prison guard) in a male prison was refused
because she failed to meet the minimum weight requirement for such
'contact' positions (positions the duties of which involve close contact
with inmates). The employer averred that this weight requirement, and
a minimum height requirement, were job related, in that they had a
relationship to strength, a 'sufficient but unspecified amount of which is
essential to effective job performance' 147. The Court held that this did
not justify the policy, as the employer had provided no evidence showing
a direct correlation between the height and weight requirements and the
amount of strength necessary for effective performance of the duties of
the job.
1D.
'If the job-related quality that the appellants identify is bona fide,
their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test
for applicants that measures strength directly. Such a test, fairly
administered, would fully satisfy the standards of Title VII because
it would be one that 'measure[s] the person for the job and not the
pergiln in the abstract.' Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US, at
436''
3.2.1.2 Physical ability to perform the job
An employer may justify policies with an adverse impact against women
if the job entails performance of a task which fewer women than men can
carry out. The BFOQ defence has been interpreted in different ways in
terms of ability to perform. Rosenfeld v Southern Pacific Co149 focuses
on sex specific abilities. Since the capacity to lift heavy weights was not
a trait confined to members of one sex, the employer could not lawfully
apply a blanket prohibition for all women who applied.
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However, the 'all or substantially all' test of Weeks v Southern Bell
Telephone Co15° allows application of the BFOQ defence in a situation
where 'all or substantially all women would be able to perform safely the
duties of the job involved'. Here it was the policy of the employer to
exclude women from jobs which required the lifting of weights over thirty
pounds. Even with this broad construction of the BFOQ defence, a
blanket exclusion may not be justifiable if it is reasonable to expect the
employer to evaluate each potential employee's ability individually.
Ability to perform the job safely may be particularly applicable in the
case of a pregnant employee. As provided in section 701(k), sex
discrimination includes discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy: to
dismiss an employee because she becomes pregnant is unlawful. However,
where ability of a pregnant employee to perform the job is put into
question, especially where the safety of others is concerned, the courts
will allow use of the BFOQ defence, or business necessity, to justify this
discrimination. Several courts have applied the BFOQ defence in the case
of flight attendants, employees of airlines, who become pregnant, allowing
the employer to require leave of absence at the start of the pregnancy.
An example of such a decision is Condit v United AirlinesI51, in which
the court was particularly concerned by the ability of a pregnant flight
attendant to carry out her duties in an emergency situation. Other
courts, applying the same principles, have held that the inability to
perform the job of a flight attendant arises at a later stage in the
pregnancy152 .
Courts will uphold mandatory leave policies for pregnant employees as
justifiable if the pregnancy seriously affects the employee's ability to
perform the job, such that the safety of third parties might be at risk.
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3.2.2 Enterprise related justifications
3.2.2.1 Grading and pay structures
As explained above 153, discriminatory pay differences may be challenged
under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII, or both. The Bennett
Amendment of section 703(h), which provides that it shall not be unlawful
under Title VII for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex
in determining pay if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions
of the Equal Pay Act, is relevant here.
The employer may justify pay differences using, as grounds for
justification, one of the four statutory defences in the Equal Pay Act, (i)
seniority; (ii) merit; (iii) quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex.
According to the provisions of section 703(h),
'It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
apply different standards of compensation ... pursuant to a bona
fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such differences are
not the result of intention to discriminate because of ... sex ...'
A seniority or merit system will operate to promote the effective running
of the enterprise; its use is an 'enterprise related' justification.
Other employment practices pertaining to the effective running of the
employer's enterprise may also be justified, in spite of adverse impact on
women, if they are 'bona fide'. For example, premiums paid to workers
on particular shifts are justifiable, but not if women are denied the
opportunity of working on the better paid shifts. In this case, the shift
differential cannot be described as a 'factor other than sex', as it is, at
least in part, not sex neutra1154. Similarly, the payment of a 'red circle'
rate to an employee assigned to a job which is normally paid at a lower
rate than the employee's usual job, will not breach the provisions of the
Equal Pay Act, even if employees of the other sex are employed on the
same job and paid at the lower rate. But 'if the employer 'red circles'
a discriminatory wage rate, the effect is to perpetuate prior equal pay
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violations, and thus necessarily is based on the sex of the employee. As
such it will not be a valid defence,155. This would apply if the wage
rate which is red circled is already discriminatory, for example if a man
moves from a higher paid job, from which women are excluded, to a job
mostly done by women.
A more problematic 'factor other than sex' is the use of different
profitability of products handled by employees as justification for
different pay. This different pay is justified by the need of the
enterprise as a whole to run efficiently. In Hodgson v Robert Hall
Clothes, Inc. 156, a saleswoman in the women's department of a clothes
shop claimed equal pay with the salesmen who worked in the men's
department. Although the court found that the work carried out was
'equal' in terms of the Equal Pay Act, the Court allowed the pay
differential on the grounds that the men's department was more
profitable.
The pay differential was considered justifiable in spite of the fact that
the women were given no opportunity to work in the men's department,
therefore the application of the profitability system was to some degree
sex based. Moreover, the court did not deal with the fact that
'profitability' was based on group statistics, and that some individual
women may have made sales with greater profit than those made by some
individual men.
3.2.2.2 Customer preference
Customer preference is not a ground of justification for sex
discrimination; it is exactly this sort of attitude which Title VII aims to
combat. In Diaz v Pan American Airways157, the employer attempted to
argue that being female was a bona fide occupational qualification for the
job of flight cabin attendant. The finding of the trial court that Pan
American's clients overwhelmingly preferred to be served by female flight
attendants was held on appeal to be irrelevant. The employer also
argued, with expert testimony, in its defence that 'an airplane cabin
represents a unique environment in which an air carrier is required to
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take account of the special psychological needs of its passengers. These
psychological needs are better attended to by females.' 158
 The Court of
Appeals was not convinced:
,The primary function of an airline is to transport passengers
safely from one point to another. While a pleasant environment,
enhanced by the obvious cosmetic effect that female stewardesses
provide as well as, according to the finding of the trial court, their
apparent ability to perform the non-mechanical functions of the job
in a more effective manner than most men, may all be impoqant,
they are tangential to the essence of the business involved.'
Sex stereotyped preferences of customers or clients may not form a
ground of justification.
3.2.3 Public benefit related justifications
3.2.3.1 Special social needs
It is not uncommon for employers to provide in their terms and conditions
that certain benefits, including contributions to pension plans, are only
given to employees who are 'head of the household'. The purpose of
these plans is to provide benefit to the person in the household who was
previously the main breadwinner (and is usually a man), so that the whole
household does not suffer if that person retires or is made redundant.
The EEOC regards such provisions as a prima fade violation of Title VII
as they tend to exclude women160. In Wabheim v JC Penny and Cd61,
the court held that disparate impact analysis may be applied to such
provisions, and that a prima facie case is made out. The court
• distinguished City of Los Angeles, Dept of Water and Power v Manhart162,
which concerned the different contributions payable by women and men
respectively to an employer's pension plan, where it was held that as the
pension programme did not treat the women concerned as individuals, but
rather as members of a class, this was unjustified discrimination. Rather,
the court ruled that, as the head of household rule was intended to
benefit the largest number of employees and those with the greatest need,
and to keep the costs to employees participating in the medical insurance
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concerned low, there were therefore 'legitimate and over-riding
justifications for the head of household rule' 163. The special social
needs of those who benefitted from the pension plan was a ground of
justification.
4 Conclusion
In spite of the fact that the ground of sex was added to the Civil Rights
Bill as an attempt to stall the progress of the Bill, Title VII has become
the most significant piece of legislation concerning sex discrimination in
the US. The whole employment relationship, including pay and conditions,
is covered by the Act, from advertisement of vacant posts to provision
of references to departing employees. The inclusion of pregnancy in the
terms of the Act may, on balance, be considered to be at least in some
way beneficial to employees, although many issues relating to pregnancy
and employment are regulated at state, rather than federal level.
Justification for discrimination by disparate treatment of women and men
is by statutory exceptions, in particular where sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification, and also by judicial interpretation of the
general measures, for example, if the employer meets the test of
'legitimate business reason'. The BFOQ defence will only be successful if
the employer can show a bona fide reason, that is a reason which is,.
'objective', in the sense of related to the job, and not 'subjective', in the
sense of related to the employer's preferences, for the discrimination.
Although the test for 'legitimate business reason' is potentially broader,
the concept of pretext, whereby the employee may produce evidence which
shows that the justification advanced by the employer hides a
discriminatory motive, to a certain extent narrows the standard for
justification in the employee's favour.
	 .
The development of adverse impact analysis in discrimination cases has
aided plaintiffs seeking to challenge discriminatory practices, previously
only challengeable if evidence of a discriminatory motive could be shown.
This is a significant judicial development of the US federal law on sex
discrimination. However, it seems that the standard by which employers
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may justify a practice or policy with adverse impact, once narrowly drawn
and focused on 'necessity', is now of a wider nature. For adverse impact
cases, a reasonable justification, similar to the 'legitimate business reason'
of disparate treatment analysis, is, it seems, becoming the accepted
standard. The role of the concept of pretext is important in this respect,
as it is in the establishment of pretext that the employee may ultimately
succeed in the action. If evidence of alternative non-discriminatory
action is recognised as evidence of pretext, then the broadening of the
Griggs standard may not prove too disadvantageous for employees.
Substantive grounds for justification are provided by statute, and also
by judicial interpretation of 'legitimate business reason' and 'adverse
impact discrimination'. The widening of adverse impact analysis to apply
to 'subjective' requirements or conditions which have the effect of
discriminating against a protected class will, it is expected, entail a
parallel widening of available grounds for justification. So long as it
remains open to employees to show that the 'genuine needs' of employers
are unjustified, by a showing of pretext, this need not represent an
unwelcome development.
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Chapter 7
Federal Republic of Germany
1 Employment Law of Germany: Sources and Structure
Before examining the provisions of German law relating to discrimination
between women and men in employment, a brief overview of the sources
and structure of employment law in the Bundesrepublik is necessary. The
structure of German employment law seems complicated not least because
it has many sources at different levels'; constitutional, statutory,
contractual and case law.
At the top of the legal hierarchy, some provisions of the Grundgesetz
(GO (Basic Law or constitution) are relevant to employment law. At the
level of statute law, the most significant legislative provision regulating
equal treatment of women and men in employment is the BOrgerliches
Gesetzbuch (BGB1 (Civil Code), which is an all-embracing instrument
governing contractual and other private law relationships. The provisions
apply only to those employment contracts which are governed by the BGB;
the greatest impact is on private sector wage earners. Civil servants
(Beamte4) and the self employed are excluded. The EG-
Anpassungsgesetz5, which is the amendment to the BGB containing the
provisions on equal treatment of women and men in employment, does
however apply to employees in the public sector other than Beamte6.
'The prohibition of discrimination in the BGB is valid only for the
area of employment covered by the BGB. In situations not covered
by the BGB, the prohibition of discrimination is based on Article 3
II GG only ... The rules of the BGB do not apply to officials in
public service. In the view of the legislature, the rples in Article
33 II [GO are sufficient for this group of persons."
There are also a number of more specific statutes which contain
provisions relevant to the principle of equal treatment of women and men
in employment.8
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Employment contracts in German law fall into two distinct categories; the
individually negotiated employment contract and the Tarifvertrag
(collective bargaining agreement). These are, of course, subject to
provisions of the GG and statute law. Tarifvertrage are agreed by
industrial relations bargaining between employers' organisations and trade
unions. Most cover a whole section of an industry or trade and are
mandatorily applicable to all employees in the industry 9, even those who
are not members of the union. In fact, it is often stated in individual
contracts that the relevant Tarifvertrag will apply. The Tarifvertrag
regulates the 'content, formation and termination of employment
relationships'19.
An important feature of German employment law is the Betriebsrat (Works
Council). This body has the role of participation and co.-determination in
decision-making on social, personnel or economic matters at the level of
the factory or business (as opposed to the company or corporate level).
The Betriebsrat is elected by all employees in a particular factory. The
Betriebsrat may have an influence in management decisions where such
decisions affect an employee at the factory, either directly or
indirectly ll. The rights and duties of the employer, employees and
Betriebs rat are regulated by the Betriebsverfatsungsgesetz (BetrVG)
(Labour Management Relations Act) 1972. According to section 75 of the
BetrVG,
'The employer and the Betriebsrat shall take care that all persons
working in the firm are treated in accordance with the principles
of law and justice, and in particular that they are not subjected
to discrimination based on ... sex'.
Another significant right is the right of the Betriebsrat to be consulted
where the employer intends to terminate the contract of employment of
one employee. The Betriebsrat may challenge the termination on the
grounds set out in BetrVG section 102 and the Kundigungsschutzgesetz
(Termination Protection Act) whereby, 'the employer is obliged, where
dismissals are necessary for compelling business reasons, to select the
employee who would be harmed least by the proposed termination...'
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It should be noted, however, that the rights of a Betriebsrat to take
action against discrimination on the grounds of sex in general is a matter
of contention.12
Employment law in Germany is regulated by specialized employment courts
(Arbeitsgerichte), rather than by the general courts. The highest court
of appeal is the Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) (Federal Labour Court).
German law is a civil as opposed to a common law system, in the sense
that the law is found in the legislative texts (GG, codes, statutes) while
decisions of courts interpret and apply the law, rather than 'make' or
develop it. Decisions of even the highest courts in the Bundesrepublik
are in no way binding as precedent. The fact that there is no reliance
on courts for definitive interpretations of legislative measures means that
the interpretations by commentators of primary texts, such as the GG and
codes, have special significance in German law.
The assertion, that German law is 'civil law' in nature, is valid in theory
in the field of employment law as in any other field of law; in practice
court decisions play such an important role in employment law that they
have been described as 'virtually legislative' 13. So important is the role
of courts in the employment law field that the Bundesarbeitsgericht has
become at least as significant as the legislature in developing the law..
This is largely because existing legislative measures are patchy or
unclear 14 or in some cases even totally absent. Therefore the BAG must
fill in the lacunae15. The characterisation of German law as 'systematic',
although valid in other fields, is not apt in the employment law field,
which is better described as tending to be more akin to 'case law' in
approach.
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2 Provisions of German law establishing Equal Treatment of Women and
Men in Employment, and justification for derogation from those provisions
The equal treatment of women and men in employment in the
Bundesrepublik of Germany is governed by various legislative provisions,
the most significant of which is the BGB, as amended by the EG-
Anpassungsgesetz of 1980. Since the amendment was introduced into
German law with the express purpose of compliance with EC law, it seems
reasonable to assume that these provisions cover both direct and indirect
discrimination, as developed and defined by the European Court16.
2.1 Direct discrimination
As the law presently stands, according to section 611a of the BGB, an
employer may not discriminate against an employee, on the grounds of
sex, in any agreement or measure pertaining to the employment
relationship. Women and men employees must be treated equally. Section
612 (3) prohibits discrimination in pay on grounds of sex. To establish
prima fade discrimination, the employee need only show that the facts
lead one to suspect a discrimination on the grounds of sex. The employer
then has the burden of proof to justify the discrimination either by
showing that material reasons, not referring to sex, justify the different
treatment, or by showing that sex is an indispensable requirement for the
activity concerned. The burden of proof transfers to the employer as a
matter of statute law.
2.1.1 Bargerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) Civil Code
Until 1980, GG Article 3 (2) 17
 was the only federally applicable general
provision on the equal treatment of women and men in employment. This
was in spite of the fact that the Bundesrepublik, as a Member State of
the EC, was under a duty to adopt provisions implementing the Equal Pay
and Equal Treatment Directives 18. Initially it was thought (and claimed
by the German government) that the provisions of the Grundgesetz were
adequate to implement these obligations and no new law was needed.18
There was also debate over whether employers could be required to treat
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women and men employees or prospective employees equally in view of the
principle of freedom of contract. 2° The European Commission initiated an
infringement procedure on 10th May 1979, whereby the Bundesrepublik
was given notice requiring specific measures to be taken to implement the
Equal Treatment Directive. The infringement procedure was halted in
August 1980 when Germany adopted the Arbeitsrechtliches EG-
Anpassungsgesetz21 (Employment Law to Comply with European Community
Provisions), adding to the BGB (until then, practically unchanged since
its establishment in 189622 ) provisions on equal treatment of women and
men.
The EG-Anpassungsgesetz was seen as a 'piecemeal compliance' with the
obligations of the Directive23. Even the title of the Act suggests that
the government was reluctant to introduce the legislation 24. The Act was
criticised as being insufficient fulfilment of the Directive 25, in particular
because it failed to provide adequate sanctions for breach of its
provisions 26. In fact, some unions were of the opinion that no statute
at all would have been better than this statute.27
Since for a reader in English, the provisions of the amended BOrgerliches
Gesetzbuch (BGB), section 611a, 612, 612a, are likely to prove inaccessible,
they are translated in full below.
'Section 611a Equal Treatment for Men and Women
(1) The employer must not, in the context of an agreement or a measure,
particularly in the establishment of an employer-employee relationship, in
promotion, in a directive or dismissal, discriminate against an employee on
grounds of sex. However, differential treatment on the grounds of sex
is permissible, as long as an agreement or a measure Is concerned with
the type of activity to be performed by the employee, and being of a
specific sex is an indisputable [or indispensible] requirement
(unverzichtbare Voraussetzung) for this activity. If, in the event of a
dispute, the employee produces evidence suggestive of discrimination on
grounds of sex, the onus is on the employer to prove that differential
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treatment is justified by practical grounds unrelated to sex, or that sex
is an indisputable requirement for the activity to be performed.
(2) If the employer-employee relationship is not established due to an
offence against the laws regarding discrimination (as set out in subsection
1) requiring to be justified by the employer, then it is the duty of the
employer to compensate for the damage which the employee suffers
through his expectation that the establishing of the employer-employee
relationship would not be hindered by such an offence. Subsection 1 is
equally applicable to promotion, if the promotion is discretionary.
(3) The right to compensation for an offence against the laws regarding
discrimination comes under the statute of limitation in two years. Section
201 applies.
'Section 611b Job description
The employer must not advertise a post, either explicitly or implicitly,
solely for men or women, as this would violate section 611a subsection 1,
sentence 3.
-
'Section 612 Salaries and Wages
[(1) Salary/wages are deemed implicitly agreed, if the provision of a
service under the given circumstances cannot be expected without due
remuneration.
(2) If the level of remuneration has not been determined, then either the
established salary/wage level, where such an established salary/wage
scale exists, or in the absence of any such scale, the normal rate of
salary/wage is to be regarded as the agreed salary/wage.]
(3) In an employer-employee relationship, remuneration for identical or
equivalent work must not be agreed at a lower rate on the basis of the
sex of the employee. The agreement of a lower remuneration is not
justified by the existence of special protective regulations applicable as
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a result of the sexual differentiation between employees. Section 611a
subs 1 sentence 3 is equally applicable.
'Section 612a Prohibition of disciplinary actions
The employer may not disadvantage an employee by an agreement or
measure because the employee has exercised his rights in a permissible
way. ,N
Sections 611a, b, 612 (3) and 612a BGB contain a general principle of
equal treatment in all individual employment i-elations. The rules cover
both contractual arrangements between employer and employee (for
example, pay) and unilateral measures of the employer (for example,
conditions of work, directives, notice to quit). It would cover the
allocation of less valuable work to women, preference of male workers for
certain activities, discrimination against women in the payment of bonuses
and in redundancies.29
The provisions require equal pay for work of equal value39, although no
criteria are set out for determining whether jobs are of equal value.
2.1.1.1 Unverzichtbare Voraussetzung
Section 611a (1) allows a justification for direct discrimination on the part
of the employer if sex is an 'Indisputable [or indispensable] requirement'
(unverzichtbare Voraussetzung) for the activity to be practised.
Naturally the term 'indisputable' is open to debate, and has even
provoked one writer to state, 'Indisputable is actually more or less
nothing at all' 31. Strictly speaking there are almost no examples of
activities (with the exception of a wet-nurse or sperm donor) which are
feasible only for women or men. However, legally speaking, other
exceptions may be made to the principle of equal treatment. The standard
implied by the word 'indisputable' is discussed by commentators as
follows. The examples cited by the Kommentar von Palandt suggest that
it is a strict standard, applicable only in narrow circumstances: for
example, 'A woman to sell corsets, or as a model for a women's clothing
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firm. A man as a tenor or bass in a choir.' 32 According to the
Munchener Kommentar, the word 'unverzichtbari does not follow the
general terminology of the BOA the assessment of the standard it applies
is therefore problematic. The example of a man to sell male clothing and
woman for women's clothing is cited here also; it is further suggested
that for a sales job in the Middle East it may be an indisputable
requirement to appoint a man 33. Pfarr and Bertelsmann suggest that the
provision applies to examples which would take the equal treatment rules
to absurd lengths, such as employing a woman to play 'Hamlet' 34. All of
these examples suggest that the 'indisputable requirement' is a strict
standard of justification.
A different treatment of women may also be permissible under this
provision if, because of the activity to be carried out, the application of
protective employment laws prevents the employment of a woman.
Measures such as those prohibiting the employment of women to work in
underground (coalface) work, in the transportation of various raw
materials, and the general prohibition of night work for female employees
(albeit with considerable exceptions) 35 will be covered by the
justification. However, the legislative aims must always be taken into
consideration. Some of these 'protective' legislative measures may be
themselves outdated and discriminatory36. Klaus Adomeit refutes the
argument of the conductor of an orchestra that he cannot employ a
woman, because if she were to become pregnant, she could not carry out
the job, as concerts run after the time (20:00) at which work for
pregnant women is forbidden as night work37.
In the case of direct discrimination, it seems the BGB provides for
justification in accordance with a fairly tight standard. This
interpretation is consonant with the legislative intent, which is to
implement equal treatment for women and men in employment in line with
EC law.
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2.1.2 Grundgesetz Article 3
The Grundgesetz contains a general equal treatment clause in Article 3,
which includes the ground of sex among its forbidden grounds for
arbitrary differential treatment.
'(1) All persons shall be equal before the law. (2) Men and women
shall have equal rights. (3) No one may be prejudiced or favoured
because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his
homeland and origin, his faith or his religious or political
opinions.'"
Where there is no applicable statutory duty of equal treatment, in
particular if the provisions of the BGB do not apply, then the general
principle of equal treatment in the constitution may be relevant in the
employment law field. In fact, since the EG-Anpassungsgestz came into
effect, the provisions of the GG have become less important in equal
treatment claims.
In view of its terse expression, it is evident that GG Article 3 requires
will acquire meaning and context through legal rulings of the courts.
Article 3 (1) is the general equality clause, setting out the equal
treatment principle. It has been established that the equal treatment
principle does not require that all persons be treated equally regardless
of the circumstances39.
'It merely forbids that persons or facts which are substantially
equal are treated differently, but not that persons or facts which
are substantially uneq4§1 shall be treated differently in relation to
the existing inequality'".
In a later judgment this judicial formulation was amended to the
obligation 'to treat equal things equally and unequal things differently
according to their special features' 41. The equality clause is violated"
when the provision in question is 'arbitrary', that is, when no reasonable
ground, arising from the nature of the object or from otherwise objective
circumstances, can be advanced for legislative differentiation or non-
differentiation42. This arbitrariness theory had already been developed
by the BundesVerfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (Constitutional Court) under
the Weimar Constitution. 'Arbitrariness was present when a reasonable,
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objectively obvious ground for the differentiation or non-differentiation
in question could not be found'43.
The constitutional principle of equal treatment does not proscribe all
forms of different treatment. The principle prohibits arbitrary
distinctions but permits those differences which can be shown to be
specially justified. However, the tendency is to raise the standard for
the establishment of such a justification", by making it more difficult to
establish that a prima fade arbitrary distinction is acceptable.
Articles 3 (2) and (3) are more specific expressions of the general
equality principle. Court decisions generally consider the two provisions
together. 45 Article 3 (2) is a statement of a legally enforceable right, not
a mere statement of policy to be later effected by legislation.46
Difference of sex may not provide a prima facie objective ground for legal
differentiation. Article 3 (2) is more concrete than Article 3 (1) in the
sense that it leaves less of a margin of discretion for the legislature.
'The different legal treatment of men and women is only allowed
when the biological or functional distinctions of sex are so decisive
In the circumstances to be regulated, that common elments can no
longer be perceived at all, or at any rate are fading'''.
The primary function of provisions in the GG is to enshrine rights of
citizens against the state. In general, provisions of the GG do not
provide adequate remedies as between private individuals 49. A much
debated problem with regard to basic rights is whether and how they may
apply in legal relationships of citizens among themselves. The problem
is known in German jurisprudence as the Drittwirkung (third party
effect) of rights. This problem arises inter alia in the employment law
field50.
It is a matter of controversy whether an individual employer is directly
bound by GG Article 3 (2), since, in general, constitutional rights give
citizens rights against the state, but not against other citizens.
According to Pfarr and Bertelsmann, this jurisprudential debate is futile
in any case, since constitutional rights, including GG Article 3 (2), become
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operative indirectly in relationships between individuals in that they have
an effect on implementable general clauses (for example in employment law,
in provisions of Tarifvertrâge) or are made concrete by rules set out in
the civil law. 51
Although all legislation in the Bundesrepublik must comply with the
principle of equality of GG Article 3, equality between women and men has
not been effected through application of this constitutional provision in
most situations between individuals in the area of employment law52. The
Drittwirkung of the general equality principle has only been accepted as
regards equal pay for women and men. Part of the reason for this is
that GG Article 3 could only be brought into play in the case of existing
employer-employee relationships, and not in those areas where there is
as yet no contract of employment 53. Thus it could not, for example,
apply to advertisements for jobs or to the questions asked by employers
in interviews.
The BAG applied GG Article 3 to equal pay questions as early as 1955.54
Where an employer generally increases the remuneration of its employees
(either subject to a Tarifvertrag or not), it may not exempt one or
several employees from the pay increase without justifiable grounds, such
as performance below the average 55. The employer may differentiate for
social reasons between various groups of employees, for instance by
granting a higher percentage increase to lower paid groups of
employees56. Employees may not be excluded from voluntary benefits
such as company pension schemes or bonuses 57, unless there are facts
justifying the unequal treatment of an individual employee or group of
employees58.
Since, according to the accepted judicial views on the Drittwirkung of the
general equality principle, its application as between an individual
employer and employee is limited to questions of equal pay and does not
cover the wider question of equal treatment, the most useful application
of Article 3 is to test the constitutionality of legislation which
differentiates between women and men 59. An example of this is the
legislation, previously in effect in three German Lander (States), on
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'housework days'. Now held unconstitutional°, this legislation allowed
working women to take one day's absence a month to do housework. The
purpose of this was to ease the burden on women who worked full-time
and who also had to do housework. The BVerfG concluded, on examining
the provisions, that the differences between men and women could not
justify the legislation61.
The other useful application of Article 3 is to test the constitutionality of
Tarifvertage. In 1955 the BAG ruled that the provisions on equality in
the GG were binding on parties to Tarifvertage, that is, trade unions and
employers' associations. If the provisions of such agreements set
different rates of pay for women and men, the provisions would be in
breach of the GG62.
2.1.3 Grundgesetz Article 33 (2)
As far as employment in the public service is concerned, there is a
second provision of the GG which could be used by women or men
claiming equal treatment. Article 33 (2) provides,
'Each German has equal opportunity of access to employment and
promotion in the public service in view of kiis [or her] suitability,
aptitude and professional achievements.'
This is a directly binding legal norm, giving all Germans an equal right
to apply for entry into public service and to be considered on the
grounds set out, to the exclusion of other grounds including sex63. As
this provision of the GG relates to employment in the 'public sector' (with
the state as employer), the problem of Drittwirkung does not arise. The
relevant relationship is always between state and individual citizen.
Article 33 provides that civil servants must be selected according to
merit. It must be appreciated 'that, although the merit principle lays
down specific grounds of 'personal aptitude, qualifications and skill' of
the applicant as the only legally acceptable grounds on which the decision
as to which of the applicants to employ may be made, these grounds
themselves are widely drawn and are open to varying interpretations. It
is very rare that Article 33 (2) will actually give rise to a right to
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employment; in fact, this can only be when the applicant is the only one
fulfilling the criteria64.
2.2 Indirect discrimination
2.2.1 Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) Civil Code
Although there is no explicit mention of indirect discrimination, it is
agreed by commentators that section 611a subs 1 sentence 1 BGB on equal
treatment of women and men covers both direct and indirect
discrimination 65. The work of Pfarr and Bertelsmann provides the first
detailed definition of indirect discrimination 66 in German law: their
definition is adopted for the following section of this chapter. In a claim
of indirect discrimination, the requirement or measure complained of must
be formulated without reference to sex. The proportion of women who can
comply with the requirement must be much smaller than that of men.
There must be no explanation other than sex or gender roles for the
different treatment. There must be an actual disadvantage to an employee
because of his or her sex. If the employee can establish these four
points, then this establishes a prima fade case of indirect discrimination.
The burden then passes to the employer to justify the discrimination. If
the employer can establish a justification for the requirement or measure,
then the claim fails.
2.2.1.1 Prima facie case
The measure or requirement concerned is imposed by the employer
without reference to sex. It will be able to be fulfilled by some women
as well as men, but may still be indirectly discriminatory. The phrase
'requirement or measure' is broadly formulated and includes individual
agreements and measures in Tarifvertrage.
The issue in establishing that the proportion of women who can comply
with the requirement is much smaller than that of men is one of proof.
What methods are open under German law to an employee to show that the
proportion of members of the sex which is or could be disadvantaged is
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much larger than the proportion of members of the other sex? In some
cases the effect on women of a measure may be so self evident that
accomplished statistical analysis is unnecessary to convince the court.
For example, jobs for research assistants in German Universities, which
enable the writing of a thesis, lapse after a certain number of years.
There is no extension in the case of maternity leave being taken in the
course of the job. 67 This clearly has a more detrimental effect on women
than on men.
Other cases are not so clear. It may be that the different effect on the
sexes is not made evident with consideration of generally known data.
Here the only way to establish prima fade indirect discrimination is by
statistical analysis. This process is relatively new to courts in Germany,
but is possible.68
The necessary data may often not be readily available to the employee
bringing the claim, or the relevant Betriebsrat. This should not be an
insurmountable problem, as the employee is only required to show facts
which suggest a discrimination. The burden of proof is then transferred
to the employer.68
The third requirement for the establishment of indirect discrimination in
German law is that this discriminatory effect of the arrangement or
measure cannot be explained other than by sex or gender roles. This
should not be problematic for the complainant employee, for if the data
show real difference in treatment between the sexes, it is unlikely that
these differences have nothing to do with sex.
Finally there must be an actual disadvantage to the employee claiming the
breach.
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2.2.L2 Justification
If the employee succeeds this far, and shows that a requirement or
measure imposed by the employer is prima fade indirectly discriminatory,
the burden of proof is transferred to the employer to show that there is
justification for the discrimination. Not every rule which in fact
disadvantages one sex is automatically impermissible. According to Pfarr
and Bertelsmann, there are two ways in which a provision may be
justified: if it is required for the activity to be carried out by the
employee, or if it pursues an objectively justified goal, which cannot be
achieved without the discriminatory effect.
2.2.1.2.1 Required for the activity
This is a further application of the concept of sex as an 'indisputable
requirement' already discussed. The BGB allows an exception to the
general rule of equal treatment if the measure is required for the activity
to be carried out. The measure is then justified, in spite of its
discriminatory effect on members of one sex. For example, the ability to
fly aeroplanes is a requirement for a pilot's job. The employer may
require applicants to hold a pilot's licence; even though fewer women than
men can meet this requirement, the measure is justified as absolutely
necessary for the activity to be carried out70. Pfarr characterises this
form of justification as 'zwingend geboten' (compellingly required), which
is to say, restrictively formulated and restrictively applied.
An example of a measure or requirement which is zwingend geboten is
that of specific qualifications, if the activity cannot be carried out
without those qualifications. A general requirement for 'knowledge and
experience' would not be covered, but may be justifiable as an.
'objectively justified goalal. The arrangement of the work place, or
indeed the duties of particular jobs, would not necessarily compel the
employer to exclude women or a substantial proportion of women. For
example, a requirement to lift and carry heavy goods may not be
zwingend geboten if the employer could incorporate mechanical lifting and
carrying into the work system.72 Similarly, hours of work which
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disadvantage women (for example, requiring employees to begin work
before school and nursery hours) could not be described as zwingend
geboten unless the work could not be carried out at any other time.
These examples, it should be noted, are suggested by commentators, and
not tested before the courts. The standard of zwingend geboten is a
high standard for justification.
2.2.1.2.2 Pursues an objectively justified goal
If the measure or requirement concerned pursues an objectively justified
goal, and the discriminatory effect cannot be eliminated or alleviated
through reasonable changes or additions, it may be justified in spite of
its discriminatory effect. This aspect of justification recognises that
there are measures or requirements which disadvantage one sex, which
are not required by the actual activity to be carried out, but which
nevertheless pursue an objectively justified goal. It allows the weighing
up of the objective of a measure against its discriminatory effect. The
standard is therefore lower than for justifications which are zwingend
geboten. The application of the justification is problematic in that, as it
allows the balancing of different claims, different values may be brought
into play, which may be in direct opposition to the principle of equal
treatment of women and men in employment. It is accepted that 'any'
factual reason will not be sufficient for justifica tion, but that rather a
more detailed examination of the objective of the discriminatory measure
is required. This detailed examination is to be in accordance with the
principle of proportionality. 73
 The principal of proportionality is a
central constitutional principle of German law.
What may be advanced as justification for an indirectly discriminatory
situation must still be regarded as unsettled. 74 Whether a particular
agreement or measure of an employment contract is regarded as justified
may depend on which other legal rights come into play. It may also
depend on how widespread and evident the discriminatory effect of the
measure concerned is. 'The stronger the disadvantage and effect on one
sex by an indirectly discriminatory rule, the weightier must be the
reasons justifying this rule.'75
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3 Substantive Grounds of Justification for unequal treatment
As noted above, there are circumstances in which, according to the law
of the Federal Republic of Germany, unequal treatment of women and men
in the employment sphere may be justified: some examples of substantive
grounds of justification are now discussed. Justification for direct
discrimination is examined first; this is followed by discussion of grounds
of justification for indirect discrimination. The law relating to equal
treatment of women and men in employment, as developed by the European
Court, is directly effective in Germany. Although the influence of EC law
is evident, an attempt has been made, for the purposes of this chapter,
to separate the interpretation by the German Arbeitsgerichte of the
relevant provisions of German law, especially interpretation of the EG-
Anpassungsgesetz, from the provisions of EC law.
3.1 Justification for direct discrimination
Direct discrimination against women (or men) in employment may be lawful
in the case of justifiable exclusions of women (or men) from employment
in particular activities. Direct discrimination against women for reasons
relating to pregnancy and maternity may also - be lawful in certain
circumstances.
3.1.1 Exclusion of activities from the principle of equal treatment
Various employment activities may be excluded from the principle of equal
treatment of women and men in employment. The most significant
examples are discussed below.
Under section 611a ff BGB,
'A differential treatment on the grounds of sex is ... permitted, in
so far as an agreement or measure is of a type the object of which
is a worker carrying out a particular activity and being a certain
sex is an indisputable requirement for this activity.'
Discrimination may be justified if it relates to the activity to be carried
out by the employee, and being of a certain sex is an indisputable
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requirement (unverzichtbare Voraussetzung) for this activity. Being of
a certain sex is an indisputable requirement for an activity if for factual
or legal reasons it can be carried out only by women or only by men76.
3.1.1.1 The 'Catalogue of Exceptions'
The Equal Treatment Directive (76/207), Article 2 (2) allows Member States
to exclude certain occupational activities from the field of application of
the Directive. It was established in 1986 that the Federal Republic was
in breach of the Directive by failing to compile a complete list of excluded
activities and notify the Commission 77. However the European Court did
not define which occupations could be exempted from the principle of
equal treatment. Pursuant to this judgment, the Federal Government of
Germany issued a 'Catalogue of Exceptions' 78, in which were enumerated
the activities which the Government considered could be excluded from
the implementing measure of the Equal Treatment Directive, namely section
611a I 2 BGB. The list of activities reads as follows 79,
'1. Jobs for which a specific sex is required for the authentic
fulfilment of a role or exercise, eg
- actor/actress, male/female singer or dancer, and such other
performing artists who have a male or female role to play;
- models for painters, sculptors and photographers;
- male/female fashion models.
2. Jobs in the religious sphere, when the preaching of the church
is affected (Artiale 140 GG, Article 137 Weimar Constitution, eg
- priests in the Catholic church;
- teachers in faculties of theology (as arranged in church
agreements).
3. Jobs in countries outside the EC where only one sex will be
accepted because of basic legal regulations, religious beliefs or
culturally specific features.
4. Jobs in a women's refuge, provided that the sponsor's concept
of care requires that the work be done exclusively by women.
5. Jobs in the area of internal or external security:
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-
In the armed forces of the Bundesrepublik, women can only
pursue careers as officers of the Medical Corps in a service
relationship with professional soldiers, or a soldiers serving for a
set time on the basis of a voluntary duty (Article 12a GG, section
1 subs 3 Law on Soldiers); women may not in any circumstances
serve with weapons;
- In the police force protecting the Federal border (Article 12a GG,
section 64 Law on Protection of the Federal Border)
5. Jobs in the administration of justice:
- In the penal system, the general service tasks (especially the
supervision and care of prisoners) and the service of care in
institutions and sections for men should be carried out by men and
in institutions and sections for women they should be carried out
be women. Exceptions are permissible. Other service tasks in
those institutions and sections for men can be carried out be
women, and in those for women they can be carried out be men (Nr
14, Abs 1 and 2 of the Dienst und Sicherheitsvorschriften for the
Strafvollzug; Service and Safety Regulations for the penal system).
- as a matter of principle women can only be detained under female
supervision (Nr 12 Abs 2 Satz 1 Untersuchungshaftvollzugsordnung;
Custody Service Orders)
- in the arrests of young people, men should supervise young men,
and women, young women. This can be deviated from if there is
no fear of undesirable events (section 3 Abs 2 of the Verordnung
Ober dgp Vollzug des Jugendarreste4 Law on Arrests of young
people)."	 -
The 'Catalogue of Exceptions' is not binding, as such, on the courts, on
whom alone the duty to interpret the provisions of section 611a BGB is
incumbent. This was stressed by the Federal Government in a statement
attached to the catalogue. The non-binding nature of the catalogue
spawned fears that it would not satisfy the duties of Germany as set out
by the European Court in its ruling in case 248/83. However, although
the courts have the final say in interpretation of 'unverzichtbare
Voraussetzung', it seemed likely that, in the application of the equal
treatment principle, the list of exceptions would become accepted as
grounds of justification in Germany, and for this reason, the Commission
initiated no further action81.
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3.1.1.2 Privacy and decency
The opinion of Rolf-Achim Eich 82 that a manager may not be forced to
work with a male instead of a female secretary must be regarded
cautiously. However, the preservation of privacy or decency in respect
of other employees or third parties, such as customers or clients, would
be grounds for justification of discrimination between women and men,
who in the carrying out the activities of employment might come into close
contact with the persons concerned.
However, an 'indisputable requirement' must be viewed in terms of the
activity to be carried out83. This excludes grounds not relating to the
activity itself, such as the frequently advanced ground of lack of
sanitary facilities for women, as justification for not employing women.
'The provision of separate sanitary facilities is a condition with
regard to the organisation of the working environment, not a
protective provision established by the activity carried out. The
duty to provide separate sanitary facilities comes after the
employment of men and women, and is not a prerequisite therefor.
It is forbidden for an employer to rely on the lack of provision of
approprAate sanitary facilities as grounds for disadvantaging
women.'"
3.1.1.3 Military service
Exclusion of women from employment in various activities in the armed
forces is provided for in the 'Catalogue of Exceptions' as discussed above.
This difference in treatment is enshrined by German constitutional law in
Article 12a of the GG which imposes a liability on men over 18 to
undertake military or some other substitute service. According to
subsection 4, women 'may on no account render service involving the use
of arms'.
	
.
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3.1.1.4 Night work prohibition
The Arbeitszeitordnung85 (AZO) (Regulation on Working Hours) section 19
(1) prohibits female Arbeiterinnen (blue collar workers) from working
between 20:00 and 06:00. Men are not subject to the provisions. This
legislation has been challenged as unconstitutional, but has been
consistently upheld by the BVerfG (Federal Constitutional Court) and
other courts on the grounds that biological differences between women
and men justify the prohibition86. This is in spite of the fact that there
is no attempt to explain which biological differences make the prohibition
necessary, nor why sex neutral legislation could not achieve the same
result87. It is not surprising that the night work prohibition has been
strongly criticised, for example by von Munch: 'The night work
prohibition violates the Grundgesetz'88.
An attempt by an employer to use the night work prohibition in
conjunction with the provisions of BGB section 611a ff, in order to justify
exclusion of women from jobs requiring work within the prohibited hours
by a category of worker covered by the AZO, by arguing that employing
a man is an 'unverzichtbare Voraussetzung, is unlikely to meet with the
strict requirements of the provision. For example, in a case 89 in which
the female applicant was refused employment in a zoo, on the grounds
that she would be required to work late and on Sundays, the BAG upheld
the ruling of the LAG (Land (State) Employment Court), that the employer
had failed to show that being male was an 'indispensable requirement' for
the activity, this being the case only in exceptional situations". It
would be possible, for example, to rearrange the shifts, should a problem
occur.
The decision of the European Court in Stoecke181 that a general
prohibition of night work for women is contrary to the provisions of the
EC Equal Treatment Directive (Directive 76/207) should strengthen this
position, as the provisions of the Directive are directly effective in
German law.
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3.1.1.5 Weight restrictions for women lifting and carrying goods
Legislative provisions set out limits to the weight that women may lift or
carry in the course of their employment92. Section 11 of the Verordnung
Ober Beschaftigung von Frauen auf Fahrzeugen (Ordinance on Employment
of Women in Vehicles) of 1971 lays down a maximum weight (no more than
10kg, as far as this only happens occasionally) for goods to be lifted and
carried by female drivers and co-workers. Similar weight limits are found
in section 67 I a of the Binnenschifffahrtsuntersuchungsordnung
(Ordinance on Investigation within Ship Journeys) of 1956.
3.1.2 Pregnancy and maternity
It may be an indisputable requirement to employ a person of a particular
sex if the activity to be carried out is regulated by protective legislation.
Such legislation invariably operates to exclude women, rather than men,
from certain activities. It has as its raison d'être the biological
differences between women and men, in particular those pertaining to
pregnancy and childbirth. Germany has various provisions of such
legislation, some of which are discussed below.
The Mutters chutzgesetz (MuSchG) (Mother Protection Act) 93
 imposes
various duties on the employer of pregnant or nursing women, for
example the duty to provide for short breaks (section 2). A range of
restrictions on the type of work which pregnant women may undertake
is imposed by the Act (section 4). Pregnant or nursing women may not
undertake overtime, night work (between 20:00 and 06:00) and work on
Sundays, with some exceptions (section 7). These special provisions,
which prima facie are in breach of the principle of equal treatment of
women and men, are justifiable as protective measures.
A differential treatment on grounds of an existing pregnancy is permitted
if, for example, a position is to be filled in which there are existing
nightshifts (prohibited for pregnant women under section 8 I MuSchG) or
heavy physical work (in the sense of the prohibitions in section 4 I and
II MuSchG) must be undertaken. In cases in which an employer may not
Federal Republic of Germany	 212
employ a pregnant woman because of statutory prohibitions, the
employment of a woman is made dependent on the fact that the applicant
is not pregnant. The criterion 'non pregnant' is in these cases an
'indispensable requirement' in the sense of section 611a I 2 BGB.94
Pregnancy therefore may be a ground for justification of discrimination.
Pursuant to International Labour Organisation agreements, the restriction
of women from employment in various activities which involve contact with
dangerous materials or radiation is effected by legislation in Germany95.
Especially notable is the prohibition of employment of childbearing women
in jobs requiring use of materials containing lead and mercury, in section
26 VII GefahrstoffV0 (Dangerous Materials Ordinance) of 1986 96 . Maximum
limits of exposure (in some cases a zero limit) to radiation are also laid
down for childbearing women, young women and pregnant women97.
Discrimination is justified on the grounds of protection of the woman
concerned, and also of the foetus.
3.2 Justification for indirect discrimination
A discriminatory agreement or measure, which is indirectly discriminatory
in that it affects members of one sex in a higher. proportion than those
of the other sex to their disadvantage, is justified if it is zwingend
geboten (compellingly required) 98 in view of the job. The BGB allows an
exception to the general rule of equal treatment if the measure is
required for the activity to be carried out. The measure is then justified
in spite of its discriminatory effect on members of one sex. The
requirement that the measure be zwingend geboten is restrictively
formulated and restrictively applied.
In addition to this, indirect (but not direct) discrimination may be
objectively justified in pursuit of certain goals, which may not be
attained without some disadvantage to women or to men. This aspect of
justification recognises that there are measures or requirements which
disadvantage one sex, which are not necessitated by the actual activity
to be carried out, but which nevertheless pursue an objectively justified
goal. A detailed examination of the objective of the discriminatory
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measure, in accordance with the principle of proportionality 99 , is required
before justification can be established. Because the balancing of the
claim to equal treatment with other claims which may come into play will
yield different results in different situations, what may be advanced as
grounds for justification for an indirectly discriminatory situation must
still be regarded as unsettled in German lawl°°.
The following section discusses various grounds for justification of
indirectly discriminatory requirements or measures, and the approach
taken to these in German law. As in previous chapters, these types of
justification are divided into 'job related justifications', 'enterprise
related justifications' and 'public benefit related justifications'.
3.2.1 Job related justifications
3.2.1.1 Physical ability to perform the job
In many employment situations, the duties of the job include the execution
of activities, such as lifting and carrying heavy goods, or operating
heavy machinery, which require a certain amount of muscular strength.
Physical strength may therefore be a job related justification for indirect
discrimination in hiring policies.
In pay policies, the employer may seek to reward employees who carry
out jobs which require use of physical strength with a higher level of
pay than employees who carry out lighter tasks. This is a matter of job
evaluation. However, indirect discrimination may occur in the process of
job evaluation if factors, which men can fulfil more easily than women, for
example physical or muscular strength, are used, without justification, in
the evaluation.
Until the ruling of the BAG in 1955 that such provisions were incompatible
with Article 3 GG, many Tarifvertrage provided for lower pay for women
p a ,for equal work, for example 'women receive 78% of men's y10 1 .
However, although it outlawed this direct discrimination of women, the
BAG in this judgment, created a potentially indirectly discriminatory
Federal Republic of Germany	 214
situation, as it provided for the creation in Tarifvertrlige of pay grades,
corresponding to the 'heaviness' of the work. The result of this is that
women employees are grouped in grades of work requiring 'geringere
kOrperliche Belastung' (lower physical effort), and these grades (known
as 'Leichtlohngruppen') are evaluated as lower than other groups,
therefore employees in those groups receive less pay than those in
others.
.In Run=ler v Dato-Drucic102 , the European Court was asked, by Article
177 reference from the Arbeitsgericht of Oldenburg, to rule on the
compatibility of the Tarifvertrag for the printing and paper industry with
provisions of EC law, in particular the Equal Pay Directive 75/117. In
this Tarifvertrag, as in many others, different pay grades were
differentiated by criteria including 'demand on the muscles', 'muscular
effort' and 'heavy work', criteria which it is more difficult for women to
fulfil than men. Moreover, in evaluating muscular effort, it was common
practice to refer to male standards.
The European Court held that job classification systems must be based on
criteria 'which do not differ according to whether the work is carried out
by a man or a woman' in. The system as a whole must not be so
organised that it has the practical effect of discriminating generally
against women (or men) employees.
The effect of the judgment of the European Court is that Tarifvertage
which contain provisions relating to Leichtlohngruppen, if they are not
to breach the requirements of EC law, must include, alongside those
criteria which men can fulfil more easily than women, balancing criteria
which women can fulfil more easily than men.104
The judgment of the European Court also suggests that, as a starting
point for evaluation, neither a position based on the average male
employee nor one based on the average female employee is appropriate:
rather a non-sex based position should be adopted.105
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The judgment of the BAG in Rummler may be described as
'disappointing' 106. Although the court repeated the operative part of the
judgment of the European Court, it did not evaluate the scheme concerned
in the light of this judgment. Rather, it merely considered the work of
the plaintiff, decided that it fell within group III of the scheme, not
group IV, as she claimed, and therefore dismissed her case.
As for the question of which criteria are to be used to determine the
'heaviness' of work, in particular, whether a male or female standard is
to be used, a decision of the BAG in 1988107 is interesting. In
evaluating whether an activity required a 'geringere kerperliche
Belastung, the BAG relied on the decision in Rummler to support the
contention that evaluation should be done, not in accordance with
muscular effort alone, but in accordance with the ' Verkehrsanschauung,
that is by focusing on 'all circumstances which affect the human body;
standing work, inconvenient position, noise, stress and repetitive
work' in. This broader point of reference, as the circumstances affected
women and men more equally than focus on muscular strength alone, was
more in line with EC law as expressed in Rummler.
3.2.2 Enterprise related justifications
3.2.2.1 Length of service
Indirect discrimination may occur if positive consequences for employees
are attached to seniority or lengthy service. For example, entitlement to
social security and other benefits may be graded, or even dependent, on
a certain length of time belonging to the company. Women, because of
pregnancy, childbirth, and their childcare and family responsibilities, are
less able to accumulate length of service. As justification for the.
discriminatory effect of such provisions, the objective of 'rewarding
faithful service to the company' is advanced. For the employer, the
retention of a stable workforce, the reduction of turnover of employees,
the avoidance of the cost of recruitment and induction of new employees
and the retention of skilled workers are all advanced as goals. These are
all 'enterprise related' justifications. However, the benefits for the
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employer of a changing workforce for an employer, especially in times of
rapid technological progress, must be set against the validity and relative
importance of these goals. The strictly formulated requirements for
justification, that is, pursuing objectively justified goals and being
suitable and necessary for this purpose, are by no means always met in
a situation of advantaging certain employees, and therefore discriminating
against others, by attaching benefits to lengthy service.'"
3.2.2.2 Grading and pay structures
Indirect discrimination in pay may occur where an employer either grants
higher pay to employees who fulfil certain criteria with which more men
than women can comply, or evaluates jobs in such a way that women are
discriminated against, as discussed above110.
Grading and pay structures in Germany depend on the categorization of
a particular employee. Arbeiter and Angestellte are special categories of
employees in German employment law, corresponding approximately to the
blue collar/white collar divide. Gehobener Angestellte (managerial
employees) are a further subcategory, more highly paid than the
Angestellte.
	
-
Differential treatment of Arbeiter and Angestellte may breach the equal
treatment principle of the GG and therefore is subject to the arbitrariness
principle111. A different treatment of Arbeiter and Angestellte in the
granting of Christmas bonuses was not, as a general rule, justifiable in
accordance with this principle 112; that is to say, it is an arbitrary
difference in treatment. The BAG held that an employer may pursue
different goals by granting bonuses and similar special payments. It may
delimit the requirements for such payments in order to achieve these
goals. An unequal treatment of different groups of employees is only
compatible with the equal treatment principle if the purpose or goal
justifies it. The purpose of a Christmas bonus was assumed by the court
to be to contribute to the special expenditure of employees occasioned by
the Christmas period and to show appreciation for the work done in the
past year. Arbeiter and Angestellte are affected in the same way by
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extra spending over Christmas and employees in both groups have carried
out work deserving of appreciation over the past year. The differential
treatment was not justified.
If it can be established that the proportion of women in the gehobener
Angestellte category is significantly lower than that of men, then if
gehobener Angestellte are treated more favourably, this may be indirect
discrimination. Peter Hanau and Ulrich Preis113 suggest that it is
conceivable that all company rules favouring gehobener Angestellte are
indirectly discriminatory because only a minute number of women reach
gehobener positions. The third Senate of the BAG did not go this far in
its decision of 11.11.1986 114. The BAG was of the opinion that the rule
favouring gehobener Angestellte could not be a matter for complaint
under the equal treatment provisions, because the discriminatory effect
was merely the result of a possibly discriminatory promotion practice, not
a result of the rule itself. According to Hanau and Preis, special rules
for gehobener Angestellte are justified by the necessity of applying
different rules to this group of employees which is especially valuable to
the company. The prima fade discriminatory effect of such provisions
will gradually fade as more women are promoted to gehobener
positions.115
	
'
3.2.2.3 Economic efficiency
Measures with a discriminatory impact on part-time workers may be
Indirectly discriminatory against women as more women than men work
part-time116 and are unable to undertake full-time employment due to
their family and household duties. Various arguments have been
advanced by employers attempting to justify measures with a
disadvantageous impact on part-time employees; these arguments usually
focus around the assertion that the employer is striving for a full-time
workforce, in order to achieve the goal of lower cost burdens. The
averred cost burdens of part-time employees include higher level of
personnel costs, additional costs in equipment and maintenance of the
workplace and economic disadvantages to the company caused by the
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working hours of part-timers. 117 Such arguments are treated with
caution by the courts.
A measure excluding part-time workers from a company pension was
accepted as indirectly discriminatory in the Bilkalla case, which was
referred to the European Court by the BAG. The European Court ruled
that the measure could be justified if 'the exclusion is based on
objectively justified factors which are unrelated to any discrimination
based on sex' 119. This would be so if the policy met a genuine need of
the enterprise, was suitable for attaining the objective set and was
necessary for that purpose. The burden was on the employer to establish
this, according to the principle of proportionality. The application of the
principle of proportionality was to be left to the national courts in each
instance.
The employer in Bilka argued that the scheme which excluded part-time
employees from the occupational pension unless they had worked full-time
for at least fifteen years was not intended to discriminate against women.
Rather, the aim of the provision was to encourage full-time employment.
Part-time workers caused organisational problems and involved higher
costs. Full-time employees were needed for certain shifts, in particular
Saturdays, which were unpopular among part-time workers. This, the
employer maintained, was an objective justification, based on economic
grounds, for the discrimination.
The BAG rejected the claim of the employer. 120 The BAG considered
current management theory and concluded that the impact of part-time
workers on organisational problems and higher costs entailed by
reorganisation, could only be regarded as minimal. In any case, any such
disadvantage to the employer was offset by benefits to the employer in
employing part-time workers. Furthermore, the BAG pointed out that,
even if the necessity to encourage Saturday working, was a 'genuine need
of the enterprise', the pensions policy was not 'suitable for attaining the
objective'. There was no differentiation in the pension scheme between
Saturday workers and part-time workers, neither was provision made in
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the scheme for part-time workers to qualify for the scheme by working
on Saturdays.
The strict application of the ruling of the European Court in Bilka,
concerning justification for indirect discrimination, has been applied by
the BAG in other decisions regarding indirect discrimination against
women by the application of different measures to part-time workers to
those applied to full-time workers. For example, the granting of a
Versorgungsordnung (benefit) by an employer only to full-time workers
was held to be indirectly discriminatory and not justified. 121 The
employer maintained that, due to its sales strategy, it would prefer to
employ only full-time staff, otherwise the technical and organisational
requirements of the business could not always be fulfilled by part-time
staff in the shop. Part-time workers would not be prepared to work at
unfavoured times. As the burden of proof is on the employer, the BAG
was able to reject these assertions, because the personnel statistics
supplied by the employer did not bear out the assertions; on the
contrary, they indicated that there was no difference in the contributions
of full and part-time workers. The employer also failed to show that the
employment of part-time workers would create higher costs than that of
full-time workers, who were at the employer's disposal for the whole
working day. It limited itself to listing the cost factors of part-time
employment, without placing the cost factors of full-time employment
alongside, for comparison. The BAG ruled that in a cost benefit analysis,
all the cost factors must be compared with one another. The employer
had failed to produce adequate evidence to justify the discrimination.
The oft advanced ground for justification of disadvantaging of part-time
workers, that part-time work is more costly for the employer, is in no
way decisive of a case in German law. On the contrary, the employer
must advance specific proof that in the circumstances shown, the
discrimination is related to economic necessity, that is, it pursues
objectively justified goals and is suitable and necessary for this purpose.
Only if the employer succeeds in showing122
 that, in its particular
undertaking and for this particular job, the cost benefit relationship is
such that full-time workers must be treated more favourably, and that the
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more favourable treatment actually operates to the employer's economic
advantage, and that it is necessary to do so, that is there is no other,
less discriminatory way of dealing with the problem, is justification
established.
The provisions of the BeschaftigungsfOrderungsgesetz (BeschFG) (Act on
Improvement of Employment Opportunities) of 26.4.1985 proscribe
discrimination against part-time employees on the grounds that they only
work part-time. BeschFG section 2 I contains a prohibition of
discrimination against part-time workers 'unless factual reasons justify
a different treatment'. It would be logical if justification under this
provision were effected in the same way as under the provisions
concerning equal treatment of women and men in BGB section 611a ff; that
is, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.
3.2.3 Public interest related justifications
3.2.3.1 Special social needs
One example in which a measure of German employment law with the effect
of discriminating against women is justified on the grounds of the special
needs of the persons concerned is discussed here. Section 1 of the
Kundigungschutzgesetz (KSchG) (Act on Protection Against Dismissal)
provides that, in general, the dismissal of an employee is 'socially
unjustified' and therefore illegal. Three reasons are available to an
employer to refute this general presumption and justify the dismissal.
These are reasons relating to the personality of the employee (where the
employee is unable to fulfil the job requirements), reasons concerning the
behaviour of the employee (misconduct) and 'economic reasons'.
Under the third reason, a dismissal is justified if, due to the economic
situation (whether external recession, or internal measures of
rationalisation or implementation of new technology) the employer can no
longer retain the employee. If a selection is to be made among several
employees, the KSchG requires that this selection must be made taking
into account the 'social aspects' of the dismissal. 	 Applying this
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requirement means that the employee who will suffer least from the
dismissal is the one who will be chosen. In order to make this decision,
a whole range of factors relating to the situation of the employee (age,
duration of employment, marital status, number of children), or the
employee's 'social needs', will be taken into account. This rule, intending
to apply a rule of social justice to each individual case123, may operate
to the disadvantage of women employees, especially if they are married
and have husbands who also work (the so-called Doppelverdienste or
'double earners'). The reasoning is that a married working woman with
a working husband is regarded as the person least likely to suffer from
being made redundant, as it is assumed that her husband will provide for
her.
This is an example of a legislative provision which may often indirectly
discriminate against women. It is applied in a sex neutral manner, but
affects a higher proportion of women than men, as almost all working
married women have a working husband, but over half of married working
men do not have a working wife 124. The application of the
'Doppelverdienste criterion is a measure of social legislation designed to
protect certain employees, and therefore is not 'zwingend geboted, being
an instrument of legislative choice. Therefore justification may only be
established in pursuit of an objectively justifiable goal, and the measure
must be proportionate. Pfarr and Bertelsmann consider that, in a•
redundancy situation, the person who is worst affected is the one for
whom it will be most difficult to find another job 125. The detrimental
effect of a long period of unemployment, they argue, is no less if
dependency on a partner, instead of self-sufficiency, has to be endured.
They suggest that other factors, relating to the likelihood of the employee
finding another job, such as qualifications, experience and mobility, are
more important. Thus women workers, especially married women with
children, as they are likely to encounter special difficulties in securing
other employment, should be protected by this legislation, rather than
being seen as the 'obvious' choice for redundancy. 'The criterion 'double
earner', in the social choice of an company redundancy, is therefore only
objectively justified when all the data, especially the ability to get
another job ... are considered.a26
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4 Conclusion
Justification for direct sex discrimination in German law is limited to
statutory exceptions; however, the number of exclusion provisions, in
particular 'protective legislation', which remain in force is significant.
The effect of these provisions is to undermine the principle of equal
treatment for women and men in employment. Furthermore, job
advertisements in Germany persist in using sex-specific languageln,
which discourages women from applying for 'male' jobs, thus perpetuating
division between women and men in the employment sphere.
Principles regarding the standard of lawful justification for indirect sex
discrimination are in the process of development. Commentators consider
that the justification advanced for discriminatory practices must be
proportionate to the discriminatory effect. This could be of great benefit
to the individual employee who is required to prove indirect
discrimination, as, if the prima fade burden is met, then the burden will
transfer thereafter to prove that the justification was necessary and
consistent with the principle of proportionality. The principle of
proportionality, a general principle of German constitutional law, has a
significant role to play in this area, if equal treatment for women and men
in employment is to be secured.
The substantive grounds for justification of discrimination in German law
are not fixed, although the Catalogue of Exceptions provides an indication
of applicable grounds in the case of direct discrimination. The number
of exclusions allowed by the Catalogue of Exceptions is fairly wide, and
is augmented by measures of protective legislation which remain in force
in spite of the existence of section 611a BG13. Grounds of justification for
indirect discrimination, regarded as compatible with the provisions of
German law, are likely to emerge from litigation; it may be the case that
since the European Court has now made it easier for employees to achieve
an appropriate remedy in sex discrimination cases128 that the number of
decisions of the German Arbeitsgerichte in the area of sex discrimination
in employment will expand greatly.
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Chapters 8 and 9 contain detailed comparison of the legal provisions
regarding justifications for discrimination in the four legal systems
examined in the present study. Use of the comparative method enables
evaluation of the statutory provisions, and their judicial interpretation,
in terms of their functionality in meeting the aims of law which proscribes
sex discrimination in employment.
As explained in Chapter 3, it is my position that the general aim of sex
discrimination law is 'equality of opportunity' for women and men in
employment. Comparison and evaluation will therefore be in terms of
'equality of opportunity' - in its full sense. In order to give substance
to the concept of equality in the context of law regulating sex
discrimination in the area of employment, the law must operate and be
applied in such a way as to counter its 'masculine' orientation, that is,
to counter the assumption that the employment relationship is one between
employer on the one hand, and a full-time employee, a main bread winner,
with no childcare or other domestic responsibilities, in short, an employee
who is a man, or who is a woman conforming to this masculine stereotype.
As it is an aim of the study to provide recommendations for the further
development of EC law, the comparison and evaluation of provisions
concerning justification is effected with a view to establishing which
approaches, rules, standards and substantive grounds for justification
should be adopted in EC law, and which approaches of the other legal
systems examined are less functional than the present EC approach.
The evaluation seeks to take into account a number of issues in its
assessment of justifications for discrimination. One basis for criticism
may be that the standard for permissible justification is too low to be
functional, that is, that the 'legal test' for justification is drawn too
broadly, or applied too loosely. The effect of a standard for justification
which is too low is that the goal of equality of opportunity may not be
achieved. A related issue is that of burden of proof; that is, the
question of which party (employer or employee) is to bear the burden of
proof at different stages of a claim concerning justification for sex
discrimination.
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A second basis for criticism may be that the substantive ground advanced
as a justification reveals unnecessary sex stereotyping. The aim of
equality of opportunity requires that individual women and men be
enabled to make employment choices without restriction in terms of sex
or gender roles. A third basis for criticism may be that, although the
substantive ground of justification is prima fade acceptable, the measure
adopted in a particular circumstance may not be genuinely necessary, and
the aim of the discriminatory measure could be met in some other, less
discriminatory way, in other words, that the justification does not meet
the principle of proportionality.
Some grounds for justification of discrimination are more readily
acceptable as functional than others. Those grounds of justification to
which little objection is taken are dealt with fairly briefly. Other
substantive grounds of justification require more detailed scrutiny, as to
whether they should be regarded as acceptable exceptions to the principle
of equal treatment for women and men in employment. The approaches of
the four legal systems concerned to these more difficult grounds of
justification in the different legal systems are compared and evaluated at
more length.
One particularly difficult issue is that of justification of 'positive
discrimination', that is, justification of measures, such as entitlement to
paid maternity leave, which grant 'special treatment' to women, and
therefore discriminate against men. There is no common agreement among
commentators as to whether measures of positive discrimination should
ever be justifiable (for an example of a feminist writer who argues that
positive discrimination should not be justifiable, see Wendy Williams, "The
Equality Crisis", in Bartlett and Kennedy, p. 15-34). My position,
however, is that some measures of positive discrimination should be
justifiable, in order to effect full equality of opportunity.
Although parallels may be drawn between the two types of discrimination
(direct and indirect), the standard or 'legal test' for justification, and the
substantive grounds by which justification may be established, differ,
depending on whether direct discrimination or indirect discrimination is
Part III	 232
to be justified. Another difference is that direct discrimination between
women and men in pay may, as a general proposition, never be justified
(except in the case of 'positive discrimination', which favours women, for
example, paid maternity leave), whereas indirect pay discrimination may
be. Both direct and indirect discrimination in treatment may be
justifiable. Because of the different conceptual considerations concerned,
direct and indirect discrimination are dealt with separately. Approaches
to justification for direct discrimination are evaluated in Chapter 8;
justification for indirect discrimination is dealt with in Chapter 9.
Parallels are drawn in the concluding chapter of the thesis, chapter 10.
Chapter 8
Direct Discrimination
1 Introduction
Rules justifying direct discrimination, that is, discrimination on the
ground of sex, exist in all four legal systems examined. Direct sex
discrimination may be effected in the refusal of employment, in denial of
promotion or in dismissal of an employee, simply on the grounds of the
sex of the employee. The rules generally take the form of exclusion
provisions provided in the legislation regulating sex discrimination in
employment. Judicial interpretation of the non-discrimination rules may
also lead to development of circumstances in which direct discrimination
is lawfully justified.
1.1 Statutory exclusions
In all four legal systems examined, there exists a general exclusion
provision, laid down in the legislation governing sex discrimination in
employment, allowing sex discrimination in those circumstances where the
sex of the employee is related to the job concerned in such a way that
it is regarded as legally justified for exclusively men (or exclusively'
women) to be employed in that position. Certain occupational activities
may only be carried out by women or only by men; either in fact, or in
law. In fact, the number of activities which can only be carried out by
women or men respectively is extremely small; arguably only those
activities entirely dependent on the different biological capabilities of
women and men, in particular women's child-bearing capacity, could
properly be included. In law, the number of activities for which direct'
discrimination on the part of employers is justified is somewhat wider.
The law, in allowing for these situations in which direct discrimination is
justified, is recognising other important values, interests or even rights,
which are balanced against the aim of equal opportunity for women and
men.
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The general exclusion provision operates where, if for the activity
concerned, sex is a 'genuine occupational qualification' (in the UK), an
'indisputable requirement' (in Germany), a 'bona fide occupational
qualification' (in the US) or a 'determining factor' (in EC law). The
terminology of these exclusion provisions indicates broad similarity, and,
in fact, the content of these exclusion provisions, indicated by the
Judicial application of the provisions in the legal systems concerned bears
this out to a reasonable extent.
In both the UK and Germany, a list of situations which prima fade fall
within the exclusion provision is laid down. The German list (the
'Catalogue of Exceptions') does not actually have legislative force, but it
is highly persuasive. The lists contain situations such as employment in
the arts, where an employee of a particular sex may be required for
reasons of artistic authenticity, and employment in the penal system,
where it may be required that an employee who is responsible for special
care and supervision of prisoners is the same sex as those who are cared
for.
In the US and the EC (and in Germany), application of the exclusion
provision (that sex is a BFOQ or a determining factor for the job) is not
limited to a list of substantive situations laid down in legislation, but is
open to judicial interpretation and, in the case of Germany, the
interpretation of commentators. The substantive grounds of justification
reached by this interpretation are broadly similar to those in the UK; for
example, direct discrimination is justified on the grounds of preservation
of decency and privacy of third parties, in jobs in the penal system.
The functional difference between laying down, in legislation, a list of
situations in which direct discrimination may be justified (as in the UK)
and leaving the establishment of substantive situations in which direct
discrimination may be justified to the courts, in interpretation of a
general exclusion provision, (as in Germany, the US and the EC) is
minimal, it seems, in practice.
There are, however, good reasons not to rely on a legislative list for
establishment of grounds of justification for direct discrimination. The
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problem with any list of exceptions is that it can never be exhaustive.
The list of GOQs in UK law is supplemented by various other exceptions
to the general principle of equal treatment for women and men in
employment, for example, a general exemption for employment in the police
force' and an exemption for ministers of religion 2 . Furthermore, lists
tend to contribute to the reinforcement of stereotypes, by discouraging
the examination of specific cases on their own merits. In other words,
reliance on a list tends to discourage application of an important aspect
of the principle of equal treatment, that is, the treatment of individuals
as individuals.
For this reason, it is not suggested that the aims of sex discrimination
law of the EC would be better served if the EC were to adopt a list of
exclusion provisions. Even if the practical problems attendant in
establishing such a list could be solved3, a list of exclusions laid down
in legislation would not necessarily function more effectively than judicial
interpretation of a general exclusion clause, provided that the judicial
interpretation is rigorous and bears in mind the aim of sex discrimination
law. Moreover, the aim of equality of opportunity might be much worse
served by the establishment of a list, since the potential for exclusion
from the principle of equal treatment is much wider if a list of situations
in which direct discrimination is prima fade justified is given, rather
than requiring the individual justification of each situation where direct
discrimination arises.
1.2 Standard of justification
More significant than the manner in which statutory exclusions from the
equal treatment principle are laid down is the way in which the general
exclusion provisions are interpreted and applied by the courts. The
standard by which justifications for direct discrimination are tested is,
therefore, important. The issue of standard of justification is discussed
in some detail in chapter 9, below, in the context of indirect
discrimination; it is sufficient to note here that the legal systems
examined reveal two broad approaches to the standard of justification for
direct discrimination.
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The UK and US systems rely primarily on a reasonableness standard. In
the UK, the defence of 'genuine occupational qualification' (GOQ) may
apply automatically if the factual situation is met, for example in the case
of employment in a single sex hospital or prison. 4 However, many GOQs
refer to the concept of reasonableness: for example, where privacy and
decency are to be protected, it may be a GOQ to employ employees of only
one sex if a person 'might reasonably object' to persons of the opposite
sex being present5; or where it is not reasonable to expect an employer
to equip the premises (oil rigs, lighthouses, ships) at which the work is
carried out for employees of both sexes, the GOQ defence may apply6.
The US standard of 'bona fide occupational qualification' is, according to
the statute, to be 'reasonably necessary to normal operation of the
enterprise'.7
In German law and in EC law, the proportionality test applies to
exclusions from the equal treatment principle. The proportionality test
requires that there must be a real and genuine need to discriminate, and
the exclusion must be necessary to meet that need. The European Court
has established clearly that the exclusions in Equal Treatment Directive,
Article 2, may be successfully established only with due regard to the
principle of proportionality. 8	-
As explained below 9, it is my position that the proportionality test
provides a more functional approach to the standard of justification than
the reasonableness test.
2 Substantive Grounds of Justification for Direct Discrimination
Substantive grounds for justification of direct sex discrimination are
discussed below, using a three-fold categorization. The first category
concerns those grounds where the duties of the job require a woman or
a man as employee. The second category concerns those grounds where
the context of the job justifies direct discrimination, because the context
of the job requires the protection of interests of other parties, either
specific individuals, or more general, 'societal' interests. The third
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category concerns those grounds where the justification relates to the
protection of the interests of women themselves.
Grounds of justification related to the duties of the job are dealt with
first, as they are the grounds most readily accepted in all four legal
systems, as 'genuine occupational qualifications', 'indisputable
requirements', 'bona fide occupational qualifications' or 'determining
factors'. The example of artistic authenticity is referred to briefly.
Grounds of justification which arise through the balancing of the
interests of others are discussed second, using the examples of cultural
necessity, protection of privacy and decency, and the maintenance of
public safety. All four legal systems examined recognise that, in certain
circumstances, other interests may override the general principle of equal
treatment for women and men in employment. Purported grounds of
justification for direct sex discrimination relating to the protection of
women are regarded, in the four systems examined, as more suspect, since
such grounds tend to rely on stereotyping of women as weak, vulnerable
and in need of protection. Even so, such stereotypical reasoning may be
found in some judgments.
There is one outstanding exception to the assertion that special protection
of women does not in general justify discrimination: the one situation
where the special protection of women is regarded as justifiable is where
the woman is pregnant. However, the discrimination in this case may
often be (or may at least purport to be) for the benefit of women, that
is, the discrimination is 'positive discrimination'. Measures of positive
discrimination will, by their nature, be disadvantageous to men, as they
accord extra rights and privileges to women. However, this direct sex
discrimination against men is justified by the special nature of pregnancy.
As the issues concerned in justification on ground of pregnancy may be
regarded as different from those in other situations of direct
discrimination (and also because it is not clear whether discrimination on
grounds of pregnancy may be considered to be direct discrimination),
pregnancy as a ground for justification is discussed separately, below.
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2.1 Artistic authenticity
As noted above, many of the situations covered by the exclusion
provisions are those in which the justification for exclusion of either
women or men from the activity concerned is more or less universally
accepted. For example, all four systems examined consider sex
discrimination to be legally justified in certain employment activities in
the arts, for instance in dramatic performances, or modelling for painters
and sculptors, where the role to be fulfilled is one which could not be
carried out authentically if undertaken by a person of the other sex.
The exclusion of members of a particular sex from employment in
particular artistic roles is essential if the intrinsic qualities of works of
art are to be valued and preserved. Who would wish to endorse a female
Hamlet, or a male Mona Lisa? The very nature of the job, and the
specific duties of the job, that is, for example, the accurate and authentic
portrayal of a character in a play, necessitate employment of a person of
a particular sex. There can be no objection to a justification on grounds
which are so closely related to effective performance of the job.
2.2 Cultural necessity
Another ground of justification for direct discrimination which is,
although perhaps a little reluctantly, accepted in the four legal systems
examined, is the ground that, due to cultural necessity, an employer is
required to employ a person of a particular sex. This ground of
justification applies where the activity to be carried out involves work
in a country in which it would be difficult, for cultural reasons, for a
woman to carry out the work, because women are excluded from the
public sphere and from business activity in that country. The
justification covers, for example, employment in several Middle Eastern
countries, where Islamic law and the prevailing social mores render it
more or less impossible for women to carry out business activities. The
fact that this ground of justification is narrowly framed, and applicable
only where a genuine difficulty would be encountered by a woman
employee, represents a statement that the prevailing culture and the
position of women in that prevailing culture, in those parts of the world
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concerned, is not supported; rather it is hoped that these countries will
eventually embrace equality. The ground of cultural necessity is also
related to the job; the relationship is not to the actual duties of the job,
but to the context in which those duties are carried out. The ground is
also related to the 'interests' of others. Allowing the ground for
justification involves a recognition that the cultural and religious
interests of societies other than Western 'post-Christian' liberal
democracies cannot in practice be, and should not be, ignored. To do so
would be an unjustifiable exercise of 'cultural imperialism'. Such a
ground for justification may be regarded as functional.
2.3 Decency and privacy
It is recognised, in all four legal systems examined, that interests and
claims of individuals other than the employee who is discriminated against
may provide grounds for justification of direct discrimination in
employment. Where concepts of decency, modesty or privacy of
individuals are considered important, the effect of protection of these
interests may result in direct discrimination against women, or against
men. The classic example is employment as a toilet attendant, where men
may justifiably be excluded from employment in a-women's toilet and vice
versa. It may be justifiable that the individuals carrying out, for
example, the jobs of nurse, or customs officer who is to carry out strip.
searches, or prison officer, are of the same sex as those with whom they
come into close physical contact in carrying out of the duties of the job.
In the case of Re Sex Discrimination in the Civil Service: EC Commission
v Francel°, the European Court relied, inter alia, on the ground of
privacy to justify sex segregation in the French government's recruitment
policies for various posts in prisons. One post for which it was claimed.
that the sex of the employee would be a determining factor was that of
head warder of a single sex prison. In reaching its decision that the
direct discrimination was justified, the European Court examined the post
of warder, from which individuals are promoted to head warder. The
Court held that the specific nature of the post of warder and the
conditions in which warders carry out their duties justifies reserving
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posts in male prisons for men and those in female prisons for women, on
the grounds of protection of the interest of decency and privacy of the
inmates with whom the warder is required to work. Although the
activities of head warders were not necessarily of such a nature that sex
is a determining factor in appointment of head warders, the reasons for
appointing head warders from the pool of warders, in particular that head
warders should have had experience of the job of warder, justified the
policy.
At first sight this decision might seem sound: it is certainly acceptable
to stipulate that head warders must have the experience of being
warders, and the specific nature of the post of warder and the duties
carried out in that post justify the recruitment of male warders for male
prisons and female warders for female prisons, on the ground of decency
and privacy of the inmates. However the decision of the European Court
does not take into account the situation where a female warder, having
gained experience in a female prison, wishes to apply for promotion to a
post for which being of a particular sex is not a determining factor, that
is the post of governor of a male prison. In this situation, it is
submitted, the exclusion of women should not be justified.
-
The interests of decency and privacy must be balanced against the
principle of equal treatment for women and men in employment. Where
the privacy, modesty and decency of another person, with whom the
employee is in close contact in carrying out the duties of the job, is at
issue, for example in the case of nursing, prison work or other caring
professions, this must be balanced against the equal treatment principle,
with due regard to equality of opportunity for women. The preservation
of decency and privacy, especially of clients or others with whom the.
employee works closely, cannot be objected to as a justification for direct
discrimination in some contexts, although a functional approach may be
regarded as one which does not seek to overextend the reach of the
ground of justification. Given that a balance of competing interests is
required, the act of balancing should, in a functional system, be carried
out in light of the genuineness of the interest, and the necessity of the
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discriminatory policy. In other words, the application of the standard of
proportionality should ensure appropriate application of the rules.
2.4 Public safety or security
All four legal systems examined allow the justification of direct
discrimination on grounds of public safety or security. This ground is
often advanced in cases concerning employment of women in policing and
public order activities. Exclusion of women from particular tasks may be
justified on the grounds of the interests of other individuals, as in the
case of the ground of privacy; however, in the case of public security,
the interest is a more general, 'societal' interest. The ground for
justification is that the employment of women in particular jobs presents
a real risk to public order and the safety of the public in general.
The position of EC law is that public security and public order may
constitute a ground for justification of direct sex discrimination. The
European Court faced the issue of justification of exclusion of women from
certain policing and public order activities in Johnston v RUC'. The
Court was called upon to interpret the Equal Treatment Directive12,
Article 2 (2), which allows derogation from the equal treatment principle
where the sex of the worker is a 'determining factor'. The Court was
required to decide whether the policy of the Royal Ulster Constabulary
concerning women members, and their equipment, in particular, the policy
that women members of the RUC are not armed, was in breach of the
Directive. The effect of this policy was that the plaintiff, Ms Johnston,
lost her job, where a man in her situation would not have done so.
In its defence, the UK government relied on Article 2 (2) of the Directive,
averring that, for the occupational activity concerned, the sex of the
worker constituted a 'determining factor', inter alia, because of the
'difference in strength between the sexes' 13 and because 'if women were
armed they might become a more frequent target for assassination and
their firearms could fall into the hands of their assailants.'14
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The decision of the European Court in Johnston suggests that a broad
'public safety' justification would be allowed in any policing activity (or
perhaps other activities also) if a Member State wished to exclude the
operation of the Equal Treatment Directive. The Advocate General went
so far as to state that 'no one doubts' that,
'in some circumstances the demands of public order may constitute
a legitimate ground for the authorities of a Member State to permit
only individuals of one sex tp do certain work relating to the
maintenance of law and order'."
The Court held,
'The possibility cannot be excluded in a situation characterised by
serious internal disturbances (in casu, Northern Ireland) that the
carrying of firearms by policewomen might create additional risks
and might be contrary to the requirements of public safety. In
such circumstances, the context of certain policing activities may
be such that the sex of the police officer constitutes a determining
factor for carrying them out. If that , is so, a Member State may
restrict such tasks to men (Article 2 (2) Directive 76/207)'
It is for the national court to decide whether this is the case, with due
regard to the principle of proportionality. 16 The exclusion provision is,
however, confined to specific activities: it is not applicable to occupations
in their entirety.
The application, in the Johnston case, of the ground of public safety as
justification for direct sex discrimination may be regarded as
questionable. The question of why female police officers are more likely
to be assassinated than male police officers was not examined, but
accepted without evidence and without scrutiny by the European Court.17
What is the basis for the 'additional risks', referred to in the judgment,
to public security, which would be incurred if women were employed as
armed RUC officers? Was the reason for the fear of assassination related
to the difference in strength between the sexes? If so, the ground for
justification was based on a generalisation which should not be available
to justify derogation from the equal treatment principle, an important
facet of which is the treatment of individuals as individuals. A
requirement of a certain amount of strength in an applicant for a job as
an armed police officer could be justified, but not a blanket ban on all
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women applicants, on the grounds that women are, on average, weaker
than men. Was the reason for the fear of assassination related to a
perception of women as less efficient in the use of firearms than men?
If so, the ground for justification was based on sex stereotyping, which
is antithetical to the aim of sex discrimination law. There is no biological
reason why women should be less effective in the use of firearms; given
sufficient training, there is no reason why women should be more
vulnerable than men when faced with a situation of internal disturbance,
such as that in Northern Ireland. The (alleged) public perception of
women as weaker, more vulnerable to assassination and less effective in
carrying out armed policing duties is also a ground of justification based
on sex stereotyping. Finally the issue of proportionality seems to have
been insufficiently considered. Would the threat to public safety and
security be significantly increased by the employment of armed women
police officers? Unless the threat was sufficiently increased by the
presence of women, the proportionality test might not be satisfied, since
the prohibition would not be necessary to protect public security.
The decision in Re Sex Discrimination in the Civil Service: EC Commission
v France18 modified the Johnston decision somewhat, narrowing its scope.
The case concerned French recruitment practices for, inter alia, five
categories of job in the national police force. The policy involved
separate recruitment competitions for women and men, with a percentage
of posts to be allotted to women and men respectively in each competition.
With regard to the posts in the police force, the French Government
argued,
'... the maintenance of public order requires a display of the
capacity to use force at all times, which would be disrupted by the
large-scale recruitment of women. The need to dissuade potential
troublemakers and the physical dangers of the job justify
recruiting only a limited proportion of women.'
This is a similar argument to that which was successful in Johnston v
Rlig it is open, therefore, to similar criticism. In response to the
argument of the French government, the Commission countered that a
dissuasive effect which police officers may have on those likely to commit
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violent or riotous crime has more to do with physical strength of the
individual than with the sex of the person concerned19. The approach
of the Commission concentrates on the characteristics of individual
employees or potential employees and removes the sex stereotyping
evident in the submission of the French government.
The Advocate General was prepared to countenance the idea that sex
could be a determining factor for some police activities, 'where the use
of force or a display of the capacity to use force are required' 20, not
because men are on average stronger than women, but because 'potential
delinquents regard men as more likely to use force'21.
However, the Advocate General considered that there was no need to
decide whether the situation in hand was such a case, because the use
of the quota system had not separated out those police activities where
a particular threat to public safety was present. 'The activities of the
five police corps in question are many and varied ... many of these
activities may be carried out by either sex.'22
'It seems to me that there are many degrees of violent behaviour
and it has not been established that women cannot deal with any
of them or that, even if for specific areas or for specific purposes,
the use of men only is justified, the engagement of women on a
quota basis throughout the police force has not been shown to be
justified whatever the nature of the activities actually carried out.
The French provisions lay down in advance a quota of jobs
available to men and women without regagd to the context in which
the occupational activity is carried out.'"
The Commission and the Advocate General countered directly the
assumption that women in general are less able to deal effectively with
violence, pointing out that generalization is inappropriate, and that the
ability to carry out policing and public order duties depends on the
physique, strength, and training of the individual concerned. The
imposition of quotas throughout the police force and prison service was
not only based on male and female stereotypes which are not relevant in
individual cases, but also was disproportionate to the proposed aim of the
quotas. It could not, therefore, be justified under Article 2 (2).
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The European Court agreed that the quotas for the various grades of
police officers were not sufficiently related to the specific activities of
the jobs concerned, as is required by the wording of Article 2 (2), to
justify an exception to the equal treatment principle. The Court held that
such a justification relating to 'public security' in general cannot apply
to employment in all posts in the police force of a Member State. This is
an application of the proportionality principle; the policy had a
discriminatory effect greater than was necessitated by its aim, the
exclusion of women from employment in situations in which there is a
particular threat to public safety or security. The principle of
proportionality operated here to support equal opportunities for women
and men in this particular sphere of employment.
The position of EC law, as set out in Johnston v Nrc, may be criticised
as one which takes account of sex stereotyping in that it relies on an
assumption that, because women are perceived .by the 'general public' as
more vulnerable than men, or less able to act as skilled police officers in
the face of violence, they may be excluded from certain policing activities
on grounds of public security. The decision in Commission v France,
however, seems to approach a more functional interpretation of the
ground of public security as justification for direct sex discrimination, by
focusing on the proportionality test.
The leading US case, Dothard v Rawlinson24, reveals similar reasoning to
that of the European Court in Johnston, although the application of the
ground of public security as justification for disparate treatment of
women is carefully limited to the special conditions under which the
employees concerned were to work, that is, in a 'special penitentiary' with
high-risk prisoners.
In Dothard v Rawlinson25, which concerned employment in a position of
prison guard in a maximum security, all male prison, the Supreme Court
held that it was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) that
employees holding the position be male. Stressing that the BFOQ defence
was only applicable in the narrowest of situations, the Court held that
this was one such situation. The judgment focused on the potential
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threat to security in a prison with a high proportion of sex offenders,
should women be appointed as prison guards.
The Supreme Court held that this particular case was not one in which
the ground of justification was solely a desire to protect potential women
employees26, but that 'more was at stake'. 27 At the very heart of the
duties of the job concerned was the maintenance of security in the
prison. Because it could be shown that sex offenders who have already
assaulted women are likely to do so again if they could gain access to
women in the prison, 'A woman's relative ability to maintain order in a
male, maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary of the type Alabama now
runs could be directly reduced by her womanhood.'28
'In a prison system where violence is the order of the day, where
inmate access to guards is facilitated by dormitory living
arrangements, where every institution is understaffed, and where
a substantial portion of the inmate population is composed of sex
offenders mixed at random with other prisoners, there ehre few
visible deterrents to inmate assaults on women custodians.'"
The important factor of the Dothard decision is that the likelihood of
assault on a woman prison officer would not only threaten the woman
concerned, but also would constitute a serious threat to the basic control
of the penitentiary and protection of its inmates and other security
personnel. 'The employee's very womanhood would thus directly
undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a
correctional counsellor's responsibility.'30
The judgment in Dothard is difficult, as the dissenting opinion points out,
as the ground for justification reveals sex stereotyping.
'It appears that the real disqualifying factor in the Court's view is
'[t]he employee's very womanhood.' ... In short the fundamentaljustification for the decision is that women as guards will generate
sexual assaults. With all respect, this rationale regrettably
perpetuates one of the most insidious of myths about women - that
women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects. The effect
of the decision is to punish women because their very presence
might provoke sexual assaults. It is women who are made to pay
the price in lost job opportunities ... The proper response to
inevitable attacks on both female and male guards is not to limit
the employment opportunities of law-abiding women ... but tqitake
swift and sure punitive action against the inmate offenders.'''
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The decision to exclude women from the position of prison guards was
justified by the assertion that the presence of women would generate
sexual assaults. This reasoning, as the dissenting judgment points out,
'perpetuates one of the most insidious of myths about women - that
women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects'32.
The result of perpetuation of this myth is that women are made to pay
the price in lost job opportunities. Equal opportunities of women and
men in employment cannot be advanced if the legal justification for
exclusion of women from posts involving contact with dangerous
individuals is based on this type of sex stereotyping. Rather measures
should be taken to protect all employees in prisons and similar situations
from the attempted attacks (whether sexually motivated or not) they will
suffer during the course of their employment. 'The proper response to
inevitable attacks on both female and male guards is not to limit the
employment opportunities of law-abiding women ... but to take swift and
sure punitive action against the inmate offenders.'33
This argument is appealing, but it is submitted that, although in the
majority of situations involving a threat to public safety and security, the
exclusion of women should not be justified, for the reasons outlined
above, there may be a few situations where the ground of public security,
and the general interest of society in law and order, may operate to
outweigh the principle of equality of opportunity. The situation in
Dothard might be regarded as one such situation. Because Dothard is so
clearly limited to the most exceptional circumstances, the approach of the
Supreme Court might be regarded as functional.
The acceptance of public security as a ground for justification of direct
sex discrimination may, it is submitted, be functional with regard to the
aims of equality of opportunity for women and men in employment, if, and
only if, there exists a real threat to public security. It should be made
clear that, in order to be considered functional, the purported
justification should be scrutinised for sex stereotyping. The Johnston
approach may not be regarded as functional, as there was no real or
specific evidence advanced to show why the employment of armed women
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police officers should constitute more of a risk, in the particular context
of the duties of the job concerned, than the employment of male police
officers. The purported justification was based on an assumption that
can be understood only in terms of traditional stereotypical generalized
assumptions of strength and skill or vulnerability of men and women
respectively. The acceptance of this justification, and its proportionality,
rests entirely on this assumption. In Dothard, the specific (and highly
unusual) context in which the work was carried out - a high-risk prison,
with a large proportion of male sex offenders among the prisoners - was
sufficient grounds to show a real threat to security if women were
employed as prison officers; a threat greater than that present where
only men were employed.
It is recognised that the distinction between Johnston and Dothard is a
fine one: however, a functional application of the ground of public
security should operate to make such careful distinctions, in order to
retain employment opportunities for women which are as wide as possible.
In fact, experience in the UK shows that women can be extremely effective
as prison governors and officers, without threat to public security.34
2.5 Safety of women	 -
In the past, in the legal systems of the UK, US and Germany, the ground
of safety of women, or the protection of women from danger, has been
used to justify direct discrimination against women, in particular in the
exclusion of women from jobs which are considered too perilous or
otherwise unsuitable for women. For example, in 1908, the US Supreme
Court, in Muller v Oregon35, was prepared to uphold legislation governing
the hours women were permitted to work, on the grounds that the special
protection of women was justified. Various measures of protective
legislation remain in force today. However, the general trend, in all four
legal systems examined, seems to be the continued narrowing of such
protective legislation, leaving only those measures where the protection
relates to women's ability to bear children, and therefore the risk to
safety is not the same for men.36
Direct Discrimination	 249
The European Court has rejected the ground of safety of women as a
general justification for the exclusion of women from dangerous jobs. The
ground of safety of women was advanced as justification in the cases of
Johnston v RUC and Re Sex Discrimination in the Civil Service, EC
Commission v France37, and was rejected. In the case of Ministbre Public
v Stoeckei8, the European Court was required to rule on the
compatibility of a provision of German law which excluded women from
nightwork. The Court pointed out that the risks incurred by women in
carrying out employment activities at night were not different in nature
to risks incurred by men in similar employment. Therefore the exclusion
of women only from those jobs was not justified on any grounds.
The US Supreme Court, in Dothard, also rejected the ground of safety of
women as a general justification for exclusion of women from employment
opportunities. As the Court pointed out, 'the argument that a particular
job is too dangerous for women may appropriately be met by the
rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman
to make that choice for herself.'
The approach that the ground of justification of women's safety be
rejected, in all except those cases concerning pregnancy and maternity,
is functional. Women should be given the same opportunity as men to
decide whether to accept the risk concerned, and gain the benefits of
employment.
2.6 Pregnancy
Grounds relating to pregnancy and maternity of a woman employee, arise
frequently as justifications for sex discrimination in employment. The
issues concerned in evaluation of justifications for discrimination related
to pregnancy may be regarded as conceptually different from those in
other situations of sex discrimination, for the simple reason that only
women are biologically able to become pregnant and bear children, and
that therefore there is, in this instance, a real, factual difference between
the position of women and the position of men.
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It is not accepted by the courts in all four legal systems examined that
discrimination on grounds of pregnancy is direct discrimination.39
Nevertheless, justification of discrimination based on the ground of
pregnancy is discussed in this chapter, concerned with direct
discrimination, for three main reasons. The first of these reasons is
practical; the European Court regards pregnancy discrimination as direct
sex discrimination 40 and, as the focus of the study is EC law, it seems
reasonable to follow the position of the European Court. The other two
reasons relate more to theory and analysis than practical considerations.
It may be asserted that pregnancy discrimination must be direct
discrimination, because only women may become pregnant. The
discrimination is, of necessity, sex based, and therefore should be
characterised as direct discrimination. The third reason for treating
pregnancy discrimination as direct discrimination is that discrimination on
grounds of pregnancy, or on other grounds relating to pregnancy, does
not fit the scheme of a claim of indirect discrimination. Indirect sex
discrimination arises where a criterion, neutral on its face, is applied in
such a way as to result in a disproportionate impact on individuals of one
sex. The criterion 'non-pregnant' is not a sex neutral requirement, as all
men will always meet the requirement, and it is only women who may
sometimes not fulfil it. In any case, it should be made clear at this point
that the present discussion does not seek to provide a definitive answer
to the question of whether pregnancy discrimination is direct
discrimination or not; rather the discussion seeks to explore whether
rules developed, and judicial interpretations thereof, regarding the
justification of discrimination on grounds of pregnancy, and grounds
related to pregnancy, are functional.
The ground of pregnancy itself is not, in any of the four legal systems
examined, a permitted ground of justification for discrimination which
operates to disadvantage women - that is, 'negative discrimination'. There
are a number of situations in which discrimination against a pregnant
employee may arise: for instance, in the refusal of an employer to employ
or to promote a pregnant woman, in the dismissal of an employee who
becomes pregnant, and in the exclusion of pregnant women from access
to training schemes, seniority rights, or other fringe benefits, for
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example, sick pay schemes which do not provide payment when the cause
of the illness is pregnancy related°.
In EC law, it was made clear, in the case of Dekker42, where it was held
that the employer was not entitled to refuse to employ a woman on the
grounds of her pregnancy, that 'negative discrimination' cannot be
justified on grounds of pregnancy. In US law and German law, grounds
related to pregnancy, for example, the ability to perform the job safely,
could justify detrimental treatment of a pregnant woman, using the BFOQ
or legitimate business reason defences (in US law) or establishing that an
'indisputable requirement' to employ a non-pregnant person existed (in
German law), but the actual ground of pregnancy itself cannot lawfully
justify 'negative discrimination'. In the UK, although discrimination on
grounds of pregnancy is not regarded as direct discrimination, in cases
in which the employer has successfully defended 'negative discrimination'
against a pregnant woman, the employer has relied on a ground related
to the pregnancy, such as the woman's absence from work, and not the
pregnancy itself.° An employer cannot simply rely on pregnancy itself
as a ground of justification, but justifications which are a consequence
of pregnancy may be accepted."
In all four systems, the ground of pregnancy itself may be a justification
for discrimination which operates to the advantage of women, and.
therefore is direct sex discrimination against men - that is, measures of
'positive discrimination'. For example, Article 2 (3) and (4) of the Equal
Treatment Directive, as interpreted by the European Court, establish this
justification in EC law.° In the US, Title VII, as amended, in section
701(k), for example, specifically requires pregnant women to be given the
benefits of health plans and paid leave, where other employees 'with
similar disabilities or conditions' would enjoy these. The German-
Mutterschutzgesetz (Mother Protection Act) grants women various
advantages in the workplace, such as, for example, extra breaks for
breastfeeding. In the UK, for example, some employees who become
pregnant enjoy the special right to non-dismissal provided by the
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, section 60.
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Most often, it is not the pregnancy itself which is advanced as a ground
of justification, but a ground related to the pregnancy. Three different
types of such grounds are discussed below. The grounds reflect those
discussed above, in that they are categorised as: a) justifications related
to the performance of the job, b) justifications related to the balancing
of interests of the employer and employee, and c) justifications related
to the protection of women. The first type of justification relates to the
employee's ability to perform the duties of the job. In general, if no
women could perform a particular job (as discussed above), then direct
discrimination is justified in the recruitment of employees for that
position. By analogy, if no pregnant women could perform the job, then
discrimination is also justified. What is concerned here is measures of
'negative discrimination'.
The second type of justification relates to grounds of justification which
concern the balancing of interests of the employer and employee. The
cost to the employer of, for example, replacing an employee while on
maternity leave, may be advanced as a ground of justification, if the
employer is required to shoulder the burden of keeping open a job for
an employee on maternity leave and is not required to do so for a man
who requires leave for a similar reason, for example, a medical reason.
What is concerned here is the justification of measures of 'positive
discrimination'.
The third type of justification relates to justification in terms of
protection of the woman and the foetus. The interests of society in the
health and protection of its children are part of the ground for
justification of discrimination. The issues of protection of the woman and
protection of the foetus are separate, but interlinked, as the health of the
foetus depends on the health of the woman. Protective measures are, on
their face, designed for women's benefit. A woman employee may derive
great advantage from some protective measures; advantage which is not
available to a male employee. However, protective measures may equally
work to the disadvantage of women, who may be excluded from
employment opportunities, and may perpetuate the stereotype of women's
vulnerability. The special protection of women cannot therefore be
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regarded as clearly falling into the category of 'negative discrimination'
or 'positive discrimination'.
2.6.1 Ability to perform the job
The refusal of an employer to employ a pregnant woman, or the
requirement that a pregnant employee take leave, is justifiable, in all four
systems examined, if the pregnancy jeopardises the employee's ability to
perform the job at all, or to perform the job effectively or safely. What
is concerned here is the physical ability to perform the job, not inability
to work which arises due to the employee's absence on maternity leave.
2.6.1.1 Physical ability
A pregnant employee may be physically unable to perform, or to perform
safely, the duties of certain jobs. In this case, differential treatment may
be justified.
For example, in the US, discrimination against a pregnant employee is not
unlawful if the employee is treated the same as another employee who
suffers from a similar physical 'inability to work. One area where the
inability of a pregnant employee to perform the job safely has received
judicial attention in the US is that of concern for the safety of
passengers where the air stewardess is pregnant. The courts have
utilised both the business necessity test and the BFOQ defence to find
that an employer airline may operate mandatory maternity leave policies,
provided that these do not show discriminatory intent in the way that
they are applied, and in particular that the accrual of seniority rights is
not affected.46 This justification is not objectionable if it is based on
the proven inability of a pregnant woman to perform the job safely, and
not on untested perceptions of capabilities of pregnant women, which may
be based on inaccurate stereotyping.
The decision of the European Court, in Dekker, that pregnancy
discrimination is direct discriminatioe means that EC law will, at some
stage, be required to develop a position to deal with the situation where
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the employer claims that a pregnant women is unable to carry out the
job. The issue has not yet arisen in a case before the European Court.
The general provisions used by the Court to examine justifications for sex
discrimination (a genuine need of the enterprise, suitable and
necessary48 ) cannot be used, as they only apply to indirect
discrimination. However, the Court could seek to rely on Article 2 (2) of
the Equal Treatment Directive, which allows Member States to exclude from
the field of application of the Equal Treatment Directive occupational
activities for which, by reason of their nature or the context in which
they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining
factor.
Provided that the nature of the job is such that the inability to perform
can be demonstrated to be directly connected to the pregnancy, little
objection can be taken to justification on grounds of physical ability to
perform. The approach of the US courts, in their reasoning in the cases
concerning air stewardesses, may be regarded as functional.
2.6.1.2 Morality
In the case of some jobs, in particular those which involve contact with
young people, in a leadership, teaching or guidance role, employers may
seek to argue that a certain standard of morality is required for the
effective performance of the job. In two of the legal systems examined,
cases have come before the courts in which the employer has argued that
it is a requirement of a particular job that women, employed to carry out
that job, either remain childless, or, if they wish to bear children, do so
within a marital relationship.
In the US, in Chambers v Omaha Girls Club", the employer, a club for
girls and young women, was successful in establishing the business
necessity defence, to justify its refusal to employ an unmarried pregnant
woman. It was also the employer's policy to exclude from employment men
who caused pregnancy outside marriage. The court accepted that the
specific nature of the employer's business, 'to foster growth and maturity
in young girls by exposing them to the greatest number of available
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positive options in life', was such that the refusal to employ Ms Chambers
was justifiable.
A very similar issue arose in the UK in Berris ford v Woodard Schools
(Midland Division) Ltd". Ms Berrisford was employed as a matron at a
Church of England girls' boarding school. She was dismissed when she
became pregnant, because she did not intend to marry the father of the
child. The 'manifestation of extra-marital sex' (that is, the pregnancy)
was considered an inappropriate model for the girls in the school. The
majority of the EAT held that there was no discrimination, as Ms
Berrisford had not been treated more favourably than a man in a similar
situation employed by the school. The male comparator accepted by the
majority was a teacher, who, on taking up employment in the school had
been told to regularise his relationship with the woman with whom he was
living at the time, by marrying her. Therefore, the EAT reasoned, where
evidence of continuing extra-marital activity was present, a man would
also have been dismissed; thus there was no discrimination on grounds
of sex.
The justification for discrimination against a pregnant woman in both
Chambers and Berris ford may not be regarded as functional, in terms of
equal treatment for women and men. The reasoning assumes that a male
comparator would be treated in the same way as the woman concerned was
treated. But pregnancy is a special case; men cannot become pregnant,
therefore the approach to equality which focuses on comparison between
the woman and a 'similarly situated' man is inappropriate in such cases.
As the minority opinion in the Berrisford decision pointed out, the man
regarded as a comparator in this case was not in a similar position to Ms
Berrisford. The man had three options available to him: either to leave
the job, or to marry his partner, or to break up the relationship. A
pregnant woman would not have the third option 51: she would be
required either to leave the job or to marry.
Furthermore, a pregnant woman may not, in fact, have the option of
marrying (after all, it takes two to marry!), because the father of the
child may refuse to do so. The woman is thus denied a job by reason of
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her pregnancy; it should be noted that, in the cases concerned, it was
the pregnancy which was the reason for the dismissal, as 'a manifestation
of extra-marital sex', and not the extra-marital sex itself. It may be
assumed that the employer would not have objected to the extra-marital
sex had it been clandestine, because a clandestine sexual relationship
would not, by definition, provide an 'inappropriate role model' for the
girls with whom the employee came into contact in the course of the job.
As David Pannick notes 52, these cases, where the adverse treatment of
a pregnant woman is for moral reasons relating to her marital status,
could most readily be dealt with if it were made unlawful by legislation
to discriminate on grounds of marital status in all circumstances.
However, it should be possible to utilise the existing provisions on sex
discrimination to recognise that the sort of treatment accorded to Ms
Chambers and Ms Berrisford is direct sex discrimination, because only a
woman could be treated in that way. A justification of that
discrimination, available on grounds of morality of potential employees,
should not be regarded as functional, as it cannot be applied equally to
men who have extra-marital sexual relations. 	 -
2.6.2 Cost to employer
The absence from work of an employee who becomes pregnant (as opposed
to her physical disability to perform the job) inevitably gives rise to
costs for the employer. The employer may therefore seek to justify
discrimination on ground of pregnancy by asserting that the disadvantage
to the employer, such as the costs incurred in finding a replacement for
the pregnant employee while on maternity leave, justifies the
discrimination. Many of the costs (both in economic cost and in
inconvenience) incurred by employers are the result of measures of
positive discrimination, which benefit women employees who become
pregnant. Where, as is, the case for example in the UK, measures of
protective legislation do not apply to all women employees, the employer
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may seek to justify, on grounds of cost, discrimination on grounds of
pregnancy against a woman who is not protected by the legislation.53
The argument that the extra costs faced by employers in providing paid
leave for employees who become pregnant justify discrimination cannot be
regarded as functional in a legal system which seeks to provide equality
of opportunity for women and men in employment. The argument is that
women who require leave for reasons related to pregnancy cost the
employer more in paid leave than comparable men, who only take leave for
sickness. However, a pregnant woman has no real male comparator. To
allow this justification for different treatment for women would perpetuate
divisions between women and men in employment, as only women may
become pregnant. Sex stereotyping would also be reinforced, as
employers would be allowed, for example, to refuse to employ any women,
on the grounds that 'all women want to get pregnant, have children and
leave work', which will cost the enterprise in paid leave.
The aim of equality of opportunity requires, in this case, that employers
bear some burden in the implementation of this important measure of
social policy. However, it should be stressed that it is not suggested
that employers should bear the burden of equalisation of opportunities
unaided. Apart from anything else, it seems likely that if employers were
required to shoulder this burden without assistance, 'covert'.
discrimination, where employers seek to avoid the obligations of anti-
discrimination law, would increase. 54 A system committed to equality of
opportunity would provide that the burden on employers to grant paid
leave to employees who become pregnant and have children is spread
evenly among all employees, employers and the state; this can be done,
for example, by employer insurance schemes, and state support. It could
be added that if such a system were applied uniformly throughout the EC;
a level playing field for employers would result, and no individual
employer would suffer a comparative disadvantage. The burden should
not be borne by women, in lost opportunities of employment. A
justification which allows this cannot be regarded as functional.
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The recent UK case of Webb v EMO Air Cargo55, illustrates an approach
to the justification of cost and inconvenience to the employer which, it
is submitted, is not functional, if the aim of anti-discrimination legislation
is accepted as equality of opportunity. In Webb it was held that, since
a man in a similar situation, for example, who required surgery for a hip
replacement, would have been treated in the same way, the employee
concerned had not been discriminated against.
Ms Webb was employed to provide cover for another employee of EMO, who
was taking maternity leave. During the first few months of her
employment, Ms Webb was to be trained alongside this other employee, so
she could take on her duties when the maternity leave began. It was
expected that Ms Webb would continue in employment with EMO after the
maternity leave of the woman she was replacing was over. Shortly after
beginning her training, Ms Webb discovered that she also was pregnant.
She was dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that, because Ms Webb had
been appointed to provide cover for a particular period of time, and, due
to her pregnancy, would not be able to provide cover for that time, her
dismissal did not breach the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
This case illustrates one of the most significant problems with an
approach based on 'formal equality' 56. The commitment to the
comparative approach, if pregnancy discrimination is to be recognised as
sex discrimination at all, requires assimilation of the condition of a
pregnant woman to that of a man with an illness which will require him
to take leave from employment. If the man is or would have been treated
as unfairly as the pregnant woman has been treated, then there is no
breach of anti-discrimination legislation. To give effect to the aim of the
anti-discrimination legislation, that is to provide real opportunities to
women in the area of employment, one must turn this reasoning on its
head. Was the woman treated unfairly because she is a woman? If she
was dismissed because of pregnancy, a condition which only applies to
women (and which, incidentally, is not - as has been argued above - an
illness), then this is the case. The Webb case can then be seen as one
in which a woman was denied the opportunity of permanent employment,
solely because she could not be present at work for a few months, which
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happened to coincide with the months which the employee providing her
training, who would eventually be a co-worker of Ms Webb's, was also to
be absent. The reason Ms Webb could not be present at work for that
time was pregnancy. If the legislation is to provide for equal
opportunities for women in the labour market, then it must operate to
take into account the biological differences between men and women; that
it is women who give birth to children. Comparison with a man is not
possible; determination of whether a woman has suffered unfair treatment
because of her pregnancy is. 'Positive discrimination', in favour of
women, should be justified in this circumstance.
Reliance on 'formal equality' and the comparative approach led the UK
court to allow justification in a situation where the discrimination should
not have been justified. This model is, therefore, inappropriate for EC
law.
In fact, the European Court has refused to permit, as grounds for
justification of discrimination against a pregnant woman, the fact that the
employer would be required to bear the costs of the maternity leave. In
Dekker, it was held that the refusal to employ a pregnant woman because
of her pregnancy is direct discrimination, in contravention of the Equal
Treatment Directive. The fact that the employer would not receive
reimbursement from the state for the sickness benefits which they would
have to pay Ms Dekker during her maternity leave, and thus would suffer
a financial detriment, was, it was held, insufficient to justify the
discrimination.
In Dekker, the European Court rejected the formal equality approach, in
particular the need for a male comparator. How the employer would have
treated a male employee who would have been absent from work for a
similar time is irrelevant. 51 This approach is apt for the issue of
pregnancy, as no realistic male comparator can be found.
In Hertz, it was reaffirmed by the European Court that discrimination on
ground of pregnancy of an employee constitutes direct discrimination, but
the Court held that the protection from dismissal which this provided for
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women did not extend beyond the period of maternity leave set down in
the law of the Member State concerned. Ms Hertz was not protected, as
her dismissal was the result of her absences from work, after the
statutory period of maternity leave, due to a pregnancy-related illness.
The statutory period of maternity leave (which could be regarded as
direct discrimination against men, who cannot enjoy the benefit) is
justifiable in EC law, as a measure of positive discrimination, under
Article 2 (3) and (4) of the Equal Treatment Directive, which saves
measures concerning the protection of women, as regards pregnancy and
maternity, and measures which promote equality of opportunity.
Michael Rubenstein is of the opinion that the approach of the European
Court, in its judgment in Hertz, is correct, in that, during the period
after the maternity leave has expired, the treatment of the woman should
be compared with the treatment of a male comparator.
'What this decision appears to do, therefore, is establish a
protected period under Community law for pregnant women,
beginning with the inception of their pregnancy and ending with
their resumption of work after statutory maternity leave, during
which dismissal for a reason connected with pregnancy or
confinement is automatically discriminatory. It is only after
statutory maternity leave has expired that a comparison must be
made with how a man would be treated in similar circumstances.
The ECJ's understandable concern was that a woman would have
permanent protection from dismissal because of pregnancy-or
confinement-related illness unless some limit was laid down.'
Measures which operate to the disadvantage of a woman during the
'protected period' are not justified; thereafter, if a man in a similar
situation would be treated in the same way, such measures would be
justified.
However, in contrast to Rubenstein, other commentators 58 have criticised
the decisions of the European Court in these two cases, in particular
Hertz, as revealing a conceptualisation of equality which, in that it
embraces formal equality, but does not recognise the need for special
provisions for women where pregnancy is concerned, is not consonant
with full equality of opportunity for women and men.
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Gillian More welcomes the decision in Dekker, for its 'common sense'
approach:
'The Court clearly considered that the 'similarly situated' approach
proposed by the British was inadequate, but, ... [i]t is doubtful
whether it can be said that the European Court of Justice embraced
the 'disadvantages' approach to gender discrimination, proposed by
MacKinnon: indeed any recognition that women are unfairly
burdened with the social costs of reproduction was sadly lacking
from both the Court's and Advocate-General's analyses. However
the Court's approach was undeniably 'simple' and 'real'. It
dispensed with all need for conceptual acrobatics, and presented a
common-sense judgment: pregnancy was clearly a condition related
to the female gender; and if a woman was treated unfavourably
because of a condition specific to her sex, then this was clearly
discrimination in breach of Community law. Interpreted broadly,
the message from the decision is that the Equal Treatment Directive
is intended p prevent working women being disadvantaged by their
pregnancy.'"
Even so, More concludes that the judgment in Dekker is unsatisfactory
in that it 'lacks any forthright recognition of women's disadvantaged
position in the labour market'60.
More is even less convinced that the decision in Hertz is appropriate: she
argues that the creation by the European Court of a 'protected period'
of maternity leave during which an employee cannot be dismissed for
reasons related to the pregnancy, after which an employee is subject to
the same provisions that would be applied to a man who suffered from an
illness requiring prolonged leave from work, 'leaves "abnormal"
pregnancies, such as Ms Hertz's, without protection'.61
More elaborates;
'The conceptualisation of the protection of pregnant women from
unfair dismissal as being a special privilege, or preferential
treatment, is objectionable. Why should those, who for so long
have been forced to bear the social cost of childbearing be seen to
be receiving a "special deal", rather than just compensation? Were
the issue of pregnancy to be approached in an alternative way,
however, and discrimination law used as a way to remedy the
disadvantages faced by pregnant women in the labour market, then
the question of "special rights", and of the point at which they are
limited, would not arise (meaning therefore tAat "abnormal"
pregnancies could also be guaranteed protection).'"
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Josephine Shaw is also of the opinion that the European Court has not
come as far in reconceptualisation of sex discrimination as it seems at
first glance at the Dekker judgment. In view of the Hertz decision, it is
premature to argue that EC sex discrimination law has reached the
position that focuses on women's disadvantages in the labour market.63
'The insistence on the part of the Court of Justice on drawing a
line between dismissal in the course of maternity or pregnancy
leave for reasons related to pregnancy, such as sickness, and
dismissal after the expiry of that leave, may introduce a pragmatic,
policy-oriented "remoteness" element into the doctrinal scheme of
discrimination, but it lacks logical consistency. Allowing employers
to dismiss women who are absent from illness caused by pregnancy
or birth once that illness can be deemed indistinguishable from
other forms of illness also suffered by men, may be inevitable
where otherwise employers will suffer financial disadvantage, but
does not hide the fact that women in thosn circumstances are still
being dismissed because they are women.'"
The US Supreme Court rejected all defences to Title VII claims based on
costs to the employer in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power v Manhart65. In the context of a employer's pensions policy which
discriminated between women and men by requiring higher payments from
women, the Supreme Court opined,
'In essence, the [employer] is arguing that the prima fade showing
of discrimination based on evidence of different contributions for
the respective sexes is rebutted by its demonstration that there is
a like difference in the cost of providing benefits for the
respective classes. That argument might prevail if Title VII
contained a cost-justification defense ... But neither Congref ts nor
the courts have recognised such a defense under Title VII.'"
The judgment is general in application; it may therefore reasonably be
assumed that it applies to discrimination on the grounds of the cost of
pregnancy.
If the European Court is to develop a functional model for justification
for discrimination against women on grounds of the extra cost burden
imposed on the employer, then this model must take into account the
fundamental difference between women and men in this context. Men do
not become pregnant, and do not suffer from the application of
stereotyped assumptions that they will become pregnant and leave work,
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thus placing a burden on the employer. The ground of justification at
issue concerns the balancing of the interests of employers against those
of employees, in determining where the cost burden should lie. Women
have had to bear the 'social burden' of childbirth; measures which
alleviate that burden by granting women protection from losing their jobs
or other employment benefits because they are pregnant redress the
balance. It is my position that measures of positive discrimination or
protective legislation are appropriate, in order to effect equality of
opportunity, where pregnancy is concerned, simply because it is only
women who can become pregnant and bear children. The role of
childcarer, on the other hand, can equally well be carried out by men,
therefore sex neutral provisions should apply to measures concerned with
child care responsibilities. 67 In practice, because it is difficult to
identify at what moment in time pregnancy related and child birth
measures end and child care measures begin, it seems appropriate, at
least for the promotion of certainty for employers and employees alike, to
establish a 'protected period' during pregnancy and the period
immediately following the birth of the child, within which positive
discrimination (even if it proved costly) in the woman's favour would be
justified. The cost burden on an employer does not provide lawful
justification in other instances: care should be taken to exclude it in the
case of pregnancy. The equalisation of opportunities for women and men
in employment is a measure of social policy, effected for sound reasons,
therefore the community as a whole, rather than the individual employees
concerned alone, should be required to bear the cost burden. State
intervention could secure a system which would ensure that costs
inherent in providing equal opportunities for women employees who
become pregnant are evenly spread.
2.6.3 Protection of employee or foetus
Different treatment of women employees who are pregnant, or who may
become pregnant, may be justifiable if the job is such that the working
environment presents a hazard to pregnant woman or to the foetus.
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In the UK and Germany, special legislative measures, designed to protect
pregnant women, remain in force, in spite of general legislative measures
designed to counter all sex discrimination in employment. For example,
in the UK, section 51 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 provides that a
defence to a claim of sex discrimination is available where the employer
is complying with an existing legislative provision. The Health and Safety
legislation in the UK imposes a duty on employers to safeguard their
employees' health and safety. The employer relied successfully on this
measure to justify discriminatory treatment of a woman employee in Page
v Freight Hire (Tank Haulage) Ltd 8. The plaintiff was employed as a
heavy goods driver, a job which from time to time involved carrying
chemicals. The employers, having been notified by the manufacturers of
a particular chemical that the chemical was dangerous to women of child-
bearing age, refused to let Ms Page drive vehicles containing that
chemical. It was held that in examination of the justification of the
employer's treatment of Ms Page, the matters which were to be considered
included the seriousness of the risk being guarded against, the steps
reasonably necessary to eliminate it, and, in suitable cases, the wishes of
the employees affected. The employer was successful.
Although it is agreed that the EAT's assessment -of the relevant factors
in assessing a purported justification of this nature is broadly correct,
the judgment reveals that the tribunal in fact did not pay sufficient
attention to the third factor, that is, the wishes of the individual
concerned. It is only if there is no doubt as to the risk, and no other
way of protecting the employee available that the wishes of the employee
should be ignored. Otherwise a commitment to equality of opportunity
requires that a woman be allowed, as Ms Page attempted, to express a
willingness to take on the risk and enjoy the benefits of employment. It
should not be assumed that all women of a particular age wish to have
children. The special protection of women, and not of men, may
perpetuate sex stereotyping of women as weak and in need of protection.
The justification may not be regarded as functional if it is drawn too
broadly.
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In contrast to the position in the UK and Germany, in the US, after
judicial development of principles not unlike those in the UK at
present69, the legislature passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978,
to the effect that pregnancy discrimination was to be cognisable as direct
discrimination on the ground of sex. While a legislative statement to the
effect that discrimination on the ground of pregnancy is prima fade
unlawful is to be regarded as functional as it promotes equality of
opportunity, there remain a number of problems with the US legislation.
One of the principal problems with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is
that it is not made clear in the legislation whether certain measures of
positive discrimination are permissible under it. Justification for positive
discrimination on the grounds of protection of pregnant women, and their
foetuses is, therefore, difficult to establish.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978 adds to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act the following section 701(k):
'The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include ...
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or other
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ...'
Linda Howard70 and Hannah Furnishn argue that the provisions of Title
VII, including the amendment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, are
inappropriate to deal with the issue of protection of the foetus from
hazardous toxic substances in the workplace. The potential harm to a
pregnant employee, a foetus, or even an employee who is fertile, is a
possible justification for policies or decisions of employers which
discriminate against women, either by treating such women differently or
by adverse impact. The potential for actions in tort by employees or
children of employees for foetal damage caused by the environment of the
workplace may also be regarded as a possible ground for justification.
However, the wording of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978, on its
face, does not permit the employer to establish justification on these
grounds.
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The employer could attempt to establish a BFOQ defence for the exclusion
of women from activities, or from contact with materials in the course of
her employment, which might damage an existing or future foetus.
However, the BFOQ defence does not seem appropriate here, as it only
applies where 'all or substantially all' women are physically unable to
perform the job. The woman might be able to perform the job, but might
risk her own health, or the health and development of the foetus, in so
doing.
Alternatively, under adverse impact analysis, the employer could have
recourse to the business necessity defence, either by referring to the
necessity to protect the safety of the foetus as a third party, as in the
flight attendant cases72, or by referring to the economic liability in tort
which would arise should the foetus suffer harm 73. It seems that the
first of these purported business necessities cannot succeed as the state
of health of the foetus of the employee does not have the requisite nexus
with the employer's business 74. This was established in Burwell v
Eastern Airlines Ind 5 in which the court stated that the employer,
'cannot rest its ... defence on its concern for the health and
welfare of flight attendants and their unborn children. Such
concerns are laudatory, but do not touch upon the essence of [the
employer's] business'".
However, it should be noted that the employer in Burwell had not, in fact,
shown that any harm to the foetus would occur as a result of the
woman's employment as a flight attendant. It has been suggested that in
a case where the harm to the foetus is clearly shown, a court might be
willing to extend the business necessity test to justify special treatment
of a pregnant employee.77
As for the justification based on costs to the employer, this must be
approached with the caveat that the US courts have been unreceptive to
cost-based justifications in other contexts.78
The European Court has not yet dealt with grounds for justification for
discrimination against pregnant women which rely on risks to the foetus
if employment is continued. The Equal Treatment Directive, Article 2 (2),
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could be extended to cover jobs in which exposure to toxic materials or
other hazards (the 'context' in which the work is carried out) threatens
the health of the foetus. This would involve a reconstruction of the
contexts in which the 'sex of the worker is a determining factor'.
A more appropriate approach for EC law would be to utilise Article 2 (3),
of the Equal Treatment Directive, which provides that the Directive 'shall
be without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women,
particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity'. The subsection
recognises that measures providing special protection for women may be
justifiable. The case law of the European Court suggests that the
provision is to be interpreted narrowly, only allowing justification for
measures which are specific to women's biological condition before and
after pregnancy, and which are proportionate to their aims. 79 It is also
recognised that the justification based on protection of women should not
be used to discriminate against women, but may be applied in cases where
positive discrimination is appropriate.
The exemption provision in Article 2 (3) of the Equal Treatment Directive
is couched in terms of 'protection of women', not protection of the foetus.
This may not, however, pose a problem, as the two issues are closely
interrelated. It remains to be seen how the competing claims in this issue
will be resolved in the EC, given the approach of the European Court to
interpretation of issues concerned with the balancing of competing claims,
it seems likely that a functional result would be more or less guaranteed
by application of the proportionality test, whereby only a genuine need
to discriminate would be justifiable, and only if the measure was no more
discriminatory than necessary. Measures justified by the need to grant
special protection to women should only be allowed where absolutely
necessary, because they constitute direct negative discrimination against
men, and also because they may actually be disadvantageous to women
also. The EC could learn some valuable (negative) lessons from the US
experience, where development of the law has been haphazard. In
particular, reliance, in order to protect a woman or foetus, on defences
(BFOQ and business necessity defence), developed in other contexts, has
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resulted in insufficient considerations of the claims and principles
involved.
It is therefore submitted that the EC already has the means to and should
develop more functional rules than those developed in the other legal
systems examined, rules which balance the commitment to equality of
opportunity with the need to provide adequate protection for pregnant
women from working environments hostile to the healthy development of
the foetus. The proposed Directive on Pregnancy and Maternity', if it
receives assent of the Member States, will go some way to addressing the
particular problems of protection of pregnant women in the workplace.
The Directive proposes measures requiring Member States to ensure that
pregnant workers are protected from hazardous substances in the
workplace, measures allowing employers to reallocate duties of pregnant
employees and to provide an alternative to nightwork for employees who
give birth both before and after the birth, for a specified time. 81 The
Directive makes it clear that women's employment rights are to be
maintained.82 The provision on maternity leave, which requires a
minimum leave for the mother of 14 weeks on full pay is to be welcomed,
as a justifiable measure of special protection for women workers. The
proposed Directive makes it clear that positive measures of protection of
women are justifiable: its approach may be regarded as functional.
2.6.4 Family responsibilities
Differential treatment of women employees may be justified in the case of
special rights given to women in the provision of extended maternity
leave (that is, leave given to mothers beyond a 'protected period' just
after the mother has given birth), and parental care policies in general.
Views as to the correct approach to the need to balance employment'
responsibilities and childcare responsibilities differ. Is the solution to
grant women special rights, in measures of positive discrimination, to
enable them to carry out their responsibilities as mothers, as well as
employees? Or is the solution to enact sex neutral provisions, to allow
mothers and fathers to care for their children without losing employment
opportunities? My position is that measures in the first category are
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appropriate for protection of a women during pregnancy and in the
period immediately following the birth. The different biological
capabilities of women necessitate positive discrimination here. Once the
child has passed a certain age and is no longer closely dependent on the
mother, sex neutral rules would enable fathers to share the parental role.
It should be stressed that effective sharing of the parental role between
women and men can only be achieved by 'levelling up' of benefits, for
example, paid extended parental leave, at present enjoyed by women only.
In the US, provision for different treatment for women employees in
extended maternity leave was not dealt with by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. Maternity and paternity leave, in general, is governed
at a state or local level in the US, which means there is little uniformity
in the provisions. Federal provision, including the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, must of course be complied with. However, judicial
interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has not always
provided an appropriate response to policies of employers on extended
maternity leave and parental care. As Deborah Rhode explains;
'While [the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978] has had enormous
positive influence on maternity policies, it has by no means solved
the problems of reconciling women's family and market roles. In
effect, the statute simply prevents employers from singling out
pregnant workers for special disadvantages. It does not
affirmatively require or encourage provision of disability leaves, job
security, flexible schedules, or child-care arrangements that,yould
enable parents to accommodate work and family obligations."3
In other words, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act only goes as far as to
require that pregnant employees cannot be treated less favourably than
other employees. In order to promote full equality of opportunity,
employees (women and men) who become parents, need more favourable
treatment than employees who are not parents, in some circumstances.
This more favourable treatment is justified by society's commitment to its
children, coupled with a commitment to ensuring that men and women may
enjoy the benefits and burdens of both parenthood and employment
equally.
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Both men and women are responsible for having children, and the law
should contribute to the realisation of equal opportunities in the
restructuring of child-care responsibilities, inter alia by making it
possible for mothers and fathers to enjoy the benefits of employment. If
the law only allows the special provision of parental leave to mothers,
then it participates in reinforcing sex stereotypes in the allocation of
childcare responsibilities. Only women can have children, as biological
fact; both women and men can provide care for their children. Special
provisions relating to childbirth, justifying discrimination in employment
conditions, may be regarded as functionally effective; whereas those which
extend into childcare, without providing for parents in general, rather
than mothers in particular, are to be spurned as reinforcing sex
stereotyping and not promoting full equality of opportunity.
The position of the European Court is no more functional than that of the
US Supreme Court in this issue. The European Court ruled on maternity
leave in Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse84 and EC Commission v France",
applying Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive. The provision
allows Member States to provide for protection for the biological condition
of women during and after pregnancy; and the special relationship
between mother and child during the period immediately following
pregnancy and birth. In its interpretation of Article 2 (3) in Hofmann v
Barmer Ersatzkasse86, the Court emphasised that the special provision for
maternity leave covered by Article 2 (3) was to be interpreted narrowly.
A provision of German law granted six months leave following the birth
of a child to working mothers. A father wished to claim the leave to look
after his child while the mother went back to work. In response to the
father's claim that the German law was discriminatory, contrary to
Directive 76/207, the European Court held,
'In principle, therefore, a measure such as maternity leave granted
to a woman ... falls within the scope of Article 2 (3) of Directive
76/207, inasmuch as it seeks to protect a woman in connection with
the effects of pregnancy and motherhood. That being so, such
leave may legitimately be reserved to the mother to the exclusion
of any other person, in view of the fact that it is only the mother
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who may fine 	 subject to undesirable pressures to return to
work early.' w
This narrow construction of the European Court of Article 2 (3) was
confirmed by the decision in Re Protection of Women: EC Commission v
France88. The case concerned French legislation applying Directive
76/207, which allowed the continuation in collective agreements and
employment contracts of certain privileges for women, including extended
maternity leave, time off for sick children, an extra day holiday per year
per child and allowances for child minders. The Court held,
'With regard to the exception provided for by Article 2 (3), this
covers the situations of pregnancy and maternity. In case 184/83,
Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, the Court held that the protection
of women in connection with pregnancy has the objective of
protecting the special relationship between a woman and her child
over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by
preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple
burdens which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of
employment.
'It is clear from the general wording of the French legislation ...
and from the examples of such particular rights given ... that there
is no justification in Article 2 (3) for the disputed provisions.
Indeed, as some of the examples show, the particular rights which
are kept in force sometimes aim to protect women in their capacity
as aged workers or as parents, although male workers can be in
these positions as well as female workers.
'Therefore the French government has not succeeded in
demonstrating that the unequal treatment which is the subject of
this action, arul which it admits, is within the limits laid down by
the directive.'"
The approach of the European Court in Hofmann does not distinguish
between provisions protecting women in childbirth, and the period
immediately following the birth, and provisions relating to responsibilities
of childcare. Justification for special treatment for women only by
provisions relating to childbirth is functional, given the aim of the
legislation in providing equal opportunity for women and men in
employment, as women alone bear the burden of giving birth. The special
protection should for practical purposes extend for a certain period after
the birth, while the child is still very small, and reliant on the mother.
But provisions relating to childcare, the responsibility for which both
women and men can share, should not fall within this special period.
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After a certain point, maternity rights should give way to equal rights
for both parents. To provide otherwise is to require women and men to
perform the very roles which the anti-discrimination legislation is trying
to break down, in its attempt to provide for equal opportunities for
women and men in employment. If it is only mothers who enjoy special
rights for the care of children, then this makes women employees more
expensive than men, thus further reducing their opportunities.
Furthermore, if the law is displaying a real commitment to equality of
opportunity, there should be a 'levelling up' of special measures for
working mothers, allowing working fathers to take advantage of those
provisions equally. Unfortunately, the effect of the judgment of the
European Court in EC Commission v France is a levelling down of
provisions, and the restriction of the application of Article 2 (3) to
provisions relating to childbirth.
Hofmann and EC Commission v France at the same time both take the
special protection of women too far, and fail to promote formal equality
between women and men in provisions on leave for the purposes of
childcare, thereby reinforcing sex stereotyping and making women
employees more expensive; a position which does not promote equality of
opportunity.	 -
Unfortunately it cannot be said that the proposed Directive on Pregnancy
Cand Maternity" will provide a more functional approach. Under the
provisions of the Directive, Member States will be allowed to provide a
period of leave for employees who become pregnant and give birth and
to extend this period of protected leave for mothers, but not for fathers.
To this extent, the Directive reveals a commitment to the 'special
protection model' for discrimination relating to maternity leave, rather
than a commitment to the model of full equality of opportunity.
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3 Conclusion
As a broad generalisation, justification for direct discrimination should
only be available on the narrowest of grounds, where it is unavoidable
that women are treated differently from men in the employment sphere.
The legal systems examined reveal broad consensus on a number of
substantive grounds on which discrimination on grounds of sex is
justified. As the discussion above reveals, different grounds for
justification of direct discrimination involve very different considerations,
in the assessment of whether a ground for justification is applied in a
functional manner.
Where the ground for justification is related to the performance of the
duties of the job, for example the ground of artistic authenticity, or
physical ability to perform, there can be little difficulty with a
recognition that such a justification is functional, and necessary, if the
promotion of equality of opportunity is not to be stretched to absurdity.
Other grounds of justification relate to the interests of individuals
concerned, for example the ground of privacy of other employees, patients
or clients with whom an employee comes into contact. It is accepted that
there exist interests which, in certain circumstances, may be regarded as
more important than the principle of equality of opportunity for women
and men in employment, and that therefore such grounds of justification
may be accepted as functional. The interests of the employer may also
be considered grounds for justification, in a few narrow circumstances.
However, it should be stressed that functional justification must be based
on a genuine ground and subject to a rigorous application of the
proportionality principle.
Measures of 'positive discrimination', which are designed to redress a
situation in which women have historically been required to bear the
burden of discrimination, for example in the provision of protected
maternity leave, are justifiable. The extra cost and inconvenience to the
employer of these measures cannot provide a ground for justification of
discrimination, where it is recognised that positive discrimination is
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necessary to promote full equality of opportunity. However, employers
should not be expected to bear the cost without assistance - the state,
in effecting a measure of social policy, clearly is required to play a role
in the equalisation of cost burdens.
Women's safety or the protection of women must be considered closely in
an assessment of its functionality as a justification for discrimination.
While it is recognised that, in the case of pregnancy, where risks in the
working environment to a woman (and to the foetus) are fundamentally
different from risks to men, different treatment of women is justifiable,
this is, it is submitted, the extent to which the special protection of
women should be regarded as justifiable. Arguments to the effect that
women are more vulnerable than men, and should be protected from
general hazards and risks in employment in a different way from that in
which all employees are protected, should be exposed for what they are -
unnecessary and invidious sex stereotyping. Such an approach cannot
be regarded as functional, given the general aim of sex discrimination law,
which is to promote equality of opportunity.
Furthermore, measures of legislation which grant special rights to women
who are mothers should not be extended further than is necessitated by
the biological fact that it is women who bear children. Measures granting
special rights to working mothers are unjustifiable discrimination against
the men who are fathers. Equality of opportunity requires that women
and men share the burden (and benefit) of childcare.
The law of the EC has only just begun to address many of these issues.
The recent judgments of the European Court in Dekker and Hertz, and
also the approach of the Proposed Directive on Pregnancy and Maternity,
are not welcomed without reservation. The reasoning behind these
measures does not demonstrate clear commitment to equality of
opportunity, as opposed to other conceptions of equality. Some
reconsideration of the aims of EC legislation concerned with equal
treatment for women and men in employment is required.
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Unfortunately, it seems that, as regards positive discrimination, the other
three legal systems examined provide no approaches more functional than
that of EC law, to justification for direct sex discrimination. Comparison
of the different legal systems may be regarded as fruitful however, to the
extent that the other systems provide some examples of how EC law
should not develop, given a commitment to equality of opportunity.
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Chapter 9
Indirect Discrimination
1 Introduction
All four legal systems examined recognise that it is not only direct
discrimination, on the ground of sex, which must be countered by
legislation which has the aim of removing sex discrimination in the
employment sphere, but that it must also be possible to counter 'indirect
discrimination' (terminology of EC, UK and Germany), or discrimination by
'adverse impact' (US terminology). Indirect sex discrimination arises
where the effect of an employment practice or policy is to discriminate
against women (or against men). The employer applies a 'requirement or
condition' upon which receipt of an employment benefit (hiring for a job,
promotion, pay increments or bonuses) or detriment (dismissal,
redundancy) rests. The requirement or condition is one with which the
proportion of persons of one sex who comply is significantly smaller (or
In the case of the application of a detriment, greater) than the proportion
of persons of the other sex who comply. Statistical demonstration of this
point gives rise to a prima facie assumption of Indirect discrimination.
The employer may rebut the presumption by showing that the requirement
or condition is justified. It is evident that the issue of justification is
central to the concept of indirect discrimination.
The task of the employer (that is, the successful defence of the
discriminatory policy) may be made easier or more difficult, depending on
the judicial interpretation of the nature of the test for justification, or
the standard by which justification for an employment practice with
discriminatory effect is assessed. The ease with which employers may'
establish justification also depends on where the burden of proof lies in
an indirect discrimination claim. The level of difficulty employers
experience in justifying practices that appear fair in form, but are
discriminatory in effect, may be regarded as an indicator of the extent
to which the legislation is being interpreted in line with a commitment to
equality of opportunity. For example, if employers can lawfully justify
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discriminatory practices by reference simply to their convenience, then
the legal rule, or judicial interpretation of legislation, permitting
justification cannot be regarded as being aimed at promotion of equality
of opportunity, as the mere convenience of an employer should never
outweigh the equal treatment principle. On the other hand, if purported
justifications are subjected to rigorous analysis by the courts in
assessing the applicability and legality of the justifications, in terms of
the necessity and proportionality of the requirement or condition, and
with a view to the eradication of unnecessary sex stereotyping, then the
rules allowing justification may be described as functional. It is
recognised that commitment to equality of opportunity for women and men
may require employers to bear an extra burden, even if only the burden
of the rearrangement of existing employment practices which are
indirectly discriminatory.
The following sections will consider aspects of the 'legal test' for
justification of indirect discrimination, by means of comparison of the
approaches of the four legal systems examined in the study. Three
aspects of the 'legal test' for justification are compared and evaluated:
the standard by which justification is tested, the 'objectivity' of
purported justifications and the rules regarding . burden of proof. This
is followed by a detailed examination of some substantive grounds for
Justification of indirect discrimination.
1.1 The standard of justification
The standard or 'legal test' by which justifications for indirect
discrimination are assessed varies between the four different legal
systems examined in this study. In the UK, the legal standard for
Justification is that of 'reasonableness'. In the US, the standard required
for justification is ultimately referrable to the concept of 'pretext'. In
the case law of the European Court and in Germany (where it is a
principle of constitutional law), the concept of proportionality informs
evaluation of justification for indirect discrimination.
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The least functional standard, out of the three approaches considered in
this study, for justification of indirect discrimination, is that applied by
the UK courts; that is, the standard of 'reasonableness'. In Ojutiku it
was held that 'if a person produces reasons for doing something which
would be acceptable to right-thinking people as sound and tolerable
reasons for so doing, then he has justified his conduct'. This standard
has been followed in subsequent case law.1
The reasonableness test tends to be applied loosely by UK courts in
assessing justification for indirect discrimination, without adequate
scrutiny as to whether the requirement or condition applied by the
employer is appropriate or necessary. For example, gains in efficiency
in the operation of the enterprise, which the employer admitted were only
minor gains, were held reasonable justification for the detrimental
treatment of part time workers, in the case of Kidd v DRG2.
The standard of reasonableness is not functional, as it permits employers
unnecessary and inappropriate leeway in establishing justification. It can
easily be considered 'reasonable' for an employer to act without showing
due concern for and consideration of the principle of equality of
opportunity. The 'reasonableness' standard can have the effect of the
perpetuation of sex discrimination, as 'reasonable' behaviour (in the sense
of common practice) may often be based on sex stereotyping. The law is
unable to operate to promote equality of opportunity as long as the
perpetuation of historical discrimination may not be challenged, on the
grounds that it is reasonable. For example, in R v Secretary of State, ex
parte Eoq the UK Court of Appeal accepted that the discriminatory effect
of legislation which debarred part-time employees from various benefits
was justified. The legislation was considered 'reasonable', as to hold
otherwise would be detrimental to part-time employees, or those seeking
part-time work, especially women, as it would make part-time employees
more expensive, and would therefore reduce employment opportunities.
It is remarkable that the Court accepted this reasoning without any
specific evidence. The ruling is based on a particular stereotyped view
of part-time work, especially of women who undertake part-time work,
that part-time employees are less valuable to an employer, and less
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committed to the job, or the enterprise, than full-time employees, and
therefore to make part-time employment attractive to employers, it must
be permissible to treat part-time workers worse than full-time employees.
Considerations to the contrary, that employers may derive benefit from
part-time employees which at least offsets the perceived drawbacks, were
not given due weight in the assessment of 'reasonableness'.
It has been demonstrated3
 that the standard of reasonableness applied
in this way is not as rigorous as the standard of proportionality. This
aspect of the scheme of UK law in assessing justification is less functional
than the equivalent provisions in the law of the EC.
In the law of the US, the standard for justification of adverse impact
established in Griggs4, that of a 'manifest relationship to the employment
in question', has, it seems, been superseded by the more recent case law
of the Supreme Court. Watson5 and Wards Cove6 suggest that the
employer need only meet the standard of showing 'legitimate business
reasons'7
 for the practice with adverse impact and that 'there is no
requirement that the challenged practice be "essential" or
"indispensable" 8. Once the employer has shown a legitimate business
reason, the employee may rebut this justification by establishing 'pretext'.
One way in which pretext may be shown is by proof that a less-
discriminatory requirement or condition was available to the employer.
The concept of pretext, therefore, seems similar to that of proportionality.
However, because the burden remains with the employee% the US
standard for justification of indirect discrimination is not the equivalent
of an application of the principle of proportionality as developed in EC
law.
In German law, the principle of proportionality is part of the general
principles of law, and applies also to justification by employers for
indirect discrimination. 10
 Although the principle is applicable, it seems
that there is some way to go before its potential in situations of sex
discrimination in the employment context is fully recognised by the courts
and, more significantly, by employers. The principle of proportionality
has not (yet) featured prominently in German discrimination lawn,
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therefore the approach of German law cannot be regarded as the most
functional approach of the four legal systems examined.
The European Court, in contrast to the German courts, has placed great
emphasis on the principle of proportionality in the assessment of
justifications for indirect sex discrimination. Proportionality is an
essential part of the Bilks test, which constitutes the 'legal test' in EC
law for justification of indirect discrimination. According to Bilks, the
requirement or condition, which indirectly discriminates against persons
of one sex, must be 'suitable for attaining the objective and necessary for
that purpose'. This part of the Bilks test is an expression of the
principle of proportionality, a general principle of EC law which requires
that the means used to achieve a given purpose must be no more than
necessary to achieve that purpose12 . Strictly speaking, the principle
puts the burden on the party seeking to justify the means, in this case,
the employer. 13 Possible alternative, less discriminatory means must be
considered.
The requirement of proportionality in the justification of policies of
employers with discriminatory impact on women is an effective tool in
assessing justification. It forces the party applying the indirectly
discriminatory requirement or condition (the employer) to show that it is
necessary for a genuine purpose, and that it does not exceed the minimum
discriminatory effect inherent in achieving this purpose. Application of
the proportionality principle will operate to open up jobs (and benefits
attendant upon jobs) to more women, as it will exclude those
discriminatory practices which are not absolutely necessary for the job
and will also require scrutiny of practices said to be justified by some
other reason (enterprise or public interest related 14 ) in terms of the
relationship between that reason and the discrimination. Such a
transparent examination of indirectly discriminatory policies will expose
practices antithetical to the aim of equality of opportunity. It can
therefore be asserted that the function of proportionality as a principle
in assessing justifications contributes to the aim of anti-discrimination law
as a whole, in its commitment to equality of opportunity.
Indirect Discrimination	 285
A 'legal test' for justification of indirect discrimination which requires the
application of the principle of proportionality in the assessment of a
justification advanced by an employer, is more functional than other 'legal
tests'. The requirement that the justification meet the standard imposed
by the proportionality principle should operate to screen out purported
justifications which are inappropriate given a commitment to equality of
opportunity.
In the EC, the effectiveness of the principle of proportionality in
assessing claims of justification of indirectly discriminatory practices by
employers has been demonstrated in those decisions, (B11ka15, Rinner-
laihn16, Danfoss17) in which the European Court has been called on to
rule on the issue. The European Court should, it is submitted, continue
to apply the principle, as an essential factor in the 'legal test' or
standard for justification.
1.2 'Objective justification'
An issue related to the standard of justification, which has arisen in the
four legal systems examined, in establishing a 'legal test' for justification,
is the concept of 'objective justification'. - In consideration of
justifications advanced for indirectly discriminatory requirements or
conditions, the question of whether lawful justifications must be
'objective', as opposed to 'subjective', arises.
In the US, the debate concerning the question of whether adverse impact
analysis could apply to 'subjective' selection criteria, or only to
'objective' tests, such as intelligence tests, for prospective employees18,
was resolved in Watson v Fort Worth BanIc19. Whether the practice with
adverse impact was 'objective' or 'subjective' was held to be irrelevant;
adverse impact reasoning could apply to any requirement or condition
with which a much smaller number of those in a protected group, as
compared to those not protected, could comply. By extension, just as
objective practices could be justified, subjective practices could also be
lawful in spite of their adverse impact.
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In the UK, little reference to the concept of objectivity has been made by
the courts and industrial tribunals when discussing justification for
indirect discrimination. Ellis is critical of the Court of Appeal in
Ojutiku20 in holding that the 'need' of the employer for the
discriminatory requirement or condition is 'what is reasonably needed by
the party who applies the condition'. She points out that this leaves
unclear the question as to whether justification is to be subjective or
objective:
'was it sufficient to show merely that the employer considered the
requirement justifiable, or would it be necegsary to prove that it
did actually achieve some legitimate object?'"
Subsequent case law, especially that applying the ruling of the European
Court in Bilks, demonstrates that it is insufficient that the employer
believes that the requirement is justifiable, but that the requirement is
necessary to meet some need of the employer. 22 Ellis argues that,
'... for safety's sake, and from the point of view of the clarity of
the law, it would still be advisable for ... the legislation to make it
clear that the test is an objective one, not satisfied mgrely by
evidence as to the subjective intentions of the employer.'"
As for the law of the EC, in the Bilka case, the European Court
envisaged, for justification of indirect discrimination, an 'objective
criterion' advanced by the employer. It was demonstrated24 that thern
ruling that the criterion be 'objective' does not actually add anything to
the rest of the general rule on justification established in Bilka. As
Prechal and Burrows point out,
'... there can be no clear definition of what may constitute an
objective justification in legal terms since the decision as to
objectivity is in itself left to the discretion of a higher authority
than the person making the initial decision, ar4R1, as such, it may
change in the light of different circumstances.'" 	 .
Similarly in German law, on Pfarr's analysis, where the requirement or
condition is either required for job performance, or pursues an
'objectively justified goal', 'objectively justified' here means justified with
reference to its aim and with due consideration to the principle of
proportionality. 26 It could be therefore be concluded that the inclusion
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of a reference to 'objectivity' in the requirements for a legal justification
for indirect sex discrimination is unnecessary.
On the other hand, it might be regarded as functional to require, as part
of the 'legal test' for justification, that a purported justification may not
be 'subjective', in the sense of based on personal preference, rather than
on genuine need. An employer could not, then, successfully justify a
recruitment policy which excluded persons under a certain height, on the
grounds that the employer preferred tall employees. In itself, however,
such a requirement would not constitute an adequate standard for
scrutiny of purported justifications, as some grounds of justification
might not be 'subjective', in the sense used above, but might be
unnecessary or disproportionate.
Therefore, it seems that, rather than to inquire into whether a
justification is 'objective', a more functional approach would be to
concentrate on the particular substantive grounds available for
justification" and on the appropriate 'standard' (or legal test) of
justification, in particular in the application of a standard, such as
proportionality, which requires strict scrutiny of discriminatory measures,
disallowing unnecessary discrimination or sex stereotyping in requirements
or conditions applied to women employees which are purportedly justified.
Such a standard will promote equality of opportunity for women and men
in employment.
L3 The burden of proof
The third issue relevant in assessment of the functionality of a 'legal
test' relating to the justification of indirect sex discrimination in
employment is that of the burden of proof. In most legal systems, the
legal rule (actori incumbit probatio) is that, in civil cases, it is for the
person bringing the claim to prove the case on balance of probabilities.
The burden of proof remains with the complainant throughout: if the
defendant can show sufficient doubt on the complaint, then the claim will
fail, because the burden of persuasion is on the complainant. 28 However,
in cases concerned with discrimination in employment, the complainant will
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often have insufficient access to the information required to show the
discrimination (information which the defendant (the employer) will almost
certainly control). Moreover, whilst it may be relatively easy for an
employee to establish the requisite statistical disparity to show a prima
fade case of indirect discrimination, it may be more difficult for an
employee to show that the condition or requirement with adverse impact
is unjustifiable. For these reasons, and because of the 'unvoiced and
often unconscious prejudice which distorts acts or decisions affecting
women and persons with family responsibilities' 29, it is argued that the
general rule should be modified or reversed in discrimination cases.
There are three stages in an indirect discrimination claim; put simply, at
each stage the burden rests either on the employer or the employee. In
all four legal systems examined in this study, the initial burden, that of
establishing a prima fade case, rests on the complainant employee. At the
second stage, the employer is required to show that the policy with
adverse impact is justifiable, by whatever standard applies in the legal
system concerned. The third stage relates to the proportionality of the
requirement. In German law, establishment of a successful justification
may only be effected if the employer shows that the requirement meets
the proportionality test, as the full burden of proof of justifiability
transfers to the employer. The shift of burden of proof is required by
the equality legislation in German law. In US law, the employer bears
only the burden of showing some legitimate justification; the employee
must then establish pretext. The application of the doctrine of pretext
has the effect of transferring the burden back to the employee. The
precise location and nature of the burden of proof at each stage of an
indirect discrimination claim in the UK is less clear, but it seems it
remains ultimately with the complainant. The law developed by the
European Court has left detailed consideration of burden of proof to the
national authorities. Although the jurisprudence of the Court stresses
that it is for the employer to prove justification, the division between the
second and third stage of an indirect discrimination claim is unclear in
EC law.
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A functional approach to the burden of proof in indirect discrimination
cases is provided by German law. Section 611a of the BGB provides that,
'If, in the event of a dispute, the employee produces evidence
suggestive of discrimination on the grounds of sex, the onus is on
the employer to prove that differential treatment is justified by
practical grounds unrelated to sex, or that se N is an indisputable
requirement for the activity to be performed.'"
The German legal system is the only one of the four examined in the
present study in which it is provided by legislation that the burden of
proof is different in sex discrimination cases from other civil cases.
Section 611a provides for a two stage procedure, in which the employee
must first establish facts which suggest discrimination, a lower burden
than in most civil cases. The onus then transfers to the employer, to
justify the discrimination. The burden of proof is not reversed
completely, but the position of the complainant is made easier.31
Examination of the case law of the US Supreme Court reveals a less
functional approach to the burden of proof in adverse impact cases. The
issue of burden of proof in adverse impact cases was addressed in detail
in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Watson and Wards Cove. The
Court held that the ultimate burden of showing discrimination against a
group protected by the Civil Rights Act 1964 remains with the plaintiff
at all times32. While it is true that the 'evidentiary burden' of showing
'legitimate business reasons' or other justifications for the policy with
adverse impact is on the employer, this is not a reversal of the burden
of proof. The employer need not establish that the challenged practice
is 'essential' or 'indispensable' 33. Proof that the purported justification
is inadequate is the responsibility of the complainant, who is required to
establish that the justification is 'pretext' for a discriminatory motive.
This approach was criticised in the dissenting judgments. In Watson,
Justice Blackmun, (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) did not agree
on the points concerning burden of proof (although he concurred in the
judgement). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun is critical of the
majority for their inappropriate application of the theory of disparate
treatment in adverse impact cases.
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'Nothing in our cases supports the plurality's declaration that, in
the context of a disparate-impact challenge, "the ultimate burden
of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been
caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff
at all times." What is most striking about this statement is that it
is a near perfect echo of this Court's declaration in Burdine that,
in the context of an individual disparate-treatment claim, "the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discringnated against the plaintiff remains at all times
with the plaintiff."'
'The prima fade case of disparate impact established by a showing
of a significant statistical disparity is notably different [from a
case of disparate treatment]. Unlike a claim of intentional
discrimination, which the McDonnell factors establish only by
inference, the disparate impact caused by an employment practice
is directly established by the numerical disparity. Once an
employment practice is shown to have discriminatory consequences,
an employer can escape liability only if it persuades the court that
the selection process producing the disparity has "a manifest
relationship to the employment in question" Connecticut v Teal, 457
U.S. 440,446 (1982), quoting Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 U.S., at
432. The plaintiff in such a case already has proved that the
employment practice has an improper effect; it is up to the
employer to prove that the discriminatory effect is justified.
'Intertwined with the plurality's suggestion that the defendant's
burden of establishing business necessity is merely one of
production is the implication that the defendant may satisfy this
burden simply by "producing evidence that its employment
practices are based on legitimate business reasons." Again the
echo from the disparate treatment cases is unmistakable. In that
context, it is enough for an employer "to articulate some legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason" for the allegedly discriminatory act in
order to rebut the presumption of intentional discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S., at 802. But again the plurality misses
a key distinction: An employer accused of discriminating
intentionally need only dispute that it had any such intent - which
it can do by offering any legitimate, non-discriminatory
justification. Such a justification is simply not enough to legitimize
a practice that has the effect of excluding a protected class from
job opportunities at a significantly disproportionate rate. Our
cases since Griggs make clear that this effect itself runs afoul of
Title VII unlgss it is "necessary to safe and efficient job
performance".')
The ruling concerning the burden of proof in adverse impact cases was
also criticised in the dissenting judgement of Wards Coy?.
The disagreement between the majority and dissenting judgements in
these two decisions of the Supreme Court at face value focuses narrowly
on the proper evidentiary standards to be applied in adverse impact
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challenges to subjective employment practices. However, the uneasiness
of the majority over the emotive issue of quotas and preferential
treatment suggests that Watson and Wards Cove represent a reworking of
the Griggs doctrine of adverse impact. The discussions per Justice
O'Connor and Justice White of the proper meaning and import to be
attached to Griggs differ fundamentally from those in the dissenting
judgements. The use of disparate treatment theory permeates the
analysis of the majority judgements 'in a way that calls into question the
ability of disparate impact doctrine to remain dissociated from all notions
of discriminatory intent'37.
'Such a retreat from distinguishing the two approaches [disparate
treatment and disparate impact] could severely curtail the reach of
disparate impact. Disparate impact overcame disparate treatment's
more limited ability to transform th,g work-place by not requiring
a showing of discriminatory intent.'"
The effect of the rules concerning burden of proof in indirect
discrimination cases in the law of the US is that a justification advanced
by an employer need receive little scrutiny as to its suitability or
proportionality. Such scrutiny may only take place in the context of an
employee's showing of 'pretext'. As this involves the proof, at least by
inference, of discriminatory intent, and as a showing of discriminatory
intent may be rebutted by any legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the
US position on burden of proof may be regarded as one which operates
to favour the employer. This approach may not be regarded as
functional, given the points above concerning the difficulties for
employees in obtaining evidence, and a commitment to equality of
opportunity.
The rules concerning burden of proof in indirect discrimination cases in
the UK also reveal, on close examination, an approach which may not be
regarded as functional. In the UK, the employee has the burden of proof
in establishing facts which amount to indirect discrimination. The
employer is then required to show that the requirement or condition of
which the employee complains is justifiable. 39 Similarly, the burden of
proof rests on an employer seeking to establish a genuine material factor
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defence under the Equal Pay Act, section 1 (3). In Clymo v Wandsworth,
the EAT explained the position as follows,
'Two general points must be remembered, the first is that the onus
is upon the respondent, and secondly it is the civil burden of
proof - more likely than not. The tribunal should look at the
condition or requirement and see what it is which the respondent
seeks to achieve. That object must be more than a matter of
convenience. It is the subject of a managerial decision. It must
have a proper purpose when viewed within the whole of the
business or organisation for which the respondent is responsible
and wherein he or it may have duties or obligations. "Good and
adequate reasons" per Stephenson L.J. at p 674 [Ojutiku v
Manpower Services Commissionqu]
'If the tribunal is satisfied up to this stage, then it must carry out
a broad and objective balancing exercise taking into account all the
circumstances of the case and giving due emphasis to the
disadvantage caused by the condition or requirement against the
achievement of the object sought. The tribunal Rust then decide
whether the respondent has proved his defence.''
Thus far, the UK approach seems perfectly functional. If the 'broad and
objective balancing exercise' were applied with due concern for the
principle of equal treatment of women and men, there could be little basis
for criticism of the approach.
However, since an employer is able to establish justification if the policy
is 'reasonable', and need only show that, on balance of probabilities, this
is so, the UK approach may not be regarded as the equivalent of the
shifting of the legal burden of proof. 42 If the employee is to succeed
in UK law, in practice it is incumbent upon the employee to show that the
employer's justification is unreasonable.°
The legislative provision on the burden of proof in cases of unfair
dismissal in the UK provides a contrast to the position in cases of
indirect discrimination. The employee claiming unfair dismissal is first
required to prove that he was dismissed. Thereafter the burden
transfers to the employer to show, first, the reason for the dismissal and,
second, that it constitutes one of the five grounds set out in the statute
on which a dismissal is held to be fair. If the employer fails in either
of these points, the dismissal is automatically unfair." This is a
complete reversal of the burden of proof.
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The case law of the European Court is unclear on the question of the
ultimate burden of proof, that is, on who bears the burden of establishing
proportionality, at the third stage of an indirect discrimination claim. The
Bilka decision makes it clear that the employer is to produce grounds
justifying the indirectly discriminatory policy, and that the national court
is to assess the justification as to whether it meets a genuine need of the
enterprise and, if so, whether it satisfies the principle of proportionality.
It is not clear, however, where the burden of showing that the purported
justification meets the principle of proportionality rests. If the employee
is able to propose alternative, less discriminatory measures which would
also meet the need of the enterprise, then the employee's case is
considerably strengthened, as such evidence is likely to suggest that the
policy challenged is disproportionate. It is questionable, however,
whether the burden in practice of showing disproportionality should rest
thus on the employee. Rather it should be for the employer to
demonstrate the proportionality of the policy concerned.
In the light of the above discussion, it is submitted that the German
approach to the burden of proof, especially in cases of indirect
discrimination, is the most functional approach of the four examined. As
the law stands, it might be open to the European Court to move to an
approach such as that provided by German law, but only if the specific
question of burden of proof were raised before the Court in a reference
under Article 177. A more satisfactory means for the adoption of such an
approach would be by EC legislation. The Commission has proposed a
modification, by Directive, of the burden of proof in all sex discrimination
cases in EC law. The proposed directive on the burden of proof in the
area of equal pay and equal treatment for women and men 45 provides, in
Article 3, that,
'(1) Member States shall ensure that where persons who consider
themselves wronged by failure to apply to them the principle of
equality establish at any stage of the proceedings before a court
or any competent authority, as the case may be, a presumption of
discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there
has been no contravention of the principle of equality. The
complainant shall have any benefit of doubt which remains.'
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'(2) A presumption of discrimination is established where a
complainant shows a fact or series of facts which would, if not
rebutted, amount to direct or indirect discrimination.,
The proposal would have the most far-reaching effects in cases
concerning proof of direct discrimination; however, it could also be of
benefit to complainants in indirect discrimination cases, as any doubt as
to the validity of the purported justification would be to the complainant
employee's benefit.
It seems unlikely, however, that the proposed directive will receive the
necessary assent from the Council of Ministers. It is therefore suggested,
as a practical step towards functional rules concerning justification for
indirect sex discrimination in employment, that the European Court
continue to stress the importance of the requirement that purported
justifications meet the principle of proportionality, and that it is for the
person applying the discriminatory requirement or condition, that is, the
employer, to show that the means are appropriate to the ends, and that
there are no less discriminatory means available.
2 Substantive Grounds of Justification for Indirect Discrimination
Analysis of the case law of the four legal systems examined in this study
reveals three 'types' of substantive grounds for justification of indirect
discrimination: 'job related justification', 'enterprise related justification'
and 'public interest related justification'. While all four legal systems
examined recognise that a plurality of substantive grounds exists, by
which indirect discrimination may be established, none of the systems
reveals any recognition (judicial or legislative) that different
considerations apply to different types of grounds. Nevertheless, it is
submitted that conceptual separation of the different types is essential,
if a functional approach to justification for indirect discrimination is to
be developed. This is . because different considerations apply in the
assessment of different types of justification.
The three types of justification are defined as follows. A job related
ground of justification is one which is necessary for the performance of
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the duties of the job, for example, the requirement that an employee has
undertaken training essential for effective performance of the job, or the
requirement that the employee has sufficient strength or dexterity to
carry out the job. An enterprise related ground of justification is one
which is related to the general effective running of the employer's
enterprise as a whole, for example, the requirement that employees work
full time, as otherwise the business will suffer under the cost burden of
the extra changes of shifts necessitated by part time employees. A public
interest related ground of justification is one which is related to the
broad public or social benefit provided by the discriminatory requirement
or condition, for example, the granting of special social assistance only
to those individuals or groups with the greatest need.
In general, a legal system which made a distinction between justification
for job related reasons, justification for 'enterprise-related' reasons and
justification for 'public interest related' reasons would function more
effectively in providing equality of opportunity for women and men than
one which did not. The reason for this is that different concerns apply,
and should therefore be weighed by courts, for each type of justification.
In the case of a job related justification, analysis should be limited to
whether the indirectly discriminatory requirement is directly necessary
to the specific duties of the particular job." Other purportedly job
related justifications should be rejected as spurious. 'Enterprise related'
justifications involve consideration of different concerns; in particular
they will normally require the balancing of the interests of the employer
and the employee, including the burden of cost incurred by the employer
in removing the discrimination. 'Public interest related' justifications
involve concerns of a different nature again: the factors to be considered
in the assessment of such a justification include the general benefit to
'society as a whole' provided by the indirectly discriminatory legislation.
It should be evident from the above that the authenticity of a job related
need of an employer may be fairly easily assessed; whereas enterprise
related and public interest related needs will require more scrutiny. A
conceptual separation of the different types of need of the enterprise will
assist in the creation of fine-tuned, sharp rules (rather than blunt
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instruments) which function to justify discrimination in a system which
is committed to equality of opportunity. Ultimately the balancing of
enterprise related needs of employers and interests of employees will be
a matter of policy. This is even more so in the case of public interest
related needs, where the indirectly discriminatory measure often aims to
effect a provision of social policy. The justification may therefore only
be assessed in terms of the relative importance of the social policy
concerned, on the one hand, and the goal of equality of opportunity for
women and men, on the other hand.
It should be stressed, however, that in none of the legal systems
examined in the present study has there been consistent judicial
recognition of the difference between 'job related', 'enterprise related'
and 'public interest related' justifications.
The German commentators, Pfarr and Bertelsmann, have proposed an
analysis of German law which suggests that the conceptual separation
suggested in this study would be possible in German law. The analysis
of Pfarr and Bertelsmann is similar to that adopted in this study in its
division between justification when the requirement or condition is
'required for the activity' and justification when the requirement or
condition 'pursues an objectively justified goal'. However, neither other
commentators, nor the German courts have shown clear commitment to this
analysis. The examples cited in other commentaries, interpreting what
constitutes a valid indisputable requirement of the job, justifying indirect
discrimination include job related justifications, such as the ability to lift
and carry heavy goods, and enterprise related justifications, such as
working hours, without conceptual distinction between them.° The
approach of the German legal system, concerning conceptualisation of
different types of justification, cannot be regarded as functional.
The judiciary in the UK uses 'reasonableness' to assess the authenticity
of a purported need of the employer. Job related needs, enterprise
related needs and public interest related needs may all be 'reasonable';
however a more stringent assessment of purported justifications would
separate the three types of justification as different in nature. A job
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related need should only be reasonable if it is actually linked to the
duties of the job. The standard of justification put forward in Ojutiku48,
that 'sound and tolerable reasons' exist for the discriminatory policy
makes no distinction between reasons related to the job and those related
to the enterprise as a whole. In Rainey" and Carey513, the
reasonableness standard was applied to an enterprise related justification;
in Clymo51, the same standard was applied to a job related justification,
with no sign that the EAT was of the view that different considerations
might apply in that case. In R v Secretary of State, ex p E0052, the
reasonableness standard was applied to a public interest related
justification. Because there is no conceptual separation between the
different types of justification, the approach of the UK courts and
industrial tribunals, as regards the nature of justification, cannot be
regarded as functional, in terms of equality of opportunity. However, it
should perhaps be noted that the main weakness of the UK position
concerns the standard of justification (reasonableness) applicable in UK
law, rather than its approach to justifications of differing natures.
In the US, in the leading case of Griggs53, the Supreme Court held that
justification of adverse impact was by reference to 'business necessity'
or 'job relatedness'. This was in the context of 'objective selection
criteria', which are similar (although not identical) to job related
_55requirements or conditions. The decisions in Watson54 and Wards Cove-
have the effect of making adverse impact claims more difficult to
establish, in that the employee retains the ultimate burden of proof, and
in effect has to show that the requirement or condition is not based on
a genuine need, but is a 'pretext' for discriminatory intent. In Wards
Cove, it was stressed that there is no requirement in adverse impact
analysis that the condition be 'essential' or 'indispensable'. However, it
Is submitted that while the standard of an 'essential' or 'indispensable'
criterion may not be appropriate for enterprise or public interest related
justifications, the standard is appropriate for justifications which purport
to be related to the duties of the job. If the US courts were to divide
conceptually between the two types of justification, then they could apply
the old Griggs test to job related justifications, and a modified version
to enterprise related justifications. However no such conceptual division
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Is evident in the US federal case law; rather the general principles
developed in Griggs, the business necessity defence and the statutory
BEM defence, are used for all purported justifications.
Although the European Court has recognised substantive grounds for
justification of all three types, the law of the EC cannot be regarded as
more functional than that of the other three legal systems examined, as
the European Court has not distinguished between the different types of
justification. The Mika test applies in EC law to all types of justification.
The Court recognised, in D.anfoss$6, that a requirement (upon which pay
increments were granted to employees that employees had undergone
trainin' g specific to the duties of the job was justified. The ELT a test,
aS it presently stands, is also applicable to enterprise related
justifications, as cases where national courts have applied the Bilks
raran'' g, such as for example Rainey57, demonstrate. The Court has also
recognised broader 'public interest related') justifications. In Rinner-
Kahn% the Court considered that the exclusion of part-time employees
from a statutory sick pay scheme might in principle be justified on the
grounds of social policy, if the Bilks test were met. In short, the
European Court applies a unified test to justification of indirect
discrimination, where a differentiated test would be more functional.
The following discussion seeks to compare and evaluate substantive
grounds of justification advanced by employers in the different legal
systems examined. The three-fold division of types of justification is
followed, with discussion first of job related justifications, then enterprise
related justifications, and finally public interest related justifications.
2.1 Job related justifications
As explained above, it is submitted that job related justifications should
be relatively easy to deal with under a general statutory scheme with a
commitment to equality of opportunity. To provide equal access for
women and men to all jobs, and to avoid sex stereotyping in employment
roles, it is important that those requirements and conditions advanced by
employers which purport to be related to the duties of the job are in fact
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necessary (in its strict sense) for the job to be carried out. Part of the
assessment of necessity should require that the standard set by
application of the principle of proportionality is met by the employer.
Two areas in which job related requirements are indirectly discriminatory
are examined. The first is the requirement for the physical ability to
perform the job, where that requirement, which may be indirectly
discriminatory against women, particularly if it concerns muscular
strength, is necessitated by the actual duties of the job itself. Many
jobs, and not only those regarded traditionally as 'male' work, require a
certain amount of muscular strength on the part of the employee, for
example, agricultural work, employment in the building trade or work in
a warehouse, or, industrial cleaning, nursing or child-care. An
unjustified muscular strength test in an employer's hiring policy will have
the effect of excluding a disproportionate number of women from the job,
and therefore be indirectly discriminatory.
The second area examined is the requirement or condition for
qualifications, training and seniority, to which employment benefits are
frequently attached. These may not necessarily be strictly necessary to
perform a job59, but are nevertheless regarded as justifiable
requirements, as indicators of the abilities of the person concerned.
2.1.1 Physical abilities
In all four legal systems examined, justification for indirect discrimination
is available on grounds of physical abilities necessary to perform the
•	 60job. For example, there are some activities, which are undertaken in
the course of employment, for which a certain amount of muscular
strength is required. In particular, the lifting of heavy weights, the
carrying of loads, and any repetitive strenuous muscular effort
undertaken during employment, will require an employee to have a certain
amount of physical strength. If the duties of a job are such that these
activities are to be carried out, all four legal systems examined consider
that muscular strength is a substantive ground on which the employer
may justify indirect discrimination.
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Indirect discrimination may occur in the use of criteria such as muscular
strength, in the decision to hire an employee, since the proportion of
women who can comply with the requirement is much smaller than the
proportion of men who can comply.
The reliance by the employer on factors such as muscular strength, in
hiring, should not be justified if the factors do not relate directly to the
duties of the job. If an employer applies a lifting test to applicants for
a job which involves only light or occasional lifting, this will
unnecessarily exclude a disproportionate number of women from
employment.
Even where the requirement or condition relating to muscular strength
seems to be directly related to the duties of the job, one must be careful
not to fall into the trap of assuming that the way in which the employer
organises the work at present is the only way that it can be arranged.
The installation of lifting machinery, for example, would open up many
jobs involving lifting and carrying to those with less physical strength
(a large proportion of whom would be women). This of course again
comes down to a question of who bears the burden of establishing
equality of opportunity in employment.
In addition to the situation where an employee is denied access to a job
through an indirectly discriminatory requirement for muscular ability, the
higher evaluation, reflected in wage levels, of particular qualities, in this
case, muscular strength, may lead to indirect discrimination in pay.
The payment of employees who carry out tasks requiring muscular
strength at a higher rate than other staff may be lawful, on the grounds
that the demands of heavy physical work justify a higher pay rate than
that of other, less physically demanding tasks. The position of the courts
regarding justification for job related justifications is, therefore, relevant
to job evaluation, since job related criteria, provided they are justified,
could be used to distinguish between jobs, and between grades within
jobs, in a job evaluation scheme.
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If job evaluation schemes are based on characteristics which men fulfil
more easily than women (such as muscular strength, at issue here), then
the work which is carried out predominantly by men is consistently
valued higher than work carried out predominantly by women. A
significant number of women then are employed on jobs considered to be
low value. An employment system which has historically valued strength
over other qualities or characteristics, such as manual dexterity, will
result in the grouping of women in jobs which are less highly valued
(and therefore less well paid) than others. Legislation requiring equal
pay and equal treatment for women and men in employment, if committed
to equality of opportunity, should operate to prevent the perpetuation of
the pattern of lower pay for women by requiring each employer to act in
a non-discriminatory manner as 'an independent institution of distributive
justice' 61. Wage levels should be set with reference to the value of a
particular job.
'The key to success for this legislation thus lies, first, in the
development of a coherent and persuasive conception of a job's
value, which remains distinct from its market value, and secondly,
in resistance to any attempt to reinstate extgrnal market forces as
the appropriate test of distributive justice.'"
It should be noted at this point that the present study does not attempt
to provide a detailed analysis of the issues pertaining to equal work for
equal value, but is limited to a discussion of the specific question of
justification for indirect discrimination, which has sometimes arisen in
equal value claims.
The European Court ruled on the issue of whether muscular strength
could be used as a criterion of a job evaluation scheme in Rummler v
Dato-Druck. The Equal Pay Directive provides that,
'where a job classification system is used for determining pay, it
must be based on the same criteria for both men and women and
so drawn up as to exclude discrimination on grounds of sex.'
The Advocate General considered the 'scheme' of Article 1 of the Directive.
'Its effect, with regard to job classification systems, is that common
criteria must be used for men and women workers and that the
system must be organised in such a way as to exclude
discrimination on grounds of sex.
Indirect Discrimination	 302
'... it is not necessary for each individual criterion to be drawn up
in such a manner as to rule out discrimination, but the system as
a whole must be framed with that purpose in mind.
'If it appeared that, in spite of the guidelines for their application
laid down by the Bundesarbeitsgericht, the use of common criteria,
such as those in this case (demand on muscles, heaviness of the
work), would probably lead to a degree of discrimination against
women in this more narrow domain, that would not mean that under
the principles of the directive such criteria could not be applied.
The important question is whether discrimination is inherent in the
general scheme of the agreement or whether the common criteria as
a whole are selected, defined and weighted in such a way as to
avoid discrimination on grounds of sex.
'From the point of view of Community law nothing more can be said
in that regard. ... [A]ny further findings are a matter for the
national court.'
The Commission, in its submission, agreed that all that the Directive
requires is that a job classification system must be non-discriminatory as
a whole.
The European Court held that,
'... the principle of equal pay requires essentially that the nature
of the work to be carried out be considered objectively. ... Where
a job classification system is used in determining remuneration, that
system must be based on criteria which do not differ according to
whether the work is carried out by a man or a woman and must not
be organised, as a whole, in such a manner that it has the practical
effect of discriminating generally against workers of one sex.'"
The Court continued, agreeing with the Advocate General,
'Even where a particular criterion, such as that of demand on the
muscles, may in fact tend to favour male workers, since it may be
assumed that in general they are physically stronger than woman
workers, it must, in order to determine whether or not it is
discriminatory, be considered in the context of the whole job
classification a ystem, having regard to other criteria influencing
rates of pay.'"
A particular criterion, such as the one in question, may be justified by
the nature of the job, where the pay difference is necessary 'in order to
ensure a level of pay appropriate to the effort required by the work and
thus corresponds to a real need of the undertaking'65. However, even
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where this may be established, the job classification system as a whole
must not be discriminatory.
The judgment of the European Court also suggests that use of the male
or the female standard as a starting point for evaluation would not be
justified; rather an average should be used.
'... Any criterion based on values appropriate only to workers of
one sex carries with it a risk of discrimination and may jeopardise
the main objective of the directive, equal treatment for the same
work. That is true even of a criterion based on values
corresponding to the average performance of workers of the sex
considered to have less natural ability for the purposes of that
criterion, for the result would be another form of pay
discrimination: work objectively requiring greater strengt/IL would
be paid at the same rate as work requiring less strength.ou
The effect of the judgment in Rummler v Dato Druck is to put the onus
on the national courts to determine, on a case by case basis, whether or
not job classification systems as a whole are non-discriminatory. Apart
from requiring a national court to determine whether an individual
criterion is sufficiently job related, and therefore corresponds to a real
need of the employer, the European Court has left the evaluation of job
classification systems to the courts of Member States.
To achieve a functional system of job evaluation, with due regard to the
principle of equal treatment of women and men in employment, factors
used in job evaluation should be carefully scrutinised for justifiability,
and any evidence of sex stereotyping should be eradicated. The ruling
of the European Court in Rummler seems at least to approach such a
functional system.
2.1.2 Seniority, qualifications and training
There are two ways in which a requirement for seniority, qualifications
or training may be indirectly discriminatory against women. The first
arises where women, in general, are disadvantaged, through different
career patterns or different educational expectations from those of men.
The second is more unusual; it arises where previous direct discrimination
may later be perpetuated as indirect discrimination against the same
Indirect Discrimination
	
304
individual, once the original directly discriminatory practice has been
abandoned.
The attachment of benefits in the employment sphere to seniority may
indirectly discriminate against a large proportion of women, whose career
patterns may differ from the male archetype. Women are more likely than
men to take a break from employment for child care and family reasons,
and therefore are less able to accrue seniority. Although in general it
may be agreed that the educational opportunities available to women are
improving, there still remains a degree of gender based 'channelling' in
education and training, whereby women are not encouraged to undertake
and do not put themselves forward for certain types of training, and are
therefore under-represented in certain spheres of employment 61. The
indirect discrimination in these cases arises through the de facto position
of many women.
In contrast, in the second case, indirect discrimination arises through
previous direct discrimination. An employment practice which perpetuates
the effects of past direct discrimination on the basis of sex may be
attacked on the grounds that it now constitutes indirect discrimination.
Seniority systems may have the effect of freezing the relative positions
of employees, which result from past discrimination. A woman first
refused employment on grounds of sex, but employed at a later date, will
acquire less seniority than a man employed meantime. Seniority is used
to determine benefits of employment, such as promotion, pay increments
and protection from redundancy. Moreover, if a seniority system is
applied on a departmental level, rather than across the whole firm, it can
have the effect of 'locking in' employees. A person denied access to a
department which is particularly desirable, through direct discrimination,
will lose all seniority rights if eventually transferred there. 	 -
The approaches of the courts in the legal systems examined show that, in
both sorts of situation, it is fairly easy for employers to justify
requirements for seniority, qualifications and training. Courts tend to
accept seniority systems as genuine, unless there is some evidence that
the employer intends to discriminate.
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In the US, the provisions of 'bona fide seniority systems' were saved
from the provisions of Title VII by the Mansfield-Dirksen Amendment to
section 703(h):
'Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority ...
system ... provided that §pch differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate.'"
The Supreme Court ruled on the application of this provision in the case
of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v U.S69. The US government
alleged that the employer concerned was acting in a discriminatory
manner, contrary to Title VII, against black and Spanish-surnamed
Americans by refusing to recruit, hire, transfer or promote them to long-
route driving positions on an equal basis with whites. The government
also alleged that the seniority system, which was part of the collective
bargaining agreement adopted by the employer and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, perpetuated past racial discrimination. The
Supreme Court was called upon to rule on the applicability of section
703(h). According to the ruling in this case, a seniority system will be
bona fide, and therefore justifiable, if it is free from discriminatory intent
or purpose.
'The seniority system in this litigation is entirely bona fide. It
applies equally to all races and ethnic groups. To the extent that
it 'locks' employees into non-line-driver jobs, it does so for all.
The city drivers and servicemen who are discouraged from
transferring to line-driver jobs are not all Negroes or Spanish-
surnamed Americans; to the contrary, the overwhelming majority are
white. The placing of line-drivers in a separate bargaining unit
from other employees is rational, in accord with the industry
practice, and consistent with National Labor Relation Board
precedents. It is conceded that the seniority system did not have
its genesis in racial discrimination, and that it was negotiated and
has been maintained free from any illegal purpose. In these
circumstances, the single fact that the system extends no
retroactive seniority to pre-Act discriminatees does not make it
unlawful. ,
 [p 355-356]
Thus, section 703(h) 'immunises seniority systems which apply equally to
all workers even though they preserve the effects of employment
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discrimination, so long as the intent to discriminate does not enter into
their negotiation, genesis or maintenance.'70
The reasoning of Teamsters is equally applicable to sex discrimination
cases. In United Air Lines v Evans71, Ms Evans had been employed by
the Airline for two years, then was forced to leave her employment there
because of a rule which barred female, but not male, flight attendants
from being married. She was rehired four years later in 1972, and tried
to claim seniority credit for her earlier period of employment with the
airline. The employer refused, and she brought an action for breach of
Title VII. The Supreme Court held that she had failed to bring an action
in time, and that in any case she had not shown that the seniority system
was not 'bona fide', therefore it was protected by section 703(h).
Kenneth Karst describes the interpretation of section 703(h) in Evans as
'questionable'. The Court in Evans applied the reasoning of Teamsters to
discrimination effected after the Act. As Karst points out, 'all the
legislative history, as well as the Court's decision in Franks, indicates
that section 703 (h) was enacted to maintain only those seniority rights
existing in 1965, the effective date of title VII'72
'
The Supreme Court followed Teamsters in 1982, reiterating its ruling that,
'to be cognisable, a claim that a seniority system has a discriminatory
impact must be accompanied by proof of a discriminatory purpose'.73
Here, as in Teamsters and Evans, the Supreme Court is using reasoning
which properly belongs in disparate treatment analysis, that is proof of
the intent of the discriminator, in an issue of adverse impact analysis.
The effect and usefulness of adverse impact analysis is thus weakened.
'Because any seniority system is the product of many
considerations, to require that an invidious motive be the main one
would foreclose many meritorious challenges and would be contrary
to the long-established principle that ,gxemptions to remedial
legislation should be narrowly construed.'''
The US approach cannot, therefore, be regarded as functional.
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In the UK, seniority was used successfully to justify discrimination in the
case of Edmonds v Computer Services (South-West) Ltd15. In
establishing its defence, the employer relied on the fact that the male
comparator had greater responsibility than Ms Edmonds, because of his
seniority. The tribunal considered that if a purported male comparator
actually had greater responsibility, this would render the two jobs
incomparable. If the comparator had the potential to exercise
responsibility, the tribunal was willing to consider this a genuine material
difference under section 1 (3) of the Equal Pay Act 1970, thus justifying
the difference in pay.
The higher pay of an employee who actually exercises greater
responsibility cannot be objected to as a functional justification.
However, reliance on the mere potential to exercise greater responsibility
is more questionable. There is no link between the capacity (seniority)
which is being rewarded (in a male employee) and the effective (or more
effective) performance of the job. Because the seniority requirement
indirectly discriminates against women, a functional approach would
require specific justification of the requirement. The approach of the UK
tribunal in Edmonds cannot, therefore, be regarded as functional.
The European Court and the Advocate General considered, in Dan foss, that
seniority can be considered to be an objective justification for differences
in pay, because it nearly always has an effect on the way an employee
carries out the duties of the job. While an assertion that this is always
the case might be open to criticism, it cannot be denied that seniority,
because of the experience it implies, will have some sort of relationship
to the performance of the employee. The use of the criterion of seniority
cannot be objected to per se. Training and qualifications, the European
Court held, could be a permissible justification, if they were relevant to
the performance of the specific duties of the job concerned. The
requirement that the employer show the link between the training and the
duties of the job is functional. If there is no link, then the requirement
is not proportional to the aim it purports to meet, that is, the employment
of persons qualified or trained to carry out the actual duties of the job.
Failure to meet the proportionality principle will always result in failure
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of the purported justification in EC law. The rule applied by the
European Court in Danfoss may be regarded as functional.
In a society in which competition on merit is the paradigm, where equality
is conceptualised as 'formal equality', it seems self-evident that
differences in access to jobs, conditions, pay and other benefits are
justified in terms of the different levels of seniority, qualifications and
training of the employees concerned.. Commitment to full equality of
opportunity requires assessment of whether the persons being treated
equaily have an equal starting point. As a "job related" justification, the
requirements of seniority, qualifications or training should be subjected
to close scrutiny. If the employer can show that the requirements, in
terms of personal qupliffications, which are applied to its employees, are
strictly necessary because of the duties of the job, then justification will
be established. Other reasons advanced should be treated with
circumspection, especially if they reveal sex stereotyping. The approach
of the European Court, which requires a real link between the
requirement for seniority or training, and the performance of the job
concerned, coupled with the general requirement that all justifications
meet the proportionality test, may be regarded as the most functional of
the legal systems examined.
2.1.3 Requirement to work full-time
It is accepted by the European Court, in German law and in the law of
the UK that discrimination agenst part-time employees constitutes indirect
discrimination against women. Eecause the percentage of women who work
part-time is considerably higher than that of men, and because women,
due to family and child-care duties, are in general less able than men to
undertake full-time employment, practices and policies which disadvantage
part-time workers may fall foul of provisions of law prohibiting indirect
sex discrimination. This was accepted by the European Court in its
earliest case-law on indirect discrimination76 and is now accepted in the
law of Member States of the EC, including the UK and Germany.
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In an early UK case concerning part-time employment, the Employment
Appeals Tribunal (EAT) rejected the assertion that the requirement that
an employee work full-time is a self-evidently justified requirement. The
Home Office v Holme27 concerned a woman employee who took maternity
leave and then wished to return to work as a part-time, rather than full-
time, employee. When the employer refused, she claimed that this was
unlawful discrimination. The Industrial Tribunal (IT) agreed.
Upholding the decision of the IT, the EAT stressed the individual nature
of its decision,
'The present case stands very much upon its own. It is easy to
imagine other instances, not strikingly different from the present
case, where the result will not be the same. ... There will be cases
where a policy favouring full-time staff ... is found to be justified.'
The decision as to justifiability of discrimination against part-time
workers was to be one entrusted to the individual tribunal, and would
depend on the facts of each case. The result of this approach left the
status of the decision uncertain. Since each individual IT could come to
a different conclusion on similar facts, it was doubtful whether the
decision (except, of course, for Ms Holmes) was binding on the Home
Office.18
To give the ruling general application and effect, an exposition of which
factors should be considered in the question of whether discrimination
against part-time workers could be justified was required. The EAT
refused to give any detailed guidance as to the possible circumstances in
which the requirement for full-time employees may be justifiable, thus
leaving the way open for conflicting rulings from different ITs. As
Rubenstein points out,
'The conflict of interest, between management's desire to organise
its operations in the way it regards as most efficient and the
problems this may pose for women with dependent children, is one
found in organisations up and down the land. To permit this to be
resolved by ITs purely on the facts of each case is to invite each
case to be separately litigated and to court inequity in outcomes.'"
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In the later case of Clymo v Wandsworth LBO°, it was held by the EAT
that the requirement to work full-time (and not job share) was justified
by the nature of the duties of the job. Ms Clymo (a branch librarian)
asked to work part-time and share her job with her husband. The
employer (local authority) refused to permit job sharing at such a high
level. The EAT considered;
'it seems clear that in many working structures ... there will be a
grade or position where the jop or appointment by its very nature
requires full-time attendance.'"
The EAT distinguished between those jobs (for example, cleaner) in which
full-time work would clearly be 'a requirement or condition' which would
trigger an inquiry into indirect discrimination, and those (for example,
managing director) in which full-time work is 'part of the nature of the
employment'. 82 The EAT considered, however, that it is for an employer
to decide what is required for the purposes of running the business,
subject only to the standard of reasonableness.
'Provided that the decision made by the respondent employer is
reasonable - made upon adequate grounds - and responsible -
bearing in mind the need to avoid discrimination based upon sex
and balancing that need against other negcls and responsibilities -
then the decision is one for management.'"
This decision is unsatisfactory because it functions to allow justifications
which are convenient, or even positively advantageous, for employers, and
does not take due account of disadvantages suffered by women. It is not
disputed that there exist, at one end of the scale, jobs for which full-time
work is a necessary part of the job, but between those, and jobs at the
other end of the scale, which are now accepted as appropriate for part-
time employees (cleaner), there exists a gradation of jobs. Within this
gradation there are jobs which it may be perfectly feasible for part-time
employees to carry out, with only minimum inconvenience to the employer,
but which are regarded in current employment practice as requiring full-
time employees.
A functional approach to justification of the requirement to work full-time
would require that the employer show that the nature of the job is such
that a full-time employee is necessary. The actual duties of the job must
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necessitate a full-time employee. Application of the principle of
proportionality and clarification of the burden of proof by the courts
would weed out purported justification for indirect discrimination in
hiring for these jobs, if coupled with a real commitment to equal
opportunities. The real commitment to equal opportunities might require
that as many jobs as possible be open to part-time employees, since this
would enable more women (and also men) to participate in employment as
well as carry out their domestic and childcare responsibilities, thus
breaking down sex role stereotyping.
2.2 Enterprise related justifications
Enterprise related justifications relate to the broad economic needs of
employers, rather than the narrow duties of the job. They are
justifications which relate to the job in its wider context, the whole
enterprise of the employer. For example, an employer may seek to justify
the exclusion of part-time employees from receiving certain employee
fringe benefits, on the grounds that the extra administration entailed by
part-time employees presents a cost burden on the employer.
Justification for discriminatory practices which are based on enterprise
related reasons is more difficult to scrutinize for functionality in meeting
the general aim of sex discrimination law than job related justification.
The reason for the difficulty is that the decision as to justifiability
usually involves some sort of policy decision, or at least a balancing
exercise between different claims and interests of the parties concerned;
the employer and the employee. For this reason, it is particularly
important that the principle of proportionality plays its full role. It
should also be recognised that the reorganisation of the employment
environment, into an arrangement based on equal opportunities (and the
concomitant changes in wider society), towards which the legislation
outlawing sex discrimination is aimed, cannot be effected without some
challenge to the status quo, in which women are systemically
disadvantaged. A commitment to equal opportunities will therefore
necessitate some burden upon those (the employers, and some male
employees) who benefit from the current organisation of the world of
work. Therefore justification based solely on the (perceived) detriment
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to the enterprise, which a change in the status quo would involve, must
be regarded with some caution.
2.2.1 Economic and administrative efficiency
The ground of economic and administrative efficiency, as a ground for
justification of indirect sex discrimination on the part of employers, has
arisen most often in the case of discrimination against part-time
employees. Most provisions which disadvantage part-time workers do not
relate to the hiring process 81, but to pay and other conditions of
employment. The justification for these provisions is related more
generally to the employer's enterprise as a whole, for example, the
employer may treat full-time staff more favourably on the grounds that
it must retain some full-time staff for the proper operation of the
business. This claim is to be evaluated as an enterprise related
justification.
The leading case on discrimination against part-time employees in the
jurisprudence of the European Court is Bilka Kaufhaus v Weber von
Hartz85. The facts of this case have already been discussed in detail,
and will not be re-iterated at this point. On the question of justification
for the policy excluding part-time workers from an occupational pension
scheme, the Court examined the arguments put forward by Bilka and by
Ms Weber von Hartz.
'In its observations, Bilka contends that the exclusion of part-time
employees from the occupational pension scheme aims solely to
discourage part-time employment. In this connection it claims that
part-time employees normally refuse to work late in the afternoons
and on Saturdays. Consequently it was necessary for Bilka, in
order to ensure the presence of a sufficient number of employees
at these times, to make full-time work more attractive than part-
time work, by limiting admission to the occupational pension scheme
to full-time workers only. Bilka deduces from this that, on the
basis of the judgment in Jenkins, it cannot be accused of having
breached Article 119.
'With regard to the reasons invoked as justification for the
exclusion in question, Mrs Weber points out that Bilka is not
obliged to recruit part-time employees and that, if it decides to do
so, it is not authorised subsequently to limit the pension rights of
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those employees, who already suffer curtailment of their rights
due to their shorter working hours.'"
Rather than deciding on the issue of justifiability, given the facts of the
case, the European Court left the decision to the national court, holding,
'it falls to the national court, which alone is competent to assess
the facts, to decide whether, and if so to what extent, the grounds
put forward by an employer to explain the adoption of a pay
practice which applies irrespective of the employee's sex, but which
in fact affects more women than men, can be considered to be
objectively justified for economic reasons. If the national court
finds that the means chosen by Bilks meet a genuine need of the
enterprise, that they are suitable for attaining the objective
pursued by the enterprise and are necessary for that purpose, the
fact that the measures in question affect a much greater number
of women than men is nctit sufficient to conclude that they involve
a breach of Article 119.'"
The ruling in Bilka was applied in UK law in the context of the
justification that the indirectly discriminatory practice was necessary for
the administrative efficiency of the enterprise in the case of Rainey v
Greater Glasgow Health Board". The payment of prosthetists recruited
at a later date at a lower (standard NHS) scale than the prosthetists
initially recruited (who were all male), was justified as follows:
'... the new prosthetic service could never have been established
within a reasonable time if [the earlier employees from the private
sector] had not been offered a scale of remuneration no less
favourable than that which they were enjoying. That was
undoubtedly a good and objectively justified reason for offering
[them] that scale of remuneration.'
As regards the new recruits, a lower pay, at the general rates, was
justifiable, as,
'...from the administrative point of view, it would have been highly
anomalous and inconvenient if prosthetists alone ... were to have
been subject to a different scale.'
It was more efficient from an administrative point of view to pay
subsequent recruits on the standard scale. There was no other way open
to the employer to employ prosthetists at the later date and still meet the
need for efficiency, given the existence of an all-encompassing, negotiated
pay scale within the NHS at lower rates than equivalent pay scales in the
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private sector. Administrative efficiency, according to the House of
Lords, operates as a 'genuine need of the enterprise'.
"I consider that read as a whole the ruling of the European Court
would not exclude objectively justified grounds which are other
than economic such as administsat,ve efficiency in a concern not
engaged in commerce or business.'
It was felt by the Court that this type of justification was particularly
appropriate for a concern not engaged in commerce or business.
However there is another way to view the facts of this case, and that was
the view of the dissenting opinion in the Scottish EAT.. This view was
that it was contrary to the sex discrimination law applicable in the UK for
the Greater Glasgow Health Board to set a pay scale that was
unacceptably low, 01 up as many positions as possible with women, and
only to set a higher scale in order to 01 the remaining positions with
men. Such a practice was, in the opinion of the dissenting judge,
tantamount to den 'ding to pay men more thaurt women for doing the same
job.
On this analysis, the approach of the UK court, in applying the test of
EC law in Eillra, allowed justification to be established regardless of the
hidden discrimination against the women employees at whose expense the
employer gained its efficiency. Justification of discrimination by
reference to discriminatory conditions on the labour market cannot be
regarded as functional; to al" ow such justification would completely
-undermine the effect of the law on indirect discrimitn" anon .
Applying the ruling in Mika from the European Court, the German
BundesArbeitsGericht (BAG (Federal Labour Court rejected the rufrns of
the employer!. As regards organisational problems and higher costs to
the employer in the employment of part-time workers, the BAG held that
the impact of part-time workers on these could only be regarded as
minimal, and in any case was offset by benefits to the employer in
employing part time workers. As for the necessity to encourage Saturday
working, the BAG pointed out that, even if this was a 'genuine need of
the enterprise", the pensions policy was not "suitable for attaining the
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objective". In particular there was no differentiation in the pension
scheme between Saturday workers and part-time workers, neither was
provision made in the scheme for part-time workers to qualify for the
scheme by working on Saturdays.
The strict application of what, according to the ruling of the European
Court in Bilka, justifies indirect discrimination has been used by the BAG
in other decisions regarding indirect discrimination against women by the
application of different measures to part-time workers to those applied to
full-time workers. For example the granting of a Versorgungsordnung
(benefit) by an employer only to full-time workers was held to be
indirectly discriminatory and not justified93.
The employer's position was that, as part-time workers were not prepared
to work at unfavoured times, the organisational requirements of the
business, in particular its sales strategy, were such that full-time
workers were more beneficial to the employer. The employer advanced
personnel statistics to support this claim. The BAG was not satisfied that
these statistics were sufficient to discharge the burden on the employer
to show justification, inter alia because the statistics in fact indicated
that there was no difference in the contributions of full and part-time
workers.
The second ground relied upon by the employer was that the cost burden
of part-time employees was higher than that of full-time employees. The
BAG did not accept the evidence advanced to prove this assertion. The
evidence advanced amounted to a list of the cost factors of part-time
employment, without comparing these with the cost factors of full-time
employment. The BAG held that the employer had failed to produce
adequate evidence to justify the discrimination, as, in a cost benefit
analysis, all the relevant cost factors must be compared.
In German law, in accordance with the application by the BAG of the
ruling of the European Court in Bilks, the cost of part-time employees
does not necessarily justify discrimination. The employer, if it is to
succeed, must advance specific evidence that the indirectly discriminatory
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measure is necessary, that is, that it pursues objectively justified goals
and is suitable and necessary for this purpose. This may be particularly
difficult for the employer, as there is evidence that, in many employment
situations, particularly in the areas of production and management, the
employment of part-time employees may result in a positive cost benefit
to the employer." The employer is therefore required to show that, in
its particular undertaking and for the particular job concerned, the
relative costs to the employer of full-time and part-time employees are
such that it is necessary to treat full-time workers more favourably.
Furthermore the employer must show that the more favourable treatment
of full-time workers actually operates to the employer's economic
advantage, and that the more favourable treatment is necessary and
proportionate, that is, that there exists no other, less discriminatory
solution.
The approach of the German BAG, in its interpretation of the ruling of the
European Court in Mika, may be regarded as functional. Its focus on the
suitability and proportionality of the indirectly discriminatory condition
requires that the employer prove a specific need of the enterprise, for
example, efficiency of the business, which cannot be met in any other
way. An indirectly discriminatory requirement which meets this test may
be regarded as justifiable: requirements which do not meet the test
represent an inappropriate restriction upon the opportunities for women.
in the sphere of employment.
Pfarr and Bertelsmann95 argue that even if the employer proves that the
proportionality test is met, this does not justify the disadvantaging of
part-time employees. The alleged or actual unfavourable cost benefit
relationship of women's work compared to men's work was advanced,
historically, as justification for denying women equal pay with men. It is
now common to all legal systems which aim to outlaw sex discrimination in
employment that the equal pay principle disallows the evaluating of
women's work as lower in economic value than other work. This
evaluation would be done by confining women to activities or jobs only
undertaken by women, and calculating the costs to the employer (and
thereby justifying pay differentials) only by reference to these gender
Indirect Discrimination	 317
specific groups96. Pfarr argues that instead the costs and benefits to
the employer should be calculated by reference to the staff as a whole.
In this way, the burden of exceptional costs of individual employees or
groups of employees would then be carried by the whole workforce. Then
it is clear that it would be unfair to allow men to be paid more than
women.
In effect, Pfarr's argument wishes to equate part-time work with women's
work, thereby bringing the issue within the remit of direct discrimination.
It is submitted that this would contribute an unnecessary extension of the
concept of indirect discrimination. Rather, a functional approach to the
question of justification for discrimination against part-time workers
would satisfy the need to balance employer's enterprise interests with the
principle of equal treatment for women and men in employment. The
interpretation of the BAG, of the standard of EC law in Bilka, represents
an example of such a functional interpretation.
However, the drawback of the ruling of the European Court in Bilka,
reiterated in subsequent decisions 97, is that it is for the national court
to decide on the question of justification, given the test of necessary,
suitable and proportionate. The European Court -has given insufficient
guidance for national courts. In particular, as was shown above, the
interpretation of Bilka by the courts and tribunals in the UK is
inadequate. The approach of the UK courts overstresses the need for
'efficiency' and 'efficiency in administration' of employers 99 and does not
require that the employer meet the proportionality test. The burden of
proof also varies between Member States.99 It is submitted that the
European Court should adopt a refined version of Bilka, applicable to
enterprise related justifications, which stresses that the employer must
prove (in accordance with the normal civil standard) that there is a
genuine need for the requirement or condition, and must show that the
requirement or condition is proportionate to the purported need of the
enterprise. Emphasis should also be put upon the duty of national courts
to give due weight to the purpose of anti-discrimination legislation.
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2.3 Public interest related justifications
The third type of substantive ground for justification is that of public
interest. A public interest related justification may arise in two different
contexts. The first, and most common, is that in which provisions of
legislation, or other measures taken by the State, result in indirect
discrimination against women in employment. The employer concerned will
then seek to rely on statutory authority, as a defence to a claim of
indirect discrimination. The question then arises as to whether statutory
authority constitutes a complete defence, or whether the statutory
measure itself may be tested for justifiability. The second context is that
in which a public interest related justification, which is not grounded in
legislation, is raised by an employer. For example, an employer who
provided creche facilities for those of its workers who had no partner at
home to care for their children (a provision which would be indirectly
discriminatory against men) could seek to justify the measure on the
grounds that it served a social need of its employees and their children,
and thus was 'public interest related'. Such a ground of justification has
not, however, been established by an employer in any of the cases
discussed below.
Public interest related justifications arise most often in the context of
indirectly discriminatory legislation. Normally, statutory authorization will
constitute a complete defence to a sex discrimination claim. Certainly in
UK law, statutory authority is sufficient justification for indirect
discrimination, as there are no means available to challenge primary
legislation before the courts.IN
 In the US and in Germany, legislation
could be challenged on the grounds that it is unconstitutional; however,
this might prove extremely difficult to establish in practice. M
 The
position as regards EC law is fundamentally different. The doctrines of
direct applicability and direct effect of provisions of EC law l02 mean
that, in order to challenge national legislation of the Member States, the
complainant need only show that the national legislation is incompatible
with EC law. The provisions of EC law will then apply automatically.
Therefore, if an employee shows that the statutory provision concerned
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is incompatible with a measure of EC law, the defence of statutory
authority may be unavailable to the employer.
The analysis of public interest related grounds of justification is, it is
submitted, certain to require different considerations from those applied
to job related and enterprise related justifications.° In particular, the
broad public benefit of a legislative measure may be deemed to be more
important, in the particular circumstance, than the principle of equal
treatment. The very nature of public interest related justifications
requires that the State at least be able to rely on the social purpose of
the legislation in establishing justification. The 'social purpose' could
perhaps be regarded as the equivalent of an employer's 'genuine need'.
It could be argued that there is no reason why the standard of
justification should not be as strict for the State as it is for employers.
The legislation or State measure concerned should be suitable to meet its
aim, and should fulfil the requirements of the proportionality test. On
the one hand, it could be argued that even this standard may prove too
strict, as application of the proportionality principle would have the
result that the measure would not be justified if there was any less
discriminatory way in which the aim of the legislation could be achieved,
no matter what the cost. On the other hand is the argument that the
State is well-placed (in fact, better placed than the individual employer)
to remove indirect discrimination, even if to do so is costly, and therefore
that a commitment to equality of opportunity requires a restrictive
interpretation of justification in this context. It is recognised, however,
that this is a delicate issue, as the legislation, which an individual
complainant seeks to challenge, may well in fact be meeting a genuine
public need or serving a public interest, or at least purports to be
serving such an interest.
It is perhaps in recognition of the delicacy of a judicial challenge of a
legislative measure that the Advocate General suggested, in a case
concerning a public interest related justification l04, that measures based
in legislation should be regarded as justified unless the complainant
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2.3.1 Reduction of employment opportunities
In general, indirect sex discrimination may be justified on public interest
related grounds, where a measure of employment legislation, which
disadvantages one particular group of workers, is grounded in a measure
of social policy or seeks to achieve an aim with a broad public benefit.
The UK Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether the provisions of
UK law, found in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978,
which excluded part-time workers from various rights relating to unfair
dismissal and redundancy payments, were contrary to Article 119 and the
Equal Pay Directive, in R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte
E0C101. The UK court was obliged to follow the guidance of the previous
case law of the European Court on this matter.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal suggests that the grounds of
justification referred to by the European Court in Bilka and Rinner-Kiihn
(economic needs of an employer and social policy) are not necessarily
appropriate to consideration of the justifiability of provisions of national
legislation;
'The "objective justification" for any indirect discrimination may
therefore embrace a number of different facts, and, in the case of
primary legislation, is likely to involve consideration of aspects of
social policy and similar considerations of broad national
significancg which would not arise in the case of an ordinary
employer.'1"
The UK government justified the legislation by reference to the assertion
that employment opportunities in part-time work would be considerably
reduced if additional burdens were to be placed on potential employers.
There is a greater administrative burden involved in employing part-time
employees, and the reduced rights of part-time employees, in the payment
of redundancy payments, are counterweight to that extra administrative
burden. To declare the legislation incompatible with Article 119 would
have the effect of reducing the number of part-time jobs available to
those who want them.
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The evidence submitted by the Secretary of State to prove these
assertions was described as 'general, unspecific and speculative'.'"
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal was willing to accept the evidence as
'inherently logical'. 110 The court therefore accepted the allegations of
the Secretary of State, without any scrutiny or proof:
'We shall assume without further evidence that any reduction in the
numberof 111 employment opportunities would be sociallyundesirable. ,
It is remarkable that the Court was willing to accept the justification
advanced by the government without further evidence The result of this
approach is that there is, in UK law, it seems, no real burden on the
State seeking to justify an indirectly discriminatory statutory measure.
It was sufficient to suggest that amendment of the legislation concerned,
in order to give greater rights to disadvantaged employees, would result
in too great a detriment to employers, and therefore a reduction in part-
time jobs. The approach of the UK court disregards completely the Bilka
doctrine that justification must be suitable and necessary, and must
comply with the proportionality test, and that the party pleading
justification must prove its case.
As Simon Deakin points out:
'Although the European Court has repeatedly said that the question
of whether a particular practice is justifiable is one for national
courts, it is clear that the correct version of the test must be
applied, and that some types of argument will be too ;fiague or
general to fall within the range of permissible defences.'
The justification offered by the Secretary of State was that the legislation
reflected a 'need to reduce to a minimum regulation which might have the
effect of inhibiting the creation of new jobs' 113. As noted above, the
court did not submit the justification to detailed scrutiny. Deakin points
out that a comparison with the provisions in other Member States
concerning social rights for part-time employees reveals that many
Member States have lower hours thresholds than those in the UK, or no
thresholds at all, for the equivalent rights. For example, in France,
employers are required by law to grant part-time and full-time workers
parity in employment conditions. In France, there is evidence to suggest
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that available part-time employment actually increased following the
introduction of these measures. Certainly there exists no clear evidence
that laws granting equal treatment to part-time workers have lead to the
massive reductions in available jobs suggested by the UK government.114
Deakin concludes,
'... While it is beyond doubt that the thresholds have a
discriminatory effect which predominantly concerns women workers,
at no stage has evidence been produced to show that this policy
of selective exemption is more likely to increase employment
opportunities than the opposite policy, of legislating to harmonise
employment conditions as far as possible between part-time and
full-time workers. The government's position is, in the end, based
on a firm ideological commitment to deregulation as such.'
To allow justification for indirectly discriminatory measures based on such
a commitment is, it is submitted, antithetical to the principle of equality
of opportunity. The approach in R v Secretary of State for Employment,
ex parte EOC may not be regarded as a functional approach to
justification for the disadvantaging of part-time employees through
measures of employment legislation.
2.3.2 Genuine special social needs
Employment legislation which has as its purpose the alleviation of genuine
social needs of some individual members of society may often be framed
in a manner which is indirectly discriminatory against women. A number
of examples were noted above 115, including the following: in Germany, the
rule that 'double earners' are to be dismissed first in a redundancy
situation; in the US, a head of household rule for rights to certain
benefits, such as pensions; and, in the UK, measures targeting, for special
benefits, a particular group of unemployed people.
In general, as long as the measure is not applied in a directly
discriminatory manner, broad public interest related justifications, related
to genuine social needs, tend to be accepted by the courts in Germany,
the UK and the US. Factors taken into account include the efficient use
of resources116, the assistance of those with a particular need117, and
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the minimisation of social detriment 118 . The courts are likely to accept
as bona fide measures which provide for genuine social needs and subject
such measures to little scrutiny in terms of their discriminatory impact.
Cases where indirect discrimination arises in the provision of a social
benefit often arise because social patterns do still correspond, to a large
extent, with sexual stereotypes. In order to provide social benefit and
to relieve need, social policy measures, such as head of household rules,
or the 'double earners' rule, reflect the status quo. So long as such
rules are framed in a sex neutral manner, so that either women or men
may take advantage of, for example, the role of head of household, they
may be regarded as compatible with equality of opportunity.
The first case in which the European Court was required to deal with a
public interest related justification for indirect discrimination on the part
of an employer was the case of Rinner-laihn. Rinner-Kiihn concerned a
provision of German law 119 which obliged employers to pay sick pay for
up to six weeks, but excluded from its application employees who worked
not more than 10 hours a week or 45 hours a month. Ms Rinner-Kiihn fell
into this category of employees and was refused sick pay. The
employer's defence was, naturally, that it was acting in compliance with
the legislation. The question of the compatibility of the legislation with
the relevant provisions of EC law (Article 119 and Directive 75/117) was.
referred by the Oldenburg Arbeitsgericht to the European Court.
The German government, requested by the Court to provide information
on the reasons which motivated the legislation, sought to justify the
provision by reference to the contention,
'that the workers affected by the legislation were not integrated in
or connected with the undertaking in a comparable way to that of
other workers and that, therefore, the conditions for recognition of
duty of care from the employer tolords them, including an
obligation to pay wages, did not exist."
According to the Commission, this argument was completely ill-founded and
inappropriate:
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'It was hard to see why it should be economically defensible and
socially necessary to grant the benefit of six weeks' payment of
wages to full-time workers whilst those who are employed for
minimal periods, who are the socially weaker, should be refused
such payment. Social protection was beingovithdrawn exactly where
in practice one was most reliant upon it.'"1
The reason the purported justification is inappropriate relates to the
purpose of the sick pay legislation in the first place. The granting of
social security to workers who cannot work due to illness is a plank of
social policy. It is not a perk of the job, to be given in proportion to
the amount of work (in terms of time) carried out by an employee.
Indirect sex discrimination in the provision of sick pay could be regarded
as concealing sex role stereotyping in its application. According to this
stereotype, only full-time employees (men) are carrying out 'real work',
as main breadwinners, and they (and indirectly their families) should be
provided for by state protective laws if they cannot earn due to illness.
Part-time work (women's work) is an extra, 'pin money', or 'a bit of
pocket money', and is not 'real work'; therefore there is no need to
provide for social security in the case of sickness for part-time workers.
The implication is that there is a 'real bread winner' who can support a
part-time worker who is ill. This reasoning ignores the fact that, for
many families, the income of a woman working part-time makes the
difference between being above or below the poverty line. It also
devalues part-time work in an arbitrary manner. The argument of the
German government cannot be regarded as a functional ground for
justification.
The Court, applying its earlier ruling in Bilka, held that national
legislation which permits employers to exclude part-time employees from
the continued payment of wages in the event of illness, where that
provision affects a considerably greater number of women than men, is
not compatible with Article 119, unless the Member State concerned can
show that the legislation is justified by objective factors not related to
sex.122 Probably the most significant effect of the Court's application
of the Bilks test is that, for a Member State to justify indirectly
discriminatory legislation, the proportionality test must be met. As in
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Bilka, the final decision as to justifiability is, however, left to the national
court.
The European Court has followed its ruling in Rinner-Kahn in cases
concerning indirectly discriminatory provisions of social security
legislation, where j ustification on grounds of genuine social needs is
advanced. The guiding principle seems to be that the purpose of the
legislation or measure, that is, the provision of social benefit to a
meritorious or needy category of persons, is to be balanced against its
discriminatory effect. 123
 As elsewhere, in accordance with the ruling
in Bilka, the European Court applies the general principle of
proportionality in its assessment of justification. 124 To the extent that
the proportionality test provides more scrutiny than the tendency to
accept public interest related justifications without evidence of
discriminatory intent, the approach of the European Court may be
regarded as more functional than that of the courts of the other legal
systems, in particular the UK, examined in this study.
It is submitted that indirectly discriminatory social policy measures should
only be justifiable if related to genuine needs of individuals. If the
criteria, for example, for receipt of a benefit, are framed to be related to
need, clearly defined in terms of the needs of the person and sex neutral,
then no objection may be taken to the measures, despite their
discriminatory effect. If, on the other hand, social policy measures are
framed according to sexual stereotyping, they should not be regarded as
justifiable. The State should be required to prove that the social policy
measure fulfils a genuine need. The proportionality test should be
applied in order to scrutinise the need. The difficulty in effecting the
delicate weighing up and balancing of the goal of alleviation of social
need against the goal of provision of equality of opportunity has not,
however, been adequately addressed, in any of the case law considered
in this study, even in the case law of the European Court.
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3 Conclusion
It is inevitable that indirect discrimination will be justifiable on broader
grounds than direct discrimination. The nature of indirect discrimination
is that a requirement, condition or measure is applied in such a way that
the effect or impact is discrimination against those in a 'protected group',
in this context, women, or men. The requirement or condition applied will
almost always have a purpose other than intended discrimination against
the protected group. The purpose of the requirement or condition may
justify its continued use, in spite of its adverse impact.
In the assessment of justification for indirectly discriminatory measures,
a balancing exercise is required, between the reason for application of the
measure, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the equality of
opportunity for women and men in employment which anti-discrimination
legislation aims to secure. Justifications of three different types (job
related, enterprise related and public interest related) have been
identified for the purposes of this work. A functional approach to
justification will vary for each type of justification.
Job related justifications, which seek to defend the discriminatory impact
of the requirement or condition because of its relationship to the duties
of the job, should not be accepted unless a direct relationship with the
performance of the actual tasks entailed by the job concerned is
demonstrated. A muscular strength requirement is only justifiable if the
job actually entails use of that type of strength, in the manner tested.
Justifications related to the broader needs of the enterprise, such as the
efficient organisation of the business as a whole, should be scrutinised
for sex stereotyping, with due regard to the commitment to change of the
status quo implied by the principle of equality of opportunity for women
and men in employment.
It is more difficult to assess whether a 'public interest related'
justification is appropriate or functional. It is recognised that the issues
concerned in a public interest related justification are different from
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those concerned in job related or enterprise related justifications, not
least because the indirectly discriminatory measure is likely to be
contained in legislation. Measures designed to alleviate social need may
be indirectly discriminatory, but the public interest in such measures may
be judged to outweigh the goal of equality of opportunity in some
circumstances. However, in the carrying out of the balancing exercise
required, some assessment of public interest related grounds of
justification may be effected by a requirement that the party justifying
the measure proves that it is genuinely necessary. Justifications which
are revealed to be based on sex stereotyping should not be accepted.
Some scrutiny may also be provided by use of the principle of
proportionality -with appropriate consideration of the fact that non-
discrimination is not the only aim to be taken into account in the
weighing of the measure.
One factor of a functional approach to justification, which all three types
(job related, enterprise related and public interest related) share is that
the test of proportionality must be met. If the means chosen to meet the
need of the employer, or of the State, in the case of a public interest
related justification, are not in proportion to its ends, then justification
should not be established. On this issue, the jurisprudence of the
European Court, and the provisions of German law, provide a functional
approach. Linked to the proportionality test is the issue of burden of
proof, which, in a functional approach to justification for indirect
discrimination, should be placed on the party seeking to justify a
discriminatory practice, that is, usually, the employer. When the
discrimination is the result of a measure taken by a state, the state
should bear that burden.
To date, the approach of the European Court to substantive grounds of
justification for indirect discrimination has been to lay down broad
principles, only in the most general terms, and to leave assessment of the
necessity of specific indirectly discriminatory requirements or conditions
largely to the national court. This has resulted in inconsistency of
interpretation, and the inclusion of grounds of justification which are in
antithesis to the principle of equality of opportunity for women and men
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in employment. None of the other legal systems examined reveals an
approach more functional in its entirety. Examination and comparison of
those legal systems does, however, provide some aspects of the
justification for indirect discrimination which the European Court could
perhaps emulate, and some which it should reject.
If equality of opportunity for women and men in employment is to be
effected, the European Court should adopt a more sophisticated analysis
in its approach to justification for indirect discrimination, building on the
judgment in Bilka. The new approach should make a conceptual
differentiation between different types of justification, should clarify the
burden of proof in indirect discrimination cases, should require that the
'need' which the discriminatory requirement or condition meets is a
genuine need, should stress the doctrine of proportionality and should
emphasise that justification for indirect sex discrimination is an exception
to an extremely important principle of EC law, that of equal treatment of
women and men.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
This study has been mainly concerned with exploring exceptions to the
general principle of equal treatment for women and men, in the form of
justifications for sex discrimination in employment. The very existence
of exceptions to a general principle - any general principle - will tend
to undermine that general principle. It is, therefore, of crucial
importance, in order to ensure that the core principle is protected from
erosion, to limit exceptions in a reasoned and principled manner. In the
case of the general principle of equal treatment of women and men,
because there are some situations in which the real differences between
women and men require their different treatment, there is genuine reason
to maintain some (albeit carefully limited) exceptions. In practice, without
such exceptions, the principle runs the risk of being rejected as
altogether too strong to apply.
With the focus of the study on the law of the EC, I adopted a comparative
methodology, on the grounds that this would, at the very least, provide
valuable insights, and that a comparative approach might, under certain
circumstances, present a 'model solution'. In arriving at a functional
approach to justifications for sex discrimination in employment, the
conceptualization of equality espoused by the courts in developing
standards for justification is fundamental. In the event, although there
are elements present in all the systems which may be regarded as
consistent with my position, my analysis of approaches to justifications
in the four different legal systems, those of the EC, UK, US and Germany,
reveals no system with a consistent commitment to the conceptualization
of equality as 'equality of opportunity'. Therefore, none of these systems-
may be regarded as offering a 'model solution'. However, this does not
vitiate the usefulness of the comparative approach, as a source of a
number of insights.
Comparison of the approaches of the four legal systems to issues
concerned with justifications for sex discrimination in employment revealed
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areas of broad agreement and similarity, as well as certain areas of
difference. In terms of contrasting points of view, either the similarities
or the differences may seem unexpected. Seen in the light of common
political ideologies (Liberal democracy), it may seem surprising that any
significant differences exist between the approaches to justifications to
sex discrimination in employment within the different systems. Seen in
the light of the different historical developments of the relevant areas of
law, it is the extent of similarities that may seem remarkable. Use of the
comparative method is helpful in maintaining a balance between these two
conflicting points of view.
Similarities between the four systems are especially striking in comparison
of the substantive grounds accepted by courts as grounds of justification
for sex discrimination in employment. The substantive grounds available
are diverse and numerous. In none of the legal systems examined is
there an attempt to limit substantive grounds; such limitation is, however,
not necessarily either achievable or desirable. The clear consensus over
certain substantive grounds (for example, protection of decency and
privacy of clients or customers, or maintenance of public order) suggests
that these grounds may be regarded as generally acceptable. However,
mere evidence of consensus is insufficient grounds for the acceptance of
a particular justification as functional. Functionality of justifications may
only be assessed in the light of the purpose of sex discrimination law as
a whole, that is, by my contention, the promotion of equality of
opportunity. Comparison of the approaches of the legal systems examined
also reveals a common thread of inadequate analysis of justifications in
particular areas (for example, on questions of positive discrimination,
differentiation between pregnancy and family responsibilities, and
protection of women), in terms of equality of opportunity.
The principal differences between the approaches of the legal systems
examined are found in their approach to questions related to the standard
by which justifications for sex discrimination in employment may be
established. The standard of justification encompasses all issues
concerned with the 'legal test' for justification, including that of the
burden of proof in a case concerning justification. The standard of
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'reasonableness', as applied in the UK and the US, may be considered to
be less functional than the standard of 'proportionality', as applied in the
EC and in Germany.
As noted above, the importance of the principle of equal treatment for
women and men requires that exceptions to that principle should only be
available on carefully limited grounds. It follows, then, that a functional
standard by which justifications may be established would not permit
discriminatory behaviour on grounds of 'mere convenience'. However,
because a number of interests (for example, the interests of the employer
in maintaining a competitive enterprise), at least some of which are also
regarded as relevant, compete with the interests of employees who may
have been discriminated against, a functional standard could not go so far
as to require 'absolute necessity' in order to justify discrimination. A
functional standard must be found somewhere in the centre of a
continuum between convenience and necessity.
The points on this continuum at which the respective legal systems
examined place their standard of justification differs between the common
law and the civil law systems. It is my view that the position in the two
civil law systems examined is more functional than that in the two common
law systems. The standard in the legal systems of the UK and the US,
whereby discrimination may be justified if the court considers it
'reasonable', is not to be regarded as functional, because its effect in
practice is to require the employee to show that the action of the
employer was unreasonable. Coupled with the rules concerning transfer
of burden of proof in discrimination cases in the UK and the US,
application of the standard of reasonableness places too great an onus on
the employee, and therefore reveals insufficient commitment to the
importance of the principle of equal treatment. On the other hand, the
standard required by the principle of 'proportionality' is to be regarded,
broadly speaking, as a functional standard. The proportionality test
operates as a means of effecting a balance between the genuine interests
(and 'needs') of employers and the principle of equal treatment of women
and men employees. Correct application of the proportionality test
ensures that discriminatory behaviour will be justified, if, and only if,
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there are no less-discriminatory means available for fulfilling the genuine
need met by the discriminatory behaviour.
I contend as a general proposition that situations in which employers seek
to justify discriminatory behaviour should be subjected to individual
scrutiny and validation; a functional approach will accept justifications
only where there exists a specific genuine need for the discrimination or
the discriminatory effect. This proposition may sound trivial, but in fact
the study revealed a number of examples (in particular, in the area of
justifications related to general public interests) in which the courts
accepted alleged genuine needs of employers (or of the state) without
specific proof that the measures were necessary. In a functional model,
the employer (or whoever alleges justification) would be required to prove
a genuine need, and would not be able to establish justification on
unsubstantiated allegations.
Perhaps the most significant proposition of a general nature to emerge
from the study is that different 'types' of substantive grounds of
justification for sex discrimination in employment require fundamentally
different considerations. An analytical framework in which different types
of substantive grounds are placed would provide a functional approach
to the problem of admitting certain exceptions (but not others) to the
general principle of equal treatment. None of the legal systems examined
was found to attempt the categorization of substantive grounds in this
manner. I identified three 'types' of substantive grounds for
justification: job related justifications, enterprise related justifications,
and public interest related justifications. Although I have hitherto only
applied this categorization to justifications for indirect discrimination, in
retrospect I believe that the same categorization could also prove fruitful
in analysis of purported substantive grounds of justification for direct
discrimination.
The first type of substantive ground covers that category of situations
in which the ground of justification is related to performance of the job.
In a functional model, justification in such a case could only be
established where there is an actual relation between the need to
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discriminate (directly or indirectly) and the duties of the particular job
to be carried out. The ground of artistic authenticity provides a clear-
cut example of a functional job related justification. It must also be
regarded as functional to accept justification (generally for indirect
discrimination) based on the employee's physical ability to perform the
job. However, purported job related justifications based upon women's
(or men's) perceived abilities (as opposed to their actual abilities) would
be rejected. Justifications based on the grounds of protection of women
may pose as job related justifications, if they reflect a perceived need to
protect women from work regarded as 'heavy' or 'dangerous', which
'women are unable to perform'. These grounds of justification should not
be regarded as functional. Equality of opportunity requires that women
enjoy the same choice as men to accept or to reject 'risky' employment.
Protective measures for employees (which are generally accepted as a
matter of social policy) should as far as possible extended to employees
of both sexes; this 'levelling up' of protection may be regarded as
desirable, if equal treatment is not to be reduced to 'equal detrimental
treatment'. The one exception to the general proposition that grounds
based on women's perceived capabilities and the need to protect 'the
delicate sex' should not be regarded as functional is that of different
treatment of women in their biological capacity as childbearers. In this
instance, the different situation of women from that of men justifies
discriminatory treatment, for example in the exclusion of pregnant women
from employment in an environment proven to be harmful to the foetus.
The second type of substantive ground covers those situations where the
ground of justification is related to the efficient running of the
employer's enterprise. The main question in an assessment of the
functionality of an enterprise related justification is that of how the
legitimate interests of an employer may be balanced against the costs of
implementing the principle of equal treatment. On the one hand, a
functional approach to justification would not deny the employer some
protection from, for example, the costs of providing protected leave to an
employee who becomes pregnant. On the other hand, a functional
approach to justification of sex discrimination would not automatically
admit every cost-based ground of justification. Use of the principle of
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proportionality provides a functional standard by which the courts may
effect the balancing exercise in assessment of the competing claims of
employer and employee. When the courts apply the standard of
proportionality to enterprise related grounds of justification, care should
be taken to place to emphasis on the principle of equal treatment for
women and men in employment. In practice, application of the standard
of proportionality would mean that, where a complainant employee is able
to show a non-discriminatory alternative to the discriminatory action, this
would be decisive of the case, in that the employer would be unsuccessful
in attempting to establish justification. Although this is not strictly
within the remit of the study, my position is that, while employers may
be expected to bear some of the costs of equality of opportunity, some
sort of state intervention (for example in the provision of maternity leave
insurance schemes for employers) is probably necessary to effect the
changes in the employment sphere required to achieve equality of
opportunity.
The third type of substantive ground of justification, that of public
interest related justifications, also has a central concern the question of
balancing of competing interests. In the case of public interest related
grounds of justification the balancing exercise is more delicate than in
the previous type of ground. Where a public interest related ground of
justification is advanced for indirectly discriminatory measures found in
legislation, in a functional model, the state would be required to show
that the discriminatory effect was genuinely necessary for achieving some
specific measure of social policy. Given that the state is able to do so,
the question for the courts to decide is how to balance the social aim of
the measure concerned against the principle of equal treatment. Again
the principle of proportionality provides a functional standard by which
justifications may be assessed. When the courts apply the standard of
proportionality to public interest related grounds of justification, due
recognition should be given to the social aim of the measure concerned,
as well as to the principle of equal treatment of women and men. It
might be suggested that, in a functional model, where the state does show
a genuine need for a social measure, it is only in the narrowest of
situations that a court would be willing to overturn it.
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Grounds of justification related to the interests of the children of
employees may also be regarded as public interest related justifications,
although here the 'public interest' is probably a type of 'paternalistic'
concern for the mother and child. The granting of parental leave to
working mothers of children has been used as a ground for justification
of measures of positive discrimination, where women enjoy rights as
mothers which men are not permitted to share. It is my contention that
measures of positive discrimination should be limited to measures related
to the different treatment of women as childbearers, not least because
such measures may actually be disadvantageous to women in the long run,
by allowing them to be perceived as more costly employees. Outside the
'protected period' (of pregnancy, child birth and a short time thereafter),
a functional model would admit no justification for measures which are not
sex neutral, or which are not applied in a sex neutral manner. Childcare
(as opposed to childbearing) may be undertaken just as effectively by
men as by women; both women and men should have the opportunity to
combine the benefits and burdens of parenting with those of employment,
If they so desire. It may be the case that the general interests of
society in the well-being of its children might justify the more favourable
treatment of employees who are parents, but this issue falls somewhat
beyond the scope of this study.
	 .
EC law regarding justifications for sex discrimination in employment is
still very much in the process of development. There are a number of
ways in which EC law in this area could more closer towards espousal of
the aim of equality of opportunity. With this in view, I outline four major
recommendations:
• The standard for justification applied by the European Court,
that of proportionality, should continue to be applied. As it seems.
to be the case, in at least some Member States (the UK being an
example) that the courts fail to apply this principle precisely, some
explanation for the benefit of the national courts of the meaning of
proportionality and its particular application in cases of
justification of sex discrimination, including its bearing on the
burden of proof, should be provided.
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• Grounds advanced as justification for discrimination (especially
for direct discrimination) should continue to be subjected to
Individual scrutiny and validation. The party alleging justification
should be required to prove a genuine need for the discrimination
or the discriminatory effect. Grounds advanced for justification
should be 'transparent' and not inarticulated. These requirements
are already part of the Bilka test, but, again, it seems that they
are not strictly interpreted or enforced by national courts. The
European Court should therefore stress this part of the Bilka test.
• The existing measures of EC law permitting justification for direct
discrimination (for example the Equal Treatment Directive, Article 2)
do not deal with justifications related to pregnancy. Measures,
probably legislative in nature, should be adopted, based upon the
conception of equality of opportunity.
• The European Court should adopt a differentiated test for
justification of indirect discrimination. The Bilka test is unified: it
may be regarded as functional for the type of substantive ground
of justification for sex discrimination for which it was developed,
that is, enterprise related justifications. ' A more functional test
would differentiate between job related justifications (which would
only be acceptable where directly related to the performance of the
specific duties of the job), enterprise related justifications (to
which the Bilka test as it currently stands would apply), and public
interest related justifications (where the balancing of the interests
of the state and those of the employee concerned is a more delicate
issue). A modified version of the standard of proportionality may
need to be applied to public interest related justifications, as it
would not be functional for any non-discriminatory or less
discriminatory measure, whatever its financial or social cost, to be
used to show lack of justification for the measure concerned.
The extent to which the goal of equality of opportunity is achieved
depends on the relative value given by courts to that goal. A functional
approach to the issue of justifications for discrimination should play a
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part in the opening up of greater opportunities, not just for women, but
also for men, in employment.
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